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INSTITUTES   OF   EDUCATION 


INSTITUTES  OF  EDUCATION 


PEDAGOGICAL  r 

COMPRISING  AN 

STATE  NORMAL  S< 
LOS  AN<v; 

INTRODUCTION  TO  RATIONAL  PSYCHOLOGY 


DESIGNED    (PARTLY)   AS  A    TEXT-BOOK    FOR 
UNIVERSITIES  AND   COLLEGES 


BY 


S.    S.   LAUKIE,   M.A.,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR   OF   THE   INSTITUTES   AND   HISTORY   OF   EDUCATION 
IN   THE   UNIVERSITY  OF   EDINBURGH 


15106 


gcrft 
MACMILLAN    AND    CO, 

AND      LONDON 

1892 
All  rights  reserved 

NOV  1906 


COPYRIGHT,  1892, 
BY  MACMILLAN  AND  CO. 


TYPOGRAPHY  BY  J.  S.  GUSHING  &  Co.,  BOSTON,  U.S.A. 
PRESSWORK  BY  BERWICK  &  SMITH,  BOSTON,  U.S.A. 


Educatiom 
Library 


PREFACE. 


I  BEGA.N  this  book  as  a  Handbook  for  the  students 
of  my  own  class.  It  grew  in  the  course  of  production. 
I  felt  that  I  could  be  of  most  service  to  students,  and 
perhaps  also  to  Lecturers  on  Education,  if  I  printed  in 
full  the  more  abstract  portions  of  my  argument  — 
those,  namely,  which  dealt  with  the  philosophy  of 
method.  The  result  is  that  the  volume  is  more  than 
a  Handbook  and  less  than  a  Treatise. 

I  have  used  the  term  on  the  title-page,  "  rational 
psychology,"  to  distinguish  my  point  of  view.  Doubt- 
less it  might  be  maintained  that  no  one  should  in  these 
days  attempt  any  philosophy  of  mind  until  empirical 
psychology  has  completed  its  microscopic  task,  and 
psycho-physics  has  said  its  last  word.  This  would  be 
to  strike  dumb  all  but  the  devotees  of  physical  experi- 
mentation, while  they  themselves  do  not  hesitate  to 
travel  outside  their  peculiar  field,  and  commit  them- 
selves to  speculative  opinions  {e.g.  freedom  of  the 
Will)  which  contain  implicit  in  them  a  whole  meta- 
physical system.  It  will  be  granted  that  the  uncor- 
related  phenomena  of  consciousness,  which  empirical 
psychology  offers  us,  cannot  in  itself  yield  a  theory  of 
knowledge,  much  less  a  philosophy  of  life.  There 
must  be  some  principle,  idea  (call  it  what  you  will), 
which  correlates  and  unifies.  And  until  that  princi- 
ple emerges  out  of  the  laboratory  (if  that  is  to  be  its 
birthplace),  we  may  be  allowed  our  own  thoughts  as 


vi  Preface. 

to  its  probable  whereabouts.  Ill  any  case  a  writer  on 
the  theory  of  Education  is  really  writing  at  once  a 
theory  of  life  and  a  treatise  De  emendatione  intellectus, 
and  he  cannot  dispense  with  a  rational  and  rationalised 
scheme  of  mind,  be  it  right  or  wrong.  He  will  be 
thankful  for  all  that  physiology  and  physics  can  give 
him;  but  meanwhile,  and  until  better  advised,  he  must 
follow  his  own  course.  What  I  have  to  say  is  a 
practical  application  of  my  books  on  Metaphysics  and 
Ethics. 

After  all,  psycho-physics  can  never  be  more  than 
physics,  though  it  may  throw  some  light  on  the  char- 
acteristics, as  well  as  the  conditions,  of  sensational 
elements. 

The  notes  at  the  end  of  some  of  the  lectures,  and 
the  whole  of  the  Appendix,  are  to  be  omitted  by  stu- 
dents of  Education.  They  are  written  chiefly  for  my 
own  satisfaction,  to  justify  and  supplement  the  text; 
but  they  are  not  needed  for  the  understanding  of  it. 
To  the  general  student  of  philosophy  they  may  be 
interesting. 

It  is  quite  unnecessary,  in  my  opinion,  to  carry 
students  of  Education  into  all  the  details  of  Logic, 
Psychology,  Ethics,  and  Physiology.  It  is  necessary, 
however,  that  the  philosophy  which  they  study  should 
be  seen  to  be  truly  the  Science  of  the  Art.  Accord- 
ingly, students  have  to  get  a  firm  hold,  by  the  help  of 
their  instructors,  of  the  fundamental  principles  which 
exhibit  the  nature  and  growth  of  mind.  Everything 
which  diverts  their  attention  from  this  is  useless,  so 
far  as  the  science  and  art  of  Education  are  concerned. 

S.  S.  LAURIE. 

r\IVER8ITY    OF 

October  1892. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


PAET   I. 

THE   END,  PHYSIOLOGICAL   CONDITIONS,  MATE- 
RIALS,  AND   METHOD   OF   EDUCATION 
GENERALLY. 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION EDUCATIONAL      LIMITATIONS      AND      POSSI- 
BILITIES,         ........ 

LECTURE 

I.  Education  and  the  Ideal  in  their  General  and  His- 
torical Aspects,    .        .        .        .  .        7 
II.  The  End  of  Education.    Philosophy  as  necessary  to 

the  Formation  of  a  Conscious  End  or  Ideal,      .       15 

III.  Body  in  Relation  to  the  Education  of  Mind,     .         .       19 

IV.  The  Supreme  End  and  its  Governing  Condition,      .      22 
V.  The  Educative  Process  generally  as  determined  by 

the  Supreme  End, 31 

VI.  Materials  in  their  Relation  to  the  Nutrition    of 

Mind, 40 

VII.  Materials  in  their  Relation  to  the  Training  and  Dis- 
cipline of  Mind, 43 

VIII.  Methodology  and  its  Scientific  Basis,        ...  49 


PART   II. 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  INTELLIGENCE  AS  YIELD- 
ING THE  METHODOLOGY  OF  EDUCATION,    .       53 

I.  The  Animal  Mind, 55 

II.  The    Man-Mind.     Will :     Percipience.      Self-Con- 
sciousness,         .75 

III.  Concipience   and   the   Sense-Concept  of  the  Indi- 
vidual,           90 

vii 


viii  Contents. 

LECTURE  PAGE 

IV.  Unity  of  the   Rational  Mind :    in  its  Educational 

Reference, 99 

V.  Summing  up  and  Definitions  (thus  far),  .        .        .     103 
VI.  Application  of   the  preceding  Analysis  to  Educa- 
tional Method, 109 

VII.  The  General  Concept, 128 

VIII.  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination  —  Mediate  Affirmation,     138 

IX.  Causal  Induction, 150 

X.  Survey  of  the  Processes  of  Reason  in  order  to  show 
that  they  are  each  and  all  Analytico-Synthetic 

in  their  character, 164 

XI.  Unfolding  of  Intelligence  ;  or  Order  of  Intellectual 

Growth  in  Time, 166 

XII.  Materials  and  Dynamics  of  the  building-up  of  Mind 

as  a  Real, 1(59 


PART   III. 
METHODOLOGY,   .        .        .        .179 

PART  IV. 

APPLIED  METHODOLOGY,  OR  THE  ART  OF 

INTELLECTUAL   EDUCATION,      .         .     lie; 

PART   V. 

ETHICAL   EDUCATION— SPECIALLY 

CONSIDERED,      ....     199 

I.  Ethical  Ideas  as  the  Real,  or  Substance,  of  Life,      .  201 

II.  Brief  Analysis  of  Mind  as  an  Ethical  Activity,        .  205 

III.  Unity  of  the  Intellectual  and  Ethical  in  Education,  211 
(\utrition  and  Discipline:  Real  and  Formal.') 


Contents.  ix 


PART  VI. 

APPLIED      METHODOLOGY      AS      ART      OF  *' 

ETHICAL  EDUCATION,         .         .215 

LECTURE 

I.  The  Real  and  the  Formal, 217 

(Instruction,  Training,  and  Discipline  generally.) 
II.  Method   of   Ethical   Education   in   the   Real  —  In- 
struction,       219 

III.  Method  of  Ethical  Education  in  the  Formal  —  Dis- 

cipline,          224 

IV.  Moral  Authority  and  its  Characteristics,  .        .        .     227 
V.  Characteristics  of  the  Exercise  of  Moral  Authority,     229 

VI.  The  Moral  Sanctions  of  Authority,    ....  234 
VII.  The  Material  Sanctions  of  Authority,  i.e.  the  En- 
forcement of  Authority, 235 

VIII.  Natural  Auxiliaries  of  Authority,      ....  236 


PART   VII. 
SCHOOL-MANAGEMENT,  ORGANISATION,  ETC.,     239 


HISTORY  OF  EDUCATION,  .        .     246 


APPENDIX  ON  CERTAIN  PHILOSOPHICAL 
QUESTIONS  SUGGESTED  BY  THE  PRE- 
CEDING PAGES, .251 

A.  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BASIS, 253 

B.  DUALISM,  THE  UNCONSCIOUS,  AND  CEREBRATION,     .  261 

C.  BRIEF  SYNTHETIC  STATEMENT, 266 

D.  UNITY  OF  REASON,       .......  269 


PART   I. 


THE   END,   PHYSIOLOGICAL    CONDITIONS, 

MATERIALS,   AND  METHOD   OF 

EDUCATION   GENERALLY. 


INTRODUCTION. 

EDUCATIONAL  LIMITATIONS   AND  POSSIBILITIES. 


ENTHUSIASTS  have  spoken  as  if  we  could  manufac- 
ture men  after  a  certain  pattern,  if  only  we  proceeded 
wisely.  Religious  and  educational  reformers  have 
often  cherished  this  belief.  It  is  as  well  to  set  aside 
such  pious  dreams  at  once.  Conditions  outside  our 
activity  as  educators  are  too  potent.  We  have  to 
reckon  with  all  the  forces  that  make  for  or  against  us 
—  instincts,  passions,  custom,  connate  predispositions, 
and  racial  characteristics. 

Locke,  with  all  his  sobriety  of  temperament,  yet 
held  that  the  difference  between  one  man  and  another 
lay  in  their  education.  Even  if  we  take  education  in 
its  widest  sense,  as  including  all  the  influences  at 
work  from  infancy  upwards,  Locke's  view  would  be 
incorrect  ;  if  we  take  it  in  its  narrower  sense  of  the 
conscious  and  regulated  education  of  the  school  and 
family,  it  is  altogether  untenable.  If,  however,  we 
understand  Locke  to  mean  by  ediication  the  bringing 
up  of  a  human  being  so  as  to  fit  him  for  ordinary 
citizenship,  and  make  him  a  respectable  member  of 
society  and  a  satisfactory  representative  of  the  moral 
standard  and  social  consensus  of  his  time,  he  is  un- 
questionably right.  We  can  do  even  more  than  this  ; 

1 


Institutes  of  Education. 


for  we  can  train  youth  to  something  higher  and  better 
than  the  "  spirit  of  the  age." 

The  question  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  the 
ancients.     Horace  says  — 

"  Naturam  expellas  furca  tamenusque  recurret." 

He  is  right,  for  we  cannot  overpower  entirely  the 
determinations  of  nature  in  each  man.  But  he  is  also 
right  when  he  says  — 

"  Nemo  adeo  ferus  est  ut  non  mitescere  possit, 
Si  modo  culturae  patientem  commodet  aurem," 

which  amounts  to  this,  that  however  strong  a  natural 
disposition  to  wrong  may  be,  it  can  be  largely  modi- 
fied, if  not  wholly  extirpated,  by  education.  Juvenal, 
as  becomes  his  rdle  of  truculent  satirist,  takes  a  gloomy 
view  of  human  nature  and  its  possibilities.  Seneca 
the  Stoic,  again,  thinks  that  much  may  be  done  if  we 
begin  early,  but  has  no  hope  of  those  who  are  allowed 
to  reach  maturity  with  their  faults  and  vices  uncor- 
rected.  It  is  then  too  late.  "  As  the  twig  is  bent,  the 
tree  is  inclined."  He  also  thinks  that  education  never 
wholly  eradicates  a  vice  or  failing,  but  only  modifies 
it.  Plato  says  that  man  is  the  most  savage  of  all 
animals,  but  that  he  can  be  made  the  gentlest  and 
most  godlike  by  education,  if  there  be  a  good  disposi- 
tion in  him ;  meaning  by  disposition,  I  imagine,  such 
a  general  tendency  of  nature  as  gives  a  hopeful  field 
for  cultivation.  Quintilian  substantially  takes  the 
same  view ;  but  he  believes  more  in  the  power  of  edu- 
cation, as  such,  than  Plato  does.  Plato's  hope  lay  not 


Introduction. 


in  the  school  so  much  as  in  the  whole  social  organisa- 
tion. Then  there  is  the  Greek  proverb,  which  in  its 
Latin  form  seems  to  be  approved  by  Erasmus,  "  Non 
quovis  ex  ligno  fit  Mercurius,"  which  may  be  paral- 
leled by  the  form  in  which  an  aged  Scotch  educa- 
tionalist used  to  throw  the  conclusion  to  which  he  had 
come  in  dealing  with  the  vigorous  but  rough  and  often 
coarse-grained  Scottish  youth,  "You  can  never  put 
the  polish  of  marble  on  a  bit  of  sandstone." 

Modern  enthusiasts  have,  as  a  rule,  been  much 
more  sanguine  than  the  ancient  critics  of  humanity. 
Comenius,  for  example,  had  a  firm  conviction  that  by 
education  all  men  might  be  made  perfect.  Cicero  per- 
haps best  sums  up  ancient  opinion  and  the  conclusion 
of  common  sense,  "  Quae  bona  sunt  fieri  meliora  pos- 
sunt  doctrina,  et  quse  non  optima  aliquo  modo  acui 
tamen  et  corrigi  possunt." 

We  may  safely  hold  that,  save  in  exceptional  cases 
which  may  be  regarded  as  abnormal  products,  educa- 
tion wisely  directed  can  form  men  into  good  citizens 
if  we  begin  the  process  of  formation  early ;  that  is  to 
say,  it  can  guarantee  in  all,  that  amount  of  intelligence 
and  virtue  and  that  standard  of  social  intercourse 
which  fit  them  to  discharge  well  the  ordinary  duties 
of  men  in  all  their  political,  industrial,  and  personal 
relations.  But  when  we  go  beyond  this  and  strive  to 
bring  all  men  up  to  an  ideal  standard,  either  of  intel- 
lectual capacity  or  moral  elevation,  we  are  largely 
dependent  on  the  original  and  connate  potentialities 
of  each,  and  we  shall  fail  or  succeed  according  as  we 
have  the  natural  tendency  on  our  side  or  against  us. 


Institutes  of  Education. 


The  greatest  genius  has  defects,  both  of  intelligence 
and  character,  which  education  will  do  much  to  re- 
move ;  but  whatever  the  education,  genius  will  "  out " 
in  some  form  or  other.  The  man  of  moderate  genius, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  almost  wholly  dependent  on 
education  for  the  growth  of  such  powers  as  he  has. 
Still  more  is  this  the  case  with  the  "average  man." 
Those  again  who  are  by  nature  distinctly  below  the 
average  can  by  education  be  brought  up  to  the  aver- 
age, and  help  to  swell  the  social  current  which  already 
tends  in  its  main  stream  to  good.  The  lowest  natures, 
finally,  —  the  residuum,  —  are  held  in  check  by  those 
above  them,  and  can  and  must  be  disciplined,  by  the 
help  of  the  whip,  to  obey  their  betters  for  the  common 
good. 

I  am  speaking,  however,  of  education  in  the  large 
sense,  and  as  comprehending  all  the  influences  of  a 
man's  environment  as  he  grows  from  childhood  to 
maturity.  The  most  potent  of  these  is  the  home ; 
next  in  potency  comes  the  modern  school,  when  its 
function  is  properly  understood. 

The  school  is  the  schoolmaster,  just  as  the  family 
is  the  parent. 

As  to  the  School : 

Whatever  may  l>o  the  natural  tendencies  and  capaci- 
ties of  each  child,  all  can  be  made  better  by  education 
than  they  would  otherwise  be,  and  all  have,  by  virtue 
of  their  possession  of  reason,  a  certain  ideal  of  life 
growing  in  them,  which  can  be  further  elevated  and 
confirmed  by  the  teacher  who  puts  before  himself  an 


Introduction. 


ideal  aim.  There  is,  in  every  age,  a  conception  of 
ideal  manhood ;  and  to  this  and  for  this  we  all  must 
work  in  the  field  of  education,  if  we  are  to  work  to 
any  good  purpose.  By  striving  to  reach  the  top,  as 
Quintilian  says,  we  get  higher  up  than  by  sitting  down 
despairingly  at  the  bottom  of  the  hill.  The  aim  of 
education  is,  in  truth,  always  an  ideal  aim,  for  it  con- 
templates the  completion  of  a  man,  —  the  realisation 
in  each  man  of  what  each  has  it  in  him  to  become. 
If  a  teacher  has  not  an .  ideal  aim  he  had  better  take 
to  shopkeeping  at  once ;  he  will  there,  doubtless,  find 
an  ideal  within  his  capacity. 

In  his  necessary  ignorance  of  the  possibilities  of 
each  individual,  the  educator  is  justified  in  taking  up 
his  task  on  the  assumption  that  every  member  of  the 
human  race  is,  by  virtue  of  his  distinctive  humanity, 
endowed  with  the  same  general  capacities  and  powers, 
and  has  in  him  the  possibility  of  a  complete  develop- 
ment. This  is  the  assumption  of  his  science  and  art. 
He  does  not  recognise  a  qualitative  difference  in  human 
beings,  but  merely  a  quantitative.  No  doubt,  with  all 
men  the  possible  development  is  "  thus  far  and  no 
farther."  The  limitations  as  determined  by  physical 
constitution,  by  locality,  by  race,  and  by  heredity, 
'must  be  theoretically  admitted;  but  they  may  be 
practically  ignored.  The  aim  of  the  educator  is 
determined  by  his  conception  of  the  ideal  man, 
towards  which  all  may,  more  or  less,  be  disciplined 
and  trained. 

The  influences  which  educate  a  man  (as  I  have 
already  indicated)  are  both  vast  and  subtle,  the  na- 


6  Institutes  of  Education. 

tional  tradition,  the  family  life,  the  unconscious  pres- 
sure of  law  and  custom,  the  solicitations  of  external 
nature,  and  all  the  local  circumstances  peculiar  to  the 
environment  of  each.  These,  however,  are  fully  ad- 
mitted by  the  rational  educationalist;  but  he  at  the 
same  time  claims  to  supplement,  to  regulate  and  con- 
trol, i;he  various  and  manifold  influences  at  work,  so  as 
to  harmonise  the  varied  experience  of  the  young  into  a 
rational  unity  of  life  and  character,  and  thus  get  them 
within  sight  at  least  of  the  ideal  possible  for  each. 

The  intelligent  teacher  will  also  recognise  that  the 
natural  educators  are  the  parents,  and  that  they  are 
always  the  most  potent  for  good  or  evil.  But,  as  the 
exigencies  of  modern  society  have  deputed  much  of 
the  parental  work  to  a  special  order  in  the  State,  he 
will  also  recognise  that  he,  as  a  member  of  that  order, 
has  great  responsibilities,  and  is  under  obligation  to 
study  education  with  a  view  to  the  proper  discharge 
of  these.  His  function  is,  probably,  the  most  impor- 
tant of  all  social  functions. 

The  duty  of  a  professor  of  education  is,  I  think,  to 
give  the  students  of  the  subject  an  ideal  and  also  a 
method;  but,  above  all,  to  inspire  them  with  a  sense 
of  the  infinite  importance  and  delicacy  of  their  task. 
He  has  to  show  them  that  they  are  not  mere  exactors 
of  lessons,  but  trainers  of  the  human  spirit ;  and  also 
how,  animated  by  this  larger  conception,  they  may, 
in  teaching  subjects,  educate  minds.  He  will  expose 
the  popular  fallacy  that  the  schoolmaster's  work  is 
a  drudgery,  and  convince  his  students  that  it  is  a  privi- 
lege. 


LECTURE   I. 

EDUCATION  AND  THE  IDEAL  IN  THEIR    GENERAL  AND 
HISTORICAL  ASPECTS. 

THE  word  "  Education  "  does  not  mean  drawing  out. 
This  is  a  modern  gloss  on  the  true  meaning  of  the 
word  —  a  gloss  suggested  by  psychology.  It  means 
training  up,  as  vines  are  trained  up  poles.  The  pri- 
mary signification  of  a  word  is  not  always  a  safe  guide 
to  its  present  use,  though  it  is  always  interesting  and 
suggestive.  When  men  first  name  a  thing  or  process, 
there  often,  perhaps  generally,  precedes  the  naming 
(always  a  work  of  unconscious  genius)  a  flash  of 
insight  into  the  essential  character  of  the  thing  or 
process  named.  The  Latin  conception  of  education 
is  confirmed  by  our  own  early  usage  of  the  word,  e.g. 
"  Train  up  a  child  in  the  way  he  should  go,"  and  by 
the  German  erziehen. 

Train  up,  draw  up,  not  draw  out  —  is  the  meaning  of 
the  word  "educate,"  and  it  is  a  name  for  the  process 
which  we  cannot,  I  think,  supersede  without  loss. 

Train  up  to  what  ?  Evidently  to  some  end  or  other. 
To  what  end  ?  Looking  at  the  nature  of  man,  we 
answer,  To  some  habit  of  being  and  doing  which  the 
child  knows  nothing  of,  but  which  we,  the  trainers, 
are  supposed  to  have  as  our  aim,  and  of  which  every 
child  is  held  to  be  capable. 

7 


8  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

What,  then,  is  your  aim  ?  You  cannot  define  it 
closely,  nor  even  describe  it,  when  the  question  is 
first  put  to  you;  but,  all  the  same,  there  is  vaguely 
in  your  mind  some  type  of  manhood  or  womanhood 
up  to  which  you  yourself  are  striving  to  live,  and  to 
which,  if  you  are  in  earnest,  you  desire  to  train  the 
young.  This  type  you  have  more  or  less  consciously 
present  to  your  mind,  and  you  call  it  your  "  ideal." 

Now,  the  mass  of  men  and  women,  even  including 
parents,  may  be  left  to  an  ideal  which  is  floating  and 
vague ;  but  it  is  the  business  and  the  duty  of  all  who 
adopt  what  is  called  the  "profession"  of  education, 
to  have  some  clear  conception  of  the  ideal  up  to  Avhich 
they  train  —  a  conscious  end,  which  they  can  express 
in  words.  It  is,  when  you  think  of  it,  a  very  daring 
thing  in  you  to  profess  to  educate  a  human  being. 
Where  are  your  credentials  ?  It  seems  to  me  that 
one  who  stands  before  the  world  and  professes  to 
educate  is  guilty  of  an  impertinence,  unless  he  can 
produce  a  commission,  not  from  an  university  or  a 
college,  but  from  God  Himself.  It  is  a  grave  and 
serious  business.  In  any  case,  it  is  surely  not  too 
much  to  demand  of  you  that  you  have  some  definite 
ideal.  Why,  a  cabinetmaker  has  his  ideal  of  the  com- 
pleted cabinet,  as  he  saws  and  cuts,  planes  and  joints 
and  polishes.  You  are  engaged  in  forming  the  finest, 
most  complex,  most  subtle  thing  known  to  man,  viz. 
a  mind ;  and  do  you  propose  to  go  on  from  day  to  day 
as  your  fancy  prompts,  tinkering  here  and  tinkering 
there,  and  seeing  what  comes  of  it  ?  Surely  not. 

Now,  I  wish  next  to  say  that  the  ideal  you  have  for 


i.]  Education  and  the  Ideal.  9 

those  whom  you  educate  must  be  the  ideal  you  have 
for  yourself  —  your  own  life.  You  cannot  rise  above 
yourself,  any  more  than  you  can  carry  your  head  in 
your  mouth.  This  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  saying, 
"As  is  the  teacher,  so  is  the  school,"  to  which  I  beg 
you  to  add  an  even  more  important  truth,  "  As  is  the 
man,  so  is  the  teacher."  The  prime  qualification, 
then,  in  the  teacher  who  educates,  is  that  he  shall 
have  an  ideal  fdr  his  own  life,  and  shall  be  educating 
himself  up  to  that :  your  pupils  learn  by  doing  what 
you  do.  The  educator  has  first  of  all  to  look  to  him- 
self, and  the  study  of  education  is  also  the  education 
of  the  student :  the  ideal  and  method  are  for  him  first, 
and  for  his  pupils  next. 

Whatever  ideal  he  may  have  for  himself  as  a 
human  being,  and  consequently  for  his  pupils,  the 
teacher  may  depend  on  this,  that  the  young  cannot 
form  abstract  ideals  as  he  does :  they  look  to  the 
parent  or  teacher  as  the  concrete  embodiment  of  that 
which  they  are  to  strive  to  be.  You  may  inculcate 
what  you  please,  but  all  the  time  you  yourself  as  a 
personality  are  doing  more  than  all  your  inculcations 
can  do.  This  is  a  common-place.  Very  few  parents 
and  teachers  have  had  conscious  ideals  ;  but,  as  I  have 
indicated,  there  is  an  unconscious  ideal  in  every  man's 
bosom  which  moulds  his  character  and  governs  his 
actions,  or  at  least  prescribes  what  ought  to  govern. 

The  early  history  of  education  is,  like  the  history 
of  other  subjects,  a  history,  not  of  conscious  and  for- 
mulated ends,  ideals,  and  processes,  but  of  the  uncon- 
scious ends  pursued  by  nations  as  they  advanced  from 


10  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

barbarism  to  civilisation,  and  to  the  fulfilment  of  their 
destiny  in  the  world-history.  These  unconscious  ends 
are  merely  vague  feelings  of  a  result  to  be  aimed  at 
rather  than  a  distinct  knowledge  of  it,  and  yet  they 
are  most  potent :  they  make  history.  As  age  suc- 
ceeds age,  the  ideal  becomes  gradually  more  explicit. 
Society  begins  to  propose  to  itself  specific  aims,  that 
is  to  say,  the  development  of  certain  definite  faculties 
which  it  desires  to  see  active  in  all  its  citizens.  Vigour 
of  body,  courage,  endurance,  skill  in  the  use  of  arms, 
skill  in  this  or  that  industry,  obedience  to  civil  law, 
and  so  forth :  all  excellent  in  their  way,  but  neither 
singly  nor  in  the  aggregate  an  ideal  of  man  as  a  living 
spirit  in  a  living  body  —  a  being  of  vast  and  varied 
capacity,  of  rich  possibilities,  and  whose  life  and  acts 
have  infinite  issues.  Such  an  ideal  as  this  we  first 
have  among  the  Greeks,  and  thereafter  more  fully  in 
Christianity.  Man  as  man,  man  for  the  sake  of  man, 
not  for  his  skill  in  doing  this  or  that  —  this  is,  since 
the  days  of  Plato  and  Christ,  the  aim  of  the  educator. 
Not  what  man  is,  but  what  he  may  be  in  all  his  rela- 
tions, finite  and  infinite  —  this  is  the  problem  of  the 
educational  ideal. 

I  would,  however,  beg  you  not  to  suppose  that  edu- 
cation was  invented  either  by  the  Greek  or  the  Chris- 
tian world.  It  has  always  been  going  on.  Every 
child,  always,  at  all  times,  and  in  all  places,  is  being 
educated  —  trained  up  to  something  or  other  which 
constitutes  the  type  for  his  time,  his  place,  or  his 
class.  The  reflective  movement  in  education,  begin- 
ning, perhaps,  with  Plato,  is  simply  part  of  the 


i.]  Education  and  the  Ideal.  11 

philosophy  of  man,  and  therefore  is  to  be  justified  as 
all  philosophy  is  to  be  justified.  Philosophy  in  its  ulti- 
mate meaning  is  nothing  but  persistent  thought  on 
man,  his  nature,  his  capabilities,  his  purpose,  and  his 
destiny.  And  the  philosophy  of  education  is  simply 
the  asking  and  answering  of  questions  as  to  the 
ends  or  ideals  of  the  philosophy  of  man,  criticising 
custom  in  the  light  of  these,  and  then  studying  the 
processes  by  which  true  ends  can  be  best  reached  — 
i.e.  Method. 

In  all  ages  of  the  world  man  has  been  educated: 
not  only  so,  but  I  would  say  further,  that  we  cannot 
afford  to  despise  the  education  of  early  races;  at 
least,  when  men  had  reached  the  stage  of  settled 
agricultural  communities.  In  those  primitive  days 
you  can  easily  see  that  the  education  would  be  mainly 
what  is  now  called  technical;  that  is  to  say,  such 
instruction  as  fitted  the  yoxing  as  they  grew  up  to 
supply  their  daily  bodily  wants.  Difficulties  of  com- 
munication, the  rudimentary  state  of  the  useful  arts, 
the  dangers  and  uncertainties  to  which  individuals 
would  be  exposed  in  maintaining  intercourse  with 
each  other,  would  prevent  the  division  of  labour  and 
the  growth  of  that  industrial  interdependence  which 
is  now  an  universal  characteristic  of  civilised  life. 
This  state  of  things,  which  gave  a  narrow  horizon  to 
each,  had  its  educational  compensations ;  for  each 
man,  with  the  help  of  his  household,  would  be  himself 
master  of  many,  if  not  of  all,  necessary  arts.  From 
childhood  upwards  he  would  be  in  continual  training 
to  these.  We  should  accordingly  err  much  were  we 


12  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

to  despise  the  education  of  those  primitive  times. 
We  still  find  it  in  many  parts  of  the  world,  and  sur- 
vivals of  it  even  in  our  own  land.  The  family  which 
not  only  milked  its  own  cows,  made  its  own  butter 
and  cheese,  and  ground  its  own  corn,  but  clipped  its 
own  sheep,  cleaned,  combed,  dyed,  and  spun  the  wool, 
and  then  wove  it  into  cloth  and  made  it  into  clothes; 
which  prepared  its  own  cow-hides  for  the  feet  or  the 
target,  which  made  its  own  rude  articles  of  furniture 
and  moulded  its  own  pottery, — had  no  small  skill. 
The  faculties  were  by  these  occupations  trained,  and 
popular  instruction  might  be  said  to  be  universal  and 
domestic.  There  was  more  than  instruction  in  those 
prehistoric  days,  there  was  "  training  up  "  to  a  certain 
standard  of  effectiveness  in  the  work  of  life;  and 
there  was,  besides,  provision  for  a  higher  life,  although 
the  literature  might  be  limited  to  the  chanting  of  a 
few  rude  ballads,  indulgence  in  rustic  mimes,  and  the 
worship  of  a  god  or  gods  which  were  merely  tribal. 

Were  we  now,  in  these  modern  times,  to  educate  a 
man  merely  with  a  view  to  the  adaptation  of  his  powers 
to  certain  finite  uses  (industries  and  the  like),  we 
should  be  recurring  to  the  education  of  primeval 
civilisation  without  the  advantages  of  our  remote 
ancestors.  For  there  is  now  a  minute  division  of 
labour  in  industries,  and  the  breadth  and  variety  of 
primitive  technical  education  is  gone  for  ever.  If,  as 
a  substitute  for  breadth,  we  were  to  train  a  man  (as 
in  modern  times  we  can  do)  to  a  knowledge  of  those 
principles  which  should  regulate  the  application  of 
his  powers  to  the  narrow  field  of  his  industrial  work, 


i.]  Education  and  the  Ideal.  13 

we,  while  undoubtedly  calling  into  activity  his  rea- 
son, would  yet  be  doing  so  with  definite  and  restricted 
reference  to  mere  finite  and  bodily  uses.  This  would  be 
a  decided  advance  on  mere  training  of  the  practical 
powers  in  accordance  with  custom ;  but  it  would  not  be 
education,  but  only  what  we  now  understand  by  techni- 
cal instruction.  We  should  be  putting  brains  into  a 
man's  fingers;  but  this  is  not,  I  repeat,  education, 
though  it  contributes  to  it.  It  falls  far  short  even  of 
the  education  of  the  primitive  settler ;  it  gains  in  ra- 
tionality, but  it  loses  in  variety  and  breadth,  and  in 
its  demand  on  the  power  of  men  to  meet  exigencies. 

When  we  speak  of  educating  a  human  being,  we 
think  of  something  more  than  this.  We  all  think  of 
more  than  this  when  we  think  of  the  subject  at  all. 
There  is  (as  I  have  before  indicated)  a  presupposi- 
tion underlying  our  conception  of  the  word  education. 
That  presupposition  will  be  found  to  be  this  —  that  in 
man,  unlike  the  animals,  there  are  the  germs  of  a 
possible  growth  to  something  or  other  to  which  we 
cannot  set  limits ;  and  this  something  or  other  is  our 
ideal.  So  long  as  we  keep  this  in  view  we  are  giving 
a  " liberal/'  as  opposed  to  a  "technical"  education. 
It  is  the  recognition  of  this  potentiality  in  man  which 
makes  us  strive  to  educate  youth  and  to  educate  our- 
selves. A  man  is  not  a  mere  intelligent  tool;  he  is 
something  more.  He  exists  for  that  something  more. 
He  is  not  a  means  but  an  end.  A  material  civilisa- 
tion is  to  be  called  civilisation  only  in  so  far  as  it 
makes  the  higher  end  possible  for  a  community.  We 
begin  to  see,  in  fact,  that  the  education  of  man  up  to 


14  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT.  i. 

a  certain  ideal  is  itself  the  very  purpose  of  his  exist- 
ence, and  that  the  history  of  our  race  is,  properly 
viewed,  the  history  of  its  education. 

Education,  however,  in  this  larger  sense  was  not  in 
old  times  possible.  For  this  reason :  by  education, 
we  mean  the  training  of  a  man  with  a  view  to  make 
him  all  that  he  can  become.  Now  you  will  at  once 
perceive  that  this  very  conception  was  impossible 
until  men  had  thought  about  themselves.  Philosophy 
in  brief,  though  in  a  non-self-conscious  form  (I  mean 
not  explicitly  developed),  was  the  necessary  precursor 
of  the  idea  of  education  in  its  fulness ;  and  philoso- 
phy was  itself  the  product  of  religion,  or  one  with  it. 
The  relations  of  dependence  and  awe  in  which  man 
stood  to  the  mysterious  power  by  which  he  and  all 
his  works  were  surrounded,  and  by  which  his  best- 
laid  schemes  were  so  often  frustrated,  led  to  thought 
on  this  universal  power  and  on  man's  relation  to  it. 
Life  and  death  and  man  himself  became  objects  of 
speculation;  and  as  soon  as  men  became  capable  of 
the  thought  of  man,  they  were  competent  to  conceive 
the  thought  of  the  growth  of  man  to  the  full  fruition 
of  his  nature — in  other  words,  the  thought  of  his 
education.  But  not  sooner. 

This  thought — the  thought  of  what  man  truly  is 
in  his  highest  expression,  which  we  may  call  the 
notion  of  man,  we  owe,  I  have  said,  to  the  Greeks 
more  than  to  any  other  race. 


LECTURE  II. 

THE  END  OF  EDUCATION. 

PHILOSOPHY  AS  NECESSARY  TO  THE  FORMATION  OF 
A  CONSCIOUS  END  OR  IDEAL. 

THE  education  of  a  human  being  then  has  at  all 
times  and  in  all  circumstances  a  more  or  less  conscious 
ideal  in  view.  The  ideal  of  successive  races  of  man- 
kind is  the  measure  of  their  civilisation  and  their  true 
history. 

A  conscious  ideal  is  an  ideal  based  on  a  study  of 
man  —  in  short,  on  the  philosophy  of  man.  But  phi- 
losophy is  not  the  subject  of  this  Chair,  and  you  must 
therefore  be  often  content  to  rest  satisfied  with  state- 
ments which  cannot  be  presented  to  you  in  their  full 
reasoned  form,  but  rather  wear  a  dogmatic  aspect. 

The  ideal  is  also  the  end  or  purpose.  The  ideal 
end  or  purpose  of  education  must  manifestly  be  de- 
termined by  the  ideal  end  or  purpose  of  human  life 
itself. 

To  the  question  what  this  end  or  ideal  in  education 
may  be,  various  answers  have  been  given.  All  writers 
have  found  it  necessary  to  propound  some  end  or 
other,  for  they  have  felt  the  truth  of  what  Jean  Paul 
says,  "  The  end  desired  must  be  known  before  the 
way.  All  means  or  art  of  education  will  be,  in  the 

15 


16  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

first  instance,  determined  by  the  ideal  or  archetype 
we  entertain  of  it." 

Montaigne's  aim  is  summed  up  in  the  words,  Wis- 
dom and  Virtue.  Comenius  gives  as  his  aim,  "  Knowl- 
edge, Virtue,  Religion."  Milton's  aim  is  Likeness  to 
God,  best  attained  through  Virtue  and  Faith.  Locke's 
aim  is  Health  of  Body,  Virtue,  and  Good  Manners. 
The  Pietists  under  Spener  (died  1705)  had  for  their 
aim  the  building  up  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  in  the 
heart  of  every  child.  Herbert  Spencer's  aim  is  stated 
to  be  "  Complete  Living."  A  common  German  state- 
ment is,  that  the  end  is  the  harmonious  development 
of  all  the  powers.  I  myself  would  prefer  to  say  that 
the  ideal  aim  of  education  is  the  realisation  of  the 
ideal  of  Man  by  each  individual  in  and  for  himself. 

All  these  answers,  including  my  own,  are  so  very 
generalised  as  to  be  wholly  uninstructive.  Nor  can 
we  find  such  instruction  as  to  ends  and  ideals  as  shall 
at  the  same  time  be  a  guide  to  us  in  educating,  until, 
among  many  universally  admitted  subordinate  ends, 
we  can  find  that  supreme  end  which  governs  all  the 
rest. 

And  to  ascertain  this  we  must  first  ascertain  the 
supreme  and  governing  end  of  man's  life. 

This  end  is  the  Ethical  Life. 

The  supreme  end,  then,  of  all  education  is  an  ethi- 
cal end.  The  determination  of  this  end  and  of  the 
conditions  of  its  attainment  constitutes  the  theory 
and  methodology  of  education. 

The  standard  by  which  we  ultimately  judge  a  man 
is  his  worth  as  a  man  —  the  outcome  in  life  and  con- 


ii.]  The  End  of  Education.  17 

duct  of  all  his  capacities.  "  By  their  fruits  ye  shall 
know  them ;  "  and  the  fruit  each  yields  is  also  the 
seed  he  sows.  All  special  knowledges  are  of  value 
only  in  so  far  as  they  contribute  to  the  supreme  ethi- 
cal result.  One  man  knows  more  Greek  and  Mathe- 
matics than  another :  is  he  therefore  better  educated  ? 
May  it  not  be  that  just  because  one  knows  so  very 
much  more  than  another  he  is  worse  educated, —  ethi- 
cally a  poor  result  ?  The  actual  outcome  in  bearing 
and  conduct,  which  is  life,  is  alone  the  test  of  our 
having  fulfilled  life. 

Even  in  the  technical  education  of  a  carpenter  or 
weaver,  I  am  fitting  him  to  do  his  work  better  than 
he  would  otherwise  do  it  —  that  is  to  say,  more  effec- 
tively, and  therefore  more  honestly.  I  am  qualifying 
him  for  industrial  citizenship.  The  most  efficient  car- 
penter is,  qua  carpentering,  the  most  moral  carpenter. 
True,  the  most  moral  carpenter,  in  the  larger  sense, 
is  not  necessarily  the  most  efficient  carpenter :  but  he 
will  desire  to  be  the  most  efficient,  because  he  has  a 
moral  ideal  of  manhood  and  of  conduct  as  one  citizen 
co-operating  with  other  citizens  for  the  industrial  pur- 
poses of  life.  I  give  him  technical  instruction  that 
he  may  be  enabled  to  give  effect  in  sound  honest  work- 
manship to  his  ideal  of  his  own  manhood  and  citizen- 
ship. Even  technical  instruction,  then,  has  its  moral 
purpose  :  it  fits  a  man  *to  be  a  true  man  in  the  social 
place  he  occupies.  Thus,  into  everything  we  do,  nay, 
into  everything  we  think,  the  ethical  element  enters 
for  better  or  worse. 

But  outside  the  question  of  man  in  his  specific  in- 


18  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT.  n. 

dustrial  and  other  relations  to  his  fellow-men,  there 
is  the  question,  of  his  manhood  in  its  larger  sense,  his 
fulfilment  of  himself  simply  as  man ;  for  we  believe, 
with  the  Athenians,  that  thereby  we  best  fit  him  for 
all  his  duties,  whether  of  citizenship,  or  carpentering, 
or  anything  else.  How  am  I  to  ascertain  wherein 
man's  fulfilment  lies  —  his  true  life,  that  which  gov- 
erns all  his  relations  ? 

Evidently  only  by  inquiring  into  the  nature  of  man 
—  his  mental  constitution,  and  his  past  history  of 
effort  and  failure.  There,  if  anywhere,  we  shall  find 
what  he  is  intended  to  be,  and  how  he  is  intended  to 
act.  But  to  do  this  we  should  have  to  deal  with 
Ethics  in  general,  and  this  is  not  a  Chair  of  Ethics, 
but  of  Education.  This  much,  however,  we  may  say 
bluntly  —  The  education  of  a  child  is  the  bringing  of 
him  up  in  such  a  way  as  to  secure  that  when  he  is  a 
man  he  will  fulfil  his  true  life  —  not  merely  his  life 
as  an  industrial  worker,  not  merely  his  life  as  a  citi- 
zen, but  his  own  personal  life  through  his  work  and 
through  his  citizenship. 

But  this  is  not  all,  for  we  have  to  consider  the  con- 
ditions of  the  attainment  of  the  ethical  end  of  educa- 
tion from  the  point  of  view,  not  only  of  the  growth 
of  mind,  but  of  the  growth  of  body ;  for,  "  We  have 
not  to  train  up  a  soul,"  says  Montaigne,  "nor  yet  a 
body,  but  a  man,  and  we  cannot  divide  him."  But 
even  the  bodily  conditions,  important  as  they  are,  are 
merely  the  basis  of  that  which  is  higher. 

First  of  all,  I  ask  your  attention  to  these  physical 
conditions. 


LECTURE   III. 

BODY  IN  RELATION  TO  THE  EDUCATION  OF  MIND. 

MIND,  we  have  said,  is  involved  in  matter  or  body 
—  the  "  clay  cottage,"  as  Locke  calls  it.  There  can 
be  no  mens  sana  without  corpus  sanum.  In  discussing 
the  question  of  the  education  of  mind,  it  is  assumed 
that  healthy  bodily  conditions  are  first  of  all  secured. 
Each  day  must  be  so  arranged,  as  to  provide  the  nec- 
essary time  for  physical  exercise  —  especially  in  the 
form  of  play.  Manual  instruction  in  covered  sheds, 
apart  from  its  other  uses,  helps  to  maintain  sound 
physical  conditions,  and  in  a  climate  like  ours  seems 
to  be  almost  a  necessity. 

The  physical  or  physiological  conditions  of  mental 
receptivity  and  activity  have  also  to  be  studied  by 
the  educator  in  their  relation  to  healthy  surroundings, 
to  the  amount  of  brain-work  to  be  demanded  from 
boys  and  girls,  the  length  of  school  lessons,  home 
lessons,  and  differences  of  power  and  of  temperament. 

The  following  are  the  heads  of  a  short  course  of  Lec- 
tures on  Physical  Conditions :  — 

(1)  The  Structure  of  the  Human  Body  generally. 

(2)  The  Blood  and  its  Circulation  —  Waste  —  Nu- 
trition —  Purification. 

19 


20  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

(3)  The  Nerve-System  —  Sensory  and  Motor.    The 
Senses.     Muscular  Activity. 

(4)  The  Nerve-Apparatus  of  Receptivity  and  Ac- 
tivity ;    Gradual  growth  of  this,   and  lessons  to  be 
drawn  from  the  gradual  growth. 

(5)  Waste    of    Nerve-Substance.      Exhaustion   of 
Nerve-Substance.     Nutrition  of  Nerve-Substance. 

(6)  Memory  and  Habit  as  determined  by  physio- 
logical conditions. 

(7)  Reflex  action  :  Automatic  action  :  Secondarily- 
automatic  action,  and  its  educational  significance. 

Summary  of  educational  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  a 
consideration  of  physical  conditions :  (a)  Nutrition  and 
Oxygenation  of  blood  in  brain  (food  and  ventilation)  ; 
(b)  Rest;  and  variety  of  brain  exercise;  (c)  Gradual 
growth  of  the  intellectual  and  moral  capacity  in  connec- 
tion with  growth  of  brain :  the  consequent  limitation  of 
the  teacher's  demands  on  pupils  (length  of  lessons,  etc.); 
(d)  Habit  of  mind  in  so  far  as  it  is  merely  cerebral 
habit;  (e)  Gymnastic,  ivith  drill;  (/)  Sanitary  condi- 
tions generally  of  intellectual  and  moral  health  and 
activity. 

Books  of  Reference.  —  Carpenter's  Mental  Physi- 
ology; M'Kendrick's  Elements  of  Physiology;  Professor 
Foster's  Primer.  These  suffice  for  the  student  of 
education.1 

1  A  complete  course  of  physiology  is  not  at  all  necessary  for  the 
student  of  education.  A  general  knowledge  of  the  human  frame 
and  of  hygienic  and  cerebral  conditions  suffices.  A  course  of  four 
or  five  lectures  illustrated  by  good  diagrams  will  yield  all  the  in- 
formation needed. 


in.]  Body  in  Relation  to  the  Education  of  Mind.  21 

Perhaps  the  most  important  lesson  which  physi- 
ology teaches  in  the  domain  of  mind  is  that  mind 
processes  wear  a  kind  of  channel  for  themselves,  so 
that,  with  practice,  all  mind  activities,  intellectual  or 
moral,  good  or  bad,  flow  more  easily.  Thus,  things 
difficult  to  do  become  in  the  end  so  easy  that  the 
doing  of  them  partakes  of  the  character  of  automatic 
action.  This  kind  of  activity  is  called  secondarily- 
automatic.  On  this  point  I  would  direct  your  atten- 
tion to  chap.  iv.  vol.  i.  of  Professor  James'  Principles 
of  Psychology. 

Many  important  questions  also  are  suggested  by  the 
relation  of  bodily  growth  to  mental  growth. 

Under  gymnastic,  again,  we  have  to  compare  the 
Greek  gymnastic  with  British  games,  in  respect  of 
their  recreative  and  moral  influence  as  well  as  their 
power  of  promoting  a  balanced  physical  condition. 
Athleticism  as  opposed  to  a  reasonable,  or  Greek, 
gymnastic  must  also  receive  consideration. 

The  recent  movement  in  the  direction  of  manual 
work  is  really  an  attempt  to  counterbalance  the  too 
exclusive  demands  which  the  school  makes  on  intel- 
lect, and  ought,  in  its  due  place,  to  be  encouraged. 
The  bearing  of  such  work  in  its  reflex  effect  on  the 
intellect,  as  giving  a  certain  firmness  and  solidity  to 
purely  intellectual  operations,  is  also  worthy  of  dis- 
cussion. We  must  leave  this  whole  subject  for  lec-r 
ture-room  treatment. 


LECTURE  IV. 

THE  SUPREME  END    AND    ITS    GOVERNING    CONDITION. 

CONSCIOUSNESS,  generally,  is  Mind. 

The  conscious  subject  is  a  one,  self -identical  mind- 
entity.1  So  far  as  mere  consciousness  is  concerned, 
man  and  animals  are  like  one  another. 

But  man  is  more  than  a  conscious  animal,  because 
he  has  reason,  or  is  a  reason.  The  fundamental  form 
of  reason  makes  its  appearance  with  self-conscious- 
ness. 

Man  accordingly  may  be  defined  as  a  self-conscious 
rational  mind-entity,  involved  in  body.2 

When  the  conscious  or  self-conscious  entity  has  an 
object  present  to  it,  we  call  the  former  "  subject,"  to 
distinguish  it  from  the  "  object." 

It  appears  then  that  the  distinctive  characteristic 
or  difference  of  man  as  contrasted  with  other  conscious 
beings,  is  Reason. 

Accordingly,  man  being  specifically  a  being  of  reason, 
the  supreme  end  of  human  life,  which  has  an  inherent 
title  to  govern  all  other  minor  ends,  must  be  the  life  of 
reason  and  in  reason.  Life  is  action,  and,  accordingly, 

1  This  lecture  is  somewhat  of  the  nature  of  a  series  of  paragraphs 
to  be  fully  expounded  orally  by  the  lecturer. 

2  Vid.  Note  A  in  the  Appendix. 

22 


LECT.  iv.]  Supreme  End  and  Croverning  Condition.  23 

life  in  accordance  with  reason  may  be  more  fully  ex- 
pressed as  a  life  of  activity  in  the  things  of  reason, 
and  conduct  in  accordance  with  reason ;  and  this, 
speaking  generally,  is  what  we  have  called  the  ethical 
life.  Let  us  carry  these  propositions  into  more  con- 
crete detail. 

Moral  and  Spiritual  Life.  —  Life  in  the  activity  of 
reason,  i.e.  pure  thought  and  contemplation,  might  with 
certain  beings  be  the  highest ;  but  for  man,  since  he  can 
live  at  all  only  through  multiform  relations  to  the  non- 
rational  nature  within  him  and  to  other  things  and 
persons,  the  issue  of  his  life  in  conduct  is  the  highest : 
that  is  to  say,  life  in  reason  through  his  relations  to 
things  and  persons,  or,  generally,  life  in  relations  as 
these  are  impregnated  and  moulded  by  reason.  This 
is  the  moral  life. 

But  man,  by  virtue  of  this  same  reason  in  him,  has 
relations  with  the  Infinite.  Accordingly,  when,  in  the 
life  of  thought  and  contemplation,  man  rises  to  the 
notion  of  God  as  Being  and  Thought-universal,  and 
sees  reason  (which  is  also  the  truth)  in  relations,  as  in 
and  through  God,  who  is  Reason-universal,  —  he  then 
lives  and  acts  in  conscious  communion  with  God  as  in 
all  and  through  all.  He  now  lives,  not  only  the  life 
of  reason  and  in  reason,  but  with  Reason  as  the  uni- 
versal One  in  the  many.  This  is  the  spiritual  life. 

But  this  spiritual  life  is  only  the  moral  life  seen  in 
God,  and,  so,  the  completion  and  fulness  of  the  life 
of  man. 

The  moral  life,  accordingly,  when  it  has  passed  into 
the  spiritual  life,  is  what  I  mean  by  the  Ethical  Life. 


24  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

Note.  —  In  seeking  the  end  or  purpose  of  a  complex  organ- 
ism like  man,  we  have  to  fix  on  some  thought  and  phrase 
which  expresses  at  once  the  highest  outcome  and  the  specific 
functioning  of  his  nature.  He  must,  of  course,  first  be  what 
he  does;  but  to  stop  at  being,  with  a  creature  whose  life 
consists  in  his  relations  to  external  things,  circumstances, 
and,  above  all,  to  himself  and  other  spirits  like  himself, 
would  be  to  stop  short  of  the  completion  of  life,  which  does 
not  consist  in  being  and  reverie,  but  in  an  activity  deter- 
mined by  the  state  of  being.  We  must,  therefore,  seek  for 
some  expression  (if  we  are  to  have  only  one  expression) 
which  comprehends  the  essential  activity  of  his  nature,  and 
denotes,  at  the  same  time,  its  purpose  or  end.  The  expres- 
sion most  comprehensive  and  least  misleading  is,  I  think, 
"  ethical  life." 

Ethical  life,  then,  is  the  spiritual  life  as  including 
the  prior  moral  life. 

The  moral  life,  as  such,  is  rightly  called  the  vir- 
tuous life.  9  For  this,  there  is  manifestly  necessary  a 
virtuous  state  of  being,  and  its  sequel  effective  virtue. 
I  may  be  full  of  virtuous  sentiments  and  principles, 
but  have  very  little  effective  virtue ;  I  cannot,  how- 
ever, exhibit  effective  virtue  save  as  the  expression  of 
a  prior  state  of  being. 

Man,  in  so  far  as  he  is  animal,  has  sensations  and 
emotions  like  the  animals.  These  give  rise  to  desires, 
and  impel  him  to  do  this  or  that.  He  differs  from  the 
animals  by  virtue  of  the  reason  in  him,  which  regu- 
lates and  directs  these  emotions  and  desires,  and  pre- 
scribes ends.  The  relations  which  these  emotions 
and  desires  bear  to  each  other,  and  to  our  fellow-men, 
are  ascertained  by  reason  interpreting  experience; 


iv.]    Supreme  End  and   Governing  Condition.     25 

and  they  get  the  name  of  "  moral  ideas,"  because  they 
are  ideas  determining  action  or  conduct.  These  moral 
ideas,  e.g.  justice,  benevolence,  integrity,  courage, 
truthfulness,  purity,  holiness,  etc.,  constitute  the 
motives  of  a  man's  conduct,  if  he  is  moral.  They 
are  sometimes  called  moral  sentiments  or  virtues, 
and  the  man  who  acts  in  accordance  with  them  as  law 
of  his  nature,  is  said  to  be  virtuous.  The  idea  is  at 
once  end  and  motive,  but  he  can  fulfil  the  idea  only 
through  particular  acts. 

Man  cannot  act  on  these  ideas  until  he  possesses 
them  as  knowledge  (more  or  less  distinct).  If  he 
possesses  these  ideas  and  lives  in  the  contemplation 
of  them,  he  may  be  said  to  be  in  a  moral  or  virtuous 
state  of  being;  but  his  life  is  not  fulfilled,  nor  is  he 
virtuous,  till  he  gives  effect  to  them  in  his  daily  con- 
duct :  till  then,  they  are  only  half-born.  This  is 
effective  virtue  —  the  virtuous  or  moral  life.  In  edu- 
cation our  main  object  is  to  train  men  to  a  habit  of 
effective  virtue ;  but  we  desire  also  to  elevate  the 
virtuous  life,  if  we  can,  to  the  spiritual  life,  so  that 
the  ethical  life  may  be  fulfilled  in  its  wholeness  in 
each  man. 

Note.  —  There  are  many  who  keep  their  eyes  so  steadily 
fixed  on  a  man's  acts,  that  they  are  disposed  to  IOOK  with 
distrust  on  the  inner  growth  of  feeling  and  sentiment,  or 
what  are  commonly  called  moral  ideas  (and  sometimes 
"  principles  ")  —  those  inner  motives  which  are  a  complex 
of  reason  and  emotion,  and  precede  the  possibility  of  virtue. 
The  giving  effect  to  these  in  conduct  is  certainly,  as  effective 
virtue,  in  advance  of  the  mere  state  of  mind  which  we  call 
"virtuous";  but  as  the  cause  must  precede  the  effect,  we 


26  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

cannot  afford  in  education  to  dispense  with  the  consideration 
of  the  best  way  of  creating  the  virtuous  state  of  mind,  sim- 
ply as  a  contemplative  state,  with  a  view  to  the  ultimate 
issue  in  action. 

We  shall  find  in  practice,  doubtless,  that  the  wisest  way 
of  creating  this  virtuous  state,  is  by  getting  the  young  (and 
ourselves)  to  act,  i.e.  to  do  the  right  and  good  thing,  and 
in  this  way  evoking  the  good  emotion  or  sentiment.  In 
other  words,  the  generalised  emotion  or  moral  idea  and  the 
putting  of  it  in  practice,  should,  in  training  the  young,  be 
inseparably  bound  together  as  far  as  possible.  By  doing 
benevolent  acts,  for  example,  a  child  becomes  a  benevolent 
being,  and  entertains  in  consciousness  and  imagination  — 
all  ready  for  use  —  benevolent  emotions. 

At  the  same  time,  if  we  take  the  whole  range  of  moral 
ideas,  this  way  of  procedure  is  impracticable,  and  we  there- 
fore try  to  build  up  in  the  child  and  youth  a  system  of  moral 
ideas  which  will  constitute  a  permanent  reservoir  of  motives 
always  ready  for  use,  whether  in  moral  judgment  or  moral 
action. 

Take  the  various  moral  ideas  which  constitute  the  motives 
of  a  good-will,  viz.  benevolence,  justice,  purity,  honesty, 
integrity,  truth-speaking,  courage,  resoluteness,  perseverance, 
and  so  forth,  and  you  will  see  how  the  growth  of  these  in 
the  mind  (as  furniture  of  the  mind,  so  to  speak)  must  be 
premised  if  we  are  to  secure  our  result  —  effective  virtue  — 
in  all  conditions  and  circumstances. 

If  we  cannot  create  these  generalised  feelings  or  ideas, 
and  give  them  lodgment  in  the  minds  of  the  young  by  reg- 
ulating all  their  petty  acts,  how  are  we  to  supplement  our 
want  of  opportunity?  We  shall  get  a  full  answer  to  this  in 
the  sequel ;  but  meanwhile  I  would  say  generally,  that  we 
supplement  the  ordinary  experiences  of  life  in  three  ways :  — 
1.  By  authority  and  precept.  2.  By  our  own  example.  3. 
By  getting  children  to  contemplate  the  acts  of  others,  either 
as  they  see  them  going  on  before  their  eyes,  or,  through 
imagination,  by  the  help  of  narratives  and  poetry.  (But 
this  is  to  anticipate  the  discussion  on  method.) 


iv.]    Supreme  End  and   G-overning   Condition.     27 

The  moral  life  and  the  spiritual  life  (in  brief,  the 
ethical  life)  must  exist  as  a  system  of  ideas  and  mo- 
tives before  it  is  active,  and  consequently  presumes 
for  its  existence  an  antecedent  activity  of  reason  in 
ascertaining,  or  accepting,  ethical  ideas  and  ends. 
Hence  the  importance  in  education  of  so  training 
the  intelligence  of  all  that  each,  though  incapable  of 
ascertaining  for  himself  the  ideas  which  nourish  the 
moral  and  spiritual  nature,  may  yet  acquiesce  in  them 
with  intelligence  and  personal  conviction,  make  them 
his  own,  and  not  be  merely  the  slave  of  dogma, 
misapprehended  or  not  apprehended  at  all.  Man  is 
an  ethical  being  only  so  far  as  he  is  a  se(/*-regulated 
being. 

Men  have,  happily,  not  to  depend  each  on  the 
activity  of  his  own  reason  for  the  ascertainment  of 
the  truth  of  life  and  conduct  —  the  moral  ideas  which 
are  to  constitute  his  ever-present  motives.  They  in- 
herit the  fruit  of  the  labours  of  past  generations.  As 
regards  its  substance  generally,  indeed,  education  is 
Tradition  —  the  handing  on  of  intellectual  and  moral 
possessions  by  those  set  apart  as  competent  for  the 
task. 

We  may  now  conclude  that  the  supreme  end  of 
education  is  the  ethical  life,  and  that  the  main  instru- 
ment in  training  to  the  substance  of  this  is  tradition ; l 
and  that  reason  in  each  has  to  be  so  trained  that  the 
young  may  intelligently  acquiesce,  and  so  make  the 
transmitted  moral  and  spiritual  life  their  own. 

1  "  There  is  a  history  in  all  men's  minds 

Figuring  the  nature  of  the  times  deceased." — 2  Henry  IV.  iii. 


28  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

The  transmitters  of  this  tradition  are  primarily  the 
parent  and  schoolmaster. 

But,  further,  the  ethical  life  is  not  only  the  Good, 
but  the  LAW  for  man,  because  it  comprehends  the 
ideas  of  his  relations  to  things  and  persons  —  the  truth 
for  life  and  conduct.  By  the  fulfilment  of  this  law 
alone,  can  a  man  fulfil  or  realise  himself ;  and,  accord- 
ingly, he  owes  duty  to  the  law. 

The  reason  of  man  is  by  its  very  nature  always 
seeking  for  law,  and  we  consequently  meet  its  neces- 
sities by  bringing  him  under  a  sense  of  the  law  which 
is  inherent  in  the  truth  of  his  relations ;  and  we  accus- 
tom him,  when  young,  to  obey  the  law  though  he  can- 
not yet  see  the  truth  of  it  for  himself.  Thus  we 
strengthen  the  connate  perception  of  law  in  him,  and 
habituate  him  to  act  in  accordance  with  certain  ideas 
or  truths  as  law,  and  because  of  the  duty  he  owes  to 
law. 

When  a  youth  perceives  the  truth  of  the  moral 
ideas  which  ought  to  determine  conduct,  and  has 
acquired  a  habit  of  duty  to  them,  he  is  educated 
morally.  The  spiritual  education  may  accompany  or 
follow  this ;  and  then  there  is  realised  the  full  ethical 
life  in  him,  i.e.  activity  of  reason  or  intelligence 
whereby  he  perceives  the  truth  and  obeys  the  law, 
and  leads  the  life  of  law  in  God.  The  ethical  life  in 
a  man  then  (to  sum  up)  is  a  habit  of  action  in  accord- 
ance with  moral  ideas  as  the  divine  order,  under  a 
sense  of  duty  to  the  law  inherent  in  them  as  spiritual 
or  divine  law. 

This  may  seem  all  very  general ;  but,  in  very  truth, 


iv.]    Supreme  End  and   Governing   Condition.     29 

the  significance  of  all  we  teach  and  of  every  lesson 
we  give  is  ethical  —  always  ethical,  or  it  is,  in  its 
educational  reference,  wholly  insignificant  or  rather 
non-significant.  True,  we  have  to  educate  experts  in 
the  various  departments  of  human  activity  in  order 
that  the  torch  of  learning  and  of  civilisation  may  be 
held  high  and  handed  on.  But  the  education  of  a 
nation  does  not  aim  at  this,  but  at  something  much 
greater.  A  school  accordingly  is  not  to  be  judged 
as  an  educational  institution  by  the  number  of  its 
"scholars,"  but  by  its  ethical  results,  including,  as 
the  precondition  of  such  results,  bodily  vigour. 


Our  constant  aim  in  studying  the  science  of  educa- 
tion must  be  to  bring  all  philosophic  discussions  and 
conclusions  to  a  practical  issue.  We  have  to  deduce 
rules  for  our  guidance. 

The  supreme  end  is  always,  it  is  presumed,  with 
us,  and  is  daily  and  hourly  influencing  us  in  what  we 
teach  or  deliberately  omit  to  teach ;  but,  besides  exer- 
cising this  governing  function,  it  yields  a  principle  of 
method  which  helps  us  in  our  teaching.  For  the  end 
contemplated  is  a  practical  end ;  it  is  the  issue  of  in- 
tellect and  of  moral  and  spiritual  ideas  in  a  habit  of 
action ;  it  is  a  turning  to  use  —  the  use  of  life,  of  all 
the  furniture  and  trained  activity  of  mind. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  TURN  TO  USE. 

Accordingly,  this  principle  should  be  constantly 
applied  in  every  subject  we  teach  and  in  every  lesson 
in  every  subject.  We  see  the  rule  illustrated  by  a 


30  Institutes  of  Education.          [LECT.  iv. 

good  teacher  of  mathematics,  who  knows  that  his  busi- 
ness is  not  to  make  mathematical  experts,  but  to  use 
mathematics  in  so  far  as  it  contributes  to  the  general 
education  of  the  human  mind.  Every  theorem  under- 
stood has  its  consequences.  The  practical  relations  of 
geometry  to  mensuration  and  geometrical  drawing, 
and  the  deduction  of  riders  to  be  worked  out  inde- 
pendently by  the  pupils,  are  never  omitted  from  his 
course.  He  is  indifferent  to  the  amount  of  Euclid 
"gone  over";  his  business  is  to  pause  and  to  make 
sure  by  means  of  deductions  that  the  intellectual  dis- 
cipline and  the  practical  application  are  insured.  In 
brief,  at  every  stage  he  "  turns  to  use." 

So  with  the  good  teacher  of  language:  he  turns 
everything  to  use  from  the  first  lesson  onwards. 

The  ultimate  and  sole  effective  test  of  all  knowledge 
in  every  department  is  —  Can  the  pupil  use  it  ? 


LECTURE   V. 

THE  EDUCATIVE  PROCESS  GENERALLY   AS  DETER- 
MINED BY  THE  SUPREME  END. 

THE  spiritual  life  is  not  achieved  except  through 
the  habit  of  virtuous  activity,  and  in  like  manner  the 
virtuous  life  is  not  fulfilled  until  it  passes  into  the 
spiritual  life.  The  ethical  life,  accordingly,  is  not  a 
state  of  being  solely,  but  a  continued  series  of  ethical 
acts  bound  together  by  an  ideal  of  life.  If  this  be  so, 
and  if  the  ethical  life  be  the  supreme  end  of  educa- 
tion, the  analysis  of  the  elements  (moments  or  steps) 
of  an  ethical  act  ought  to  yield  to  us  the  Educative 
Process  generally. 

I  find  that  the  ethical  act,  as  a  final  willing  of  the 
good,  contains  the  following  elements  :  — 

1.  Right  judgment  as   to  the  facts  before  us  and 
their  relations :  a  process  of  reason.     (Substance  of 
knowledge  and  power  of  discrimination.) 

2.  A  moral  idea  (at   the   heart  of  which   there  is 
always  an  emotion)  following  on  the  clear  perception 
of  the  facts ;  which  idea  incites  or  attracts  us  to  act 
in  accordance  with  itself :  and  this  we  call  our  motive 
of  action  (at  once  end  and  motive).     (Substance  of 
morality.) 

3.  Willing  or  action  in   accordance  with  the   said 
motive-idea  under  a  sense  of  duty  to  it  as  Law  —  a 

31 


32  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

sense  of  imperative  obligation  (itself  by  itself  also  a 
motive).  (Moral  discipline.) 

4.  The  perception  of  the  idea  as  in  God  and  of  the 
law  as  Divine.  (Religion.) 

If  I  will  in  accordance  with  the  idea  (taking  it  into 
myself,  and  making  it  part  of  my  character  for  the 
occasion),  I  have  a  resultant  sense  of  harmony,  non- 
contradiction, or  peace,  which  is  always  the  inner 
guarantee  of  the  attainment  of  ethical  completeness. 

Note  1. —  Let  me  repeat  that  when  I  say  that  the  end  of 
the  education  of  the  young  is  effective  virtue  resting  on  a 
virtuous  state  of  being,  in  other  words,  the  habit  of  virtue, 
I  do  not  use  these  words  in  a  vague  sense.  The  virtuous 
life  is  not  a  life  of  contemplation,  but  of  action ;  it  is  not  an 
abstract,  but  a  concrete  made  up  of  a  series  of  daily  and 
hourly  virtuous  acts.  We  do  not  wish  to  rear  citizens  who 
talk  about  the  virtuous  life,  and  walk  about  displaying  moral 
placards,  but  citizens  who  quietly  do  their  duty  as  a  matter 
of  course,  and  are  ever  watchful  over  themselves  in  all  the 
details  of  business  and  of  social  and  family  intercourse.  A 
large  part  of  the  virtuous  life  must  always  consist  in  the 
efficient  doing  of  the  work  for  which  we  get  wages,  whether 
that  work  be  carrying  bricks  or  guiding  the  State.  To  be 
always  virtuous  is  so  difficult  that  there  is  no  energy  left  for 
ostentatiously  talking  about  it. 

Note  2.  —  The  educator  must  always  keep  chiefly  in  view 
the  primary  demands  that  may  be  legitimately  made  on  all 
men  —  a  virtuous  state  of  being  and  effective  virtue.  The 
spiritual,  which  is  the  essence  of  all  religion,  will  accompany 
or  follow.  When  we  have  trained  to  the  ethical  life  in  its 
completeness  we  have  built  the  temple.  The  activity  of 
reason  in  things  of  reason,  the  enjoyment  of  the  beautiful 
in  nature  and  art,  and  the  graces  and  courtesies  of  manner 
and  intercourse  (evKooywa),  all  go,  doubtless,  to  the  ideal 
fulfilment  of  a  man.  But  our  business  is  with  the  temple, 


v.]  Educative  Process  Generally.  33 

before  we  concern  ourselves  with  its  decoration.  The  rational 
and  the  aesthetic  for  their  own  sake  will  always  receive  the 
attention  of  the  educator,  especially  in  their  ethical  relations ; 
but  we  cannot  afford  to  think  of  them  save  as  accessory  to 
the  ethical  life. 

The  Educational  End,  as  I  conceive  it,  might  now 
be  stated  thus  :  — 

EIGHT  JUDGMENT  AND  A  HABIT  OF  GOOD  ACTION 
UNDER  A  SENSE  OF  DUTY,  ACCOMPANIED  BY  A 
COMPREHENSION  OF  THE  SPIRITUAL  SIGNIFI- 
CANCE OF  NATURE  AND  MAN. 

The  Educative  Process,  as  that  is  revealed  by  the 
analysis  of  the  ethical  act,  is,  speaking  generally,  a 
process  of  Instruction  and  of  Discipline. 

A.  —  Instruction  (Knowledge). 

(1)  Instruction  in  our  relations  to  things  and  per- 

sons, commonly  called  intellectual  instruc- 
tion. 

(2)  Instruction  in  moral   ideas,  commonly  called 

moral    instruction    (the    virtues).       (The 
Good.) 

(3)  Instruction  in  the  spiritual,  i.e.  the  religious 

idea.     (God.) 

B.  —  Training  and  Discipline  (Faculty). 

(1)  Training  and  discipline  to  the  habit  of  intelli- 
gent or  rational  activity. 


34  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

(2)  Training  and  discipline  to  the  habit  of  virtuous 

willing,  i.e.  good  action  under  a  sense  of 
duty. 

(3)  Training  to  the  spiritual  habit  of  mind. 

The  educative  process,  as  so  conceived,  gives  us  a 
systematic  view  of  the  whole  field  of  education,  out- 
side the  presupposed  physical  conditions. 

A.  — INSTRUCTION. 
The  Realistic  and  the  Humanistic. 

To  give  the  materials  of  right  judgment  we  have  to 
instruct  the  young.  It  has  been  usual  to  oppose  to 
one  another  real  (realistic)  instruction  and  human- 
istic —  the  former  being  instruction  in  those  things 
that  concern  a  man's  nafrn'e-environment ;  the  latter, 
instruction  in  the  relations  of  men  to  each  other,  and 
in  the  creations  of  man  as  a  being  of  reason,  i.e.  liter- 
ature, art,  and  all  thought  on  that  which  is  specifically 
human.  The  humanistic  has  also  been  identified  with 
Greek  and  Latin  literature,  because  at  the  time  of 
the  Renaissance  the  best  literature  was  to  be  found  in 
those  languages.  A  little  thought  suffices  to  show 
that  there  is  hopeless  confusion  in  such  distinctions. 
Literature  and  the  things  of  thought  are  in  a  much 
truer  sense  realities  than  the  things  of  sense,  and 
all  literature  and  art,  ancient  or  modern,  is  equally 
humanistic.  The  best  division  of  subjects  is  into  the 
Heal  and  the  Formal  or  Abstract,  corresponding  to 
the  two  demands  of  instruction  and  discipline ;  and 


v.]  Educative  Process   Crenerally.  35 

these  again  have  each  to  be  divided  into  Naturalistic 
and  Humanistic ;  thus  : 

I.  —  The  Real  (with  a  view  chiefly  to  Nutrition  of  Mind), 
(a)   The  Real-Naturalistic: 

(1)  Knowledge  of  the  world  of  nature  by  which  the 

pupil  is  surrounded.  (In  its  initial  stages 
this  includes  lessons  in  colour,  form,  measure, 
weight,  number,  sound,  and  object-lessons 
generally :  in  later  stages,  a  knowledge  of 
animals,  plants,  and  manufactured  products.) 

(2)  Knowledge  of  that  part  of   nature  nearest  to 

the  pupil  himself,  viz.  his  own  body,  with 
special  relation  to  the  laws  of  health. 

(3)  The  distribution  of  men  and  nations,  with  the 

physical  conditions  of  their  lives  and  their 
related  industrial  and  commercial  character- 
istics. This,  with  topography,  constitutes 
school  geography. 

(4)  Physiography. 

(6)    The  Real- Humanistic : 

(1)  Language,  i.e. 

(a)  The  vernacular  language  as  the  expression 
of  the  thought  of  others.  Literature. 

(6)  The  vernacular  language  as  the  expression 
of  one's  own  thought,  a  synthetic  exer- 
cise. (Imitative  composition,  with  a 
view  to  the  correct  use  of  language.) 

(2)  Foreign  languages  as  literature. 


36  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

(3)  Economics. 

(4)  History,  with  civil  relations. 

(5)  Moral  instruction  [including  minor  morals]. 

(6)  Spiritual  ideas,  including  religious  truth. 

Siibsidiary  Subjects: 
Art. 

(a)  Music. 

(6)  Appreciation  of  the   arts  of    painting, 
sculpture,  and  architecture. 

B.  —  TRAINING  AND  DISCIPLINE. 

II.  —  TJie  Formal  or  Abstract   (with  a  view  chiefly 
to  Discipline  of  Mind). 

(a)  Naturalistic.  (6)  Humanistic. 

Drawing.  Grammar. 

Arithmetic.  Rhetoric.1 

Mathematics.  Logic.1 

The  formal  or  abstract  chiefly  discipline  the  mind 
and  give  power;  the  real  feed  the  mind  and  give 
nutrition. 

To  give  adequate  instruction  in  all  these  studies  to 
all  is  impossible ;  but  the  instruction  of  all  should  be 
on  these  lines,  carried  as  far  as  time  permits,  and 
given  in  such  a  way  as  will  lead  to  the  further  volun- 
tary prosecution  of  them. 

1  Rhetoric  and  Logic  are  not  to  be  formally  taught  till  the  pupil 
has  reached  the  university  stage. 


v.]  Educative  Process   G-enerally.  37 

Reading  and  writing,  as  instruments  whereby  we 
receive  the  thoughts  of  others  and  convey  our  own, 
are,  of  course,  primary  elements  in  all  education ;  but, 
were  it  not  that  they  are  necessary  as  instruments  for 
bringing  the  mind  into  contact  with  the  naturalistic, 
humanistic,  and  the  formal  in  knowledge,  we  should 
not  think  of  wasting  time  over  them. 

The  above  are  our  materials  of  instruction  —  the 
food  we  give ;  and  they  are  also  the  subjects  by  which 
we  discipline  and  train  the  intelligence  and  moral 
nature  of  the  young  to  an  ethical  result.  There  are, 
within  the  range  of  school  life,  up  to  the  end  of  the 
secondary  period  (the  eighteenth  year),  no  other 
subjects  having  equal  claims. 

Liberal  and  Technical  Education.  —  All  the  above 
studies  enter  into  a  "liberal"  education.  Here  again 
we  have  to  define.  A  liberal  education  is  the  educa- 
tion of  a  man  for  the  sake  of  his  manhood,  and  up  to 
an  ideal  of  manhood,  without  regard  to  any  specific 
use  to  which  he  may  turn  his  knowledge  and  powers. 
Doubtless,  there  is  a  sense  in  which  all  education  is 
for  use  —  the  uses  of  life  and  living ;  but  by  the 
"useful"  is  usually  understood  the  materially  useful, 
that  which  enables  a  man  to  earn  his  living.  Hence 
the  term  to  be  opposed  to  "liberal"  in  education  is 
"  technical,"  that  is  to  say,  instruction  and  training 
with  reference  to  certain  industrial  uses  and  material 
results.  "Professional"  education  is  thus  so  far 
technical,  and  is  to  be  distinguished  from  industrial 
technical  education  only  in  so  far  as  it  rests  on  more 
advanced,  and  on  liberal,  studies. 


38  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

All  thinkers  on  education  of  any  importance  con- 
tend for  a  liberal  education  —  the  education  of  the 
man ;  believing  that  thereby  they  best  fit  all  men  for 
the  work  of  the  world  generally,  no  less  than  for  the 
specific  function  each  has  to  discharge  as  a  member 
of  a  co-operative  community. 

Whatever  we  teach  for  its  own  sake,  with  a  view 
to  the  ideal  of  man  solely,  is  an  element  of  liberal 
education.  Even  manual  instruction,  not  to  speak  of 
the  elements  of  science,  falls  under  this  designation. 
All  depends  on  the  purpose  we  have  in  view,  whether 
it  be  general  or  special. 

The  Athenians  held  that  the  best  men  —  simply  as 
men  —  made  the  best  citizens  ;  the  Spartans,  though 
Hellenic  in  their  general  conceptions  of  education, 
had  a  more  restricted  view.  Their  ideal  of  man  was 
the  soldier,  and  their  training  was,  in  truth,  technical 
in  the  gymnastic  and  military  sense ;  and,  so  far,  it 
was  a  debased  Greek  form. 

Culture  is  a  vague  term  ;  but  when  we  speak  of  a 
"  man  of  culture,"  we  certainly  mean  a  man  of  liberal 
education.  And  if  our  definition  of  a  liberal  educa- 
tion be  correct,  a  man  may  be  a  man  of  culture  though 
destitute  of  Latin  and  Greek.  On  the  other  hand,  in- 
asmuch as  a  liberal  education  has  regard  to  the  ideal 
of  "man,"  it  follows  (and  is  a  fact  admitted  by  all) 
that  the  humanistic  or  maw-subjects  promote  a  liberal 
education,  and  consequent  culture,  in  a  sense  which 
realistic  studies  do  not.  A  man  trained  solely  on  the 
latter  cannot  be  liberally  educated  ;  a  man  trained 
solely  on  the  former  can,  on  the  contrary,  be  liberally 


v.]  Educative  Process   G-enerally.  39 

educated.  In  short,  what  is  called  "  culture  "  is  not 
within  reach  of  the  man  trained  solely  on  the  real- 
naturalistic,  but  it  is  attainable  by  the  man  trained 
solely  on  the  real-humanistic.  At  the  same  time, 
naturalistic  siibjects,  I  admit,  might  be  so  taught  as 
to  be  humanised,  and  thus  come  within  the  sphere  of 
the  humanistic. 


LECTURE   VI. 

MATERIALS  IN  THEIR  RELATION  TO  THE  NUTRITION 
OF  MIND. 

WE  have  now  to  consider  the  real  elements  of 
education,  naturalistic  and  humanistic,  one  after  the 
other,  and  ascertain  what  is  the  precise  significance 
of  each  for  man,  and  in' what  sense  they  contribute  to 
his  nutrition.  Always  limiting  our  range  of  view 
to  the  termination  of  what  is  called  the  period  of 
"  secondary "  instruction,  —  the  age  of  seventeen 
complete,  —  we  have  to  ascertain  how  much  of  each 
subject  ought  to  be  acquired  within  that  period  with 
a  view  to  the  regulation  of  life  —  right  judgment  and 
good  action. 

Two  governing  considerations  must  accompany  us 
in  this  inquiry,  and  be  assumed  throughout. 

1.  Whatever  subjects  we  teach,  each  should  be  so 
taught  from  the  beginning,  that  at  whatever  age  social 
necessities   may  interrupt  the  course  of  instruction, 
the  pupil  shall  have  received  all  the  benefit  from  it 
which  his  age  admits  of. 

2.  Inasmuch  as  the  supreme  end  is  always  ethical, 
instruction  in  every  subject,  and  at   every  stage   of 
that  subject,  should  be  dominated  by  this  end  as  re- 
gards its  quantity,  quality,  and  method. 

40 


LECT.  vi.]  Materials  as  Nutrition.  41 

[Here  follows  a  consideration  of  real  subjects  in 
detail  and  their  educational  values,  —  considered  as 
materials  or  substance  of  knowledge.  The  discussion 
extends  over  five  or  six  lectures,  which  would  too 
much  encumber  this  book.] 

Note.  —  Though  it  is  to  anticipate,  let  me  here  say  a  word 
as  to  the  Instruction-Plan.  There  has  been  much  writing 
ou  the  question  of  the  organisation  of  schools  —  primary, 
secondary,  and  so  forth.  The  organisation  of  a  school  is  an 
external  matter,  and  sums  itself  up  in  the  time-table. 

A  far  more  important  question  is  the  organisation  of  the 
instruction;  and  the  first  difficulty  here  is  the  selection  of 
subjects  which  we  think  boys  and  girls  ought  to  have  stud- 
ied by  the  time  they  reach  the  age  of  seventeen  complete, 
and  how  much  of  each. 

Then,  we  have  to  determine  the  amount  and  nature  of  the 
instruction  in  each  subject  at  the  different  stages  of  mental 
growth.  Every  age  has  its  own  studies.  The  knowledge  of 
each  and  every  subject  taught  must  grow  with  the  growth  of 
the  mind  we  are  educating,  and  not  anticipate  it.  If  it  an- 
ticipate it,  the  result  of  the  instruction  is  not  knowledge,  but 
rote-information . 

The  organisation  of  instruction  is  a  difficult  task.  It  is 
not  at  all  necessary  for  educational  purposes  that  boys  and 
girls  of  seventeen  should  know  much  of  anything,  but  it  is 
essential  that  they  know  thoroughly,  according  to  a  sound  method, 
what  they  profess  to  know,  and  that,  when  they  leave  school, 
they  find  themselves,  through  the  skill  and  devotedness  of 
their  teachers,  in  a  rational  attitude  to  all  knowledge.1  I 
shall  illustrate  the  quantity  of  knowledge  to  be  conveyed, 
and  its  gradation,  when  I  speak  in  detail  of  applied  method. 
The  amount,  however,  is  of  little  value  compared  with  the 

1 1  am  well  aware  that  with  some  boys  and  girls  such  results  are 
unattainable ;  none  the  less  do  they  constitute  the  teacher's  aim  and 
ideal. 


42  Institutes  of  Education.          [LKCT.  vi. 

result  in  respect  of  intellectual  exactness,  intellectual  interest, 
and  intellectual  power. 


We  have  now  before  us  the  Ethical  End  in  its  full 
statement.  We  have  also  laid  down  the  Educative 
Process  in  general ;  and  dealt  with  the  first  part  of 
the  process,  viz.  Right  Judgment,  in  so  far  as  this  is 
dependent  on  mere  knowledge.  We  have  further 
surveyed  the  materials  of  this  knowledge  —  the  sub- 
jects which  a  youth  of  seventeen  ought  to  have 
studied,  distinguishing  those  which  are  essential  and 
those  which,  though  only  accessory,  are  yet  important. 
However  much  more  a  youth  may  know,  these  things 
(pp.  34,  35,  36)  he  ought  to  know,  if  he  is  to  be  fitly 
educated  for  the  work  of  life  and  his  ethical  function 
in  life.  The  youth  of  active  mind  will  extend  his 
knowledge  far  beyond  any  limits  which  we  might 
think  it  reasonable  to  set;  but  all  extension  beyond 
these  limits  has  to  do  with  the  elevation  of  the  plane 
of  intellectual  and  ethical  life  and  the  reach  of  the 
mental  horizon,  rather  than  with  that  knowledge  which 
is  imperative  for  all. 


LECTURE   VII. 

MATERIALS  IN  THEIR  RELATION  TO  THE  TRAINING  AND 
DISCIPLINE  OF  MIND. 

To  Right  Judgment  is  necessary,  not  only  knowl- 
edge, but  an  active,  vigorous,  and  discriminating  in- 
telligence. The  saying,  -''Knowledge  is  power,"  is 
only  a  half-truth ;  for,  without  an  active  and  vigorous 
intellect,  it  may  be  a  burden  and  an  obstruction. 
When  we  consider  that  the  mere  experience  of  life, 
apart  from  books  and  schools,  may  give  man  almost 
all  he  wants  for  the  moral  guidance  of  his  life  in  all 
ordinary  matters,  if  only  he  can  bring  to  bear  on  that 
experience  a  perspicacious,  penetrating,  and  interpret- 
ing intellect,  we  feel  that  power  alone  is  power,  and 
that  knowledge  —  the  accumulated  results  of  experi- 
ence —  must  take  a  second  place  in  the  education  of  a 
human  being.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  scarcely  correct 
to  say  that  training  and  discipline  are  of  more  impor- 
tance than  knowledge.  Mathematics,  for  example, 
disciplines  the  intelligence ;  and  we  can  easily  con- 
ceive a  mind  admirably  disciplined  by  mathematics, 
but  conspicuously  faulty  in  judgment  because  of  its 
ignorance  of  the  real  and  concrete  relations  of  things 
into  which  moral  and  aesthetic  elements  always  largely 
enter.  So  with  all  pure  discipline  as  such.  Accord- 

43 


44  Institutes  of  Education.  [LKCT. 

iugly,  the  substance  of  knowledge  acquired  —  the  food 
or  nutrition  of  mind,  is  of  more  importance  than  some 
educationalists  are  disposed  to  think.  Let  us  say 
that  instruction  and  discipline  are,  in  fact,  of  equal 
moment.  Instruction,  however,  naturally  first  engages 
our  attention  when  we  have  a  mind  to  educate.  There 
is  a  void  before  us  which  we  have  to  fill. 

Now  we  can  instruct,  in  a  sense,  without  giving  any 
appreciable  training  and  discipline  to  the  intelligence. 
For  our  instruction  may  be  merely  information  —  facts 
which  the  pupil  commits  to  memory  ;  the  reducing  of 
these  to  rational  cohesion  being  left  to  the  chapter 
of  accidents.  The  acquiring  of  information,  simply  as 
information  and  as  an  exercise  of  memory,  is  what  is 
meant  by  rote-instruction.  Among  other  evils  attend- 
ing such  a  mode  of  conveying  knowledge  is  this,  that 
it  cannot  possibly  interest  and  attract  the  intellect,  or 
the  moral  and  spiritual  nature,  of  a  human  being ;  and 
thus,  a  distaste  for  learning  and  a  silent  antagonism 
to  the  teacher,  and  also  to  authority  generally,  are 
generated.  Accordingly,  it  has  been  found  necessary 
to  inflict  physical  chastisement,  and  to  appeal  to  fear 
in  various  other  forms,  in  order  to  compel  the  majority 
of  boys  to  do  the  work  of  rote-acquisition.  In  truth, 
this  way  of  instructing  is  always  necessarily  accom- 
panied with  severity  of  discipline ;  and  hence,  the 
teacher  or  magister  has  been  popularly  known  through 
all  the  ages  as  pedant,  dominie,  castigator  puerorum, 
plagosus,  and  so  forth. 

Again,  we  may  instruct  intelligently,  but  with  a 
view  to  discipline  alone.  In  that  case,  we  equally  fail 


vii.]  Training  and  Discipline.  45 

to  interest  the  young  mind,  and  so  to  achieve  our  ulti- 
mate intellectual  purpose,  which  is  the  placing  of  the 
mind  in  an  attitude  of  rational  activity  to  all  knowl- 
edge. Such  an  attitude  can  exist  only  when  there  is 
interest  as  well  as  discipline.  The  growing  body  can- 
not be  fed  by  a  series  of  difficult  exercises  in  digest- 
ing, but  only  by  food  which  it  can  readily  assimilate 
and  digest.  So  with  the  mind :  it  demands  feeding, 
and  the  food  must  be  of  a  kind  that  it  can  digest  and 
assimilate  if  it  is  to  grow  either  in  knowledge  or  in 
power,  and  above  all,  in  intellectual  interest. 

These  considerations  place  us,  as  students  of  the 
science  and  art  of  education,  in  a  critical  position. 
Are  the  questions  of  assimilation  of  knowledge  and 
of  discipline  to  power  different  questions  which  yield 
us  answers  involving  mutual  contradiction  ?  If  so, 
our  case  as  educationalists  would  be  a  bad  one ;  for 
we  should  have  to  follow  two  different  methods  in 
order  to  attain  the  two  different  ends  —  nutrition  and 
discipline.  Fortunately  it  is  not  so  ;  the  best  method 
of  instructing  with  a  view  to  assimilation,  is  also  the 
best  method  of  training  and  disciplining  with  a  view 
to  power,  as  we  shall  see.  The  educational  problem 
is  thus  simplified. 

In  the  preceding  paragraph  I  have  assumed  that 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  Method  :  and  a  method  may 
be  good,  better,  or  best.  Indeed,  the  etymology  of  the 
word  "  instruction  "  would  of  itself  suggest  to  us  that 
there  is  method,  for  it  implies  the  building  of  one 


46  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

course  on  another  in  a  certain  order  with  a  view  to 
the  completing  of  a  structure. 

All  will  admit  that  there  must  be  some  method  of 
instructing:  and  further,  that  the  best  method  must 
be  that  which  follows  the  way  in  which  the  fabric  of 
mind  builds  itself  up.  This,  indeed,  is  the  ultimate 
form  in  which  the  question  of  educational  method 
must  be  put.  This  is  also,  let  it  be  noted,  the  ultimate 
question  of  all  psychology  (and  to  a  large  extent  of 
metaphysics  also),  so  closely  are  the  philosophy  of 
mind  and  the  education  of  mind  connected.  The 
answer  to  the  one  question  is  the  answer  to  the  other. 
But  the  student  of  education  asks  the  question  always 
with  a  practical  purpose,  and  especially  with  distinct 
reference  to  the  building  up  or  growing  of  mind.  He 
does  not,  in  a  mere  abstract  interest,  analyse  the  com- 
plex result  before  him  —  the  adult  mind ;  but  mind 
in  its  process  of  gradual  formation:  and  even  this 
abstract  question  he  investigates  with  a  view  to  a 
further  question,  viz.  "  What  can  I  wisely  do  to  help 
mind  to  grow  so  that  it  may  reach  a  certain  ideal 
standard  of  knowledge  and  power?"  All  the  tradi- 
tionary words  that  have  to  do  with  the  bringing  up  of 
the  young  point  etymologically  to  this,  as  that  which 
underlies  all  the  particular  problems  of  the  family 
and  the  school,  e.g.  "education,"  "training,"  "in- 
struction," "  discipline." 

The  best  method  of  instruction,  I  have  said,  is  also 
happily,  the  best  method  of  disciplining.  We  may  fix 
our  attention,  then,  on  the  method  of  instructing,  since 
we  shall  find  that  the  method  of  discipline  is  therein 


vn.]  Training  and  Discipline.  47 

also  contained.  By  a  sound  method  of  instruction  we 
shall  find  that  we  best  train  and  discipline  the  mind, 
and  by  a  sound  method  of  training  and  discipline  we 
shall  find  that  we  best  instruct  it.  This  will  appear 
more  clearly  as  we  go  along.  In  the  meantime,  as  we 
have  already  defined  the  term  "  instruct,"  let  us  now 
endeavour,  before  going  further,  to  find  whether  there 
is  any  distinction  between  "training"  and  "disciplin- 
ing"—  two  words  which  I  have  generally  used  to- 
gether, as  if  in  their  combination  they  expressed  one 
notion. 

"  Training  "  and  "  disciplining  "  are  essentially  the 
same  process;  but  there  is  a  distinction. 

To  train  the  intelligence,  is  to  carry  it,  or  lead  it, 
through  the  various  steps  which  end  in  the  knowledge 
of  anything,  e.g.  I  lead  a  boy,  step  by  step,  through 
the  processes  which  end  in  his  adequate  comprehension 
of  the  demonstration  of  a  geometrical  theorem,  and  I 
thus  train  his  intelligence,  inasmuch  as  I  guide  him 
through  intelligent  processes ;  and  in  so  far  as  I  ac- 
custom him  to  such  processes.  He  reconstructs  in  his 
own  mind,  by  my  help  and  imitatively,  the  thought  of 
the  original  mathematician,  and  the  thinking  process 
in  him  is  thereby  trained.  Now,  to  discipline  is  the 
same  as  to  train,  with  this  difference,  that  I  call  on 
the  boy  to  initiate  for  himself,  and  carry  through  for 
himself  without  my  help,  the  processes  which  end  in 
the  demonstration  of  a  theorem  or  problem  ;  as,  for 
example,  when  I  set  a  rider.  To  do  this  a  boy  has  to 
think  more  closely,  to  apply  himself  more  intensely, 


48  Institutes  of  Education.         [LECT.  vn. 

and  in  finding  out  the  steps  of  proof  for  himself 
he  approaches  more  closely  thought  in  itself,  —  the 
processes  of  reason  as  such,  and  the  conditions  of  its 
satisfaction. 

Discipline  of  intelligence,  accordingly,  is  the  self- 
initiated  activity  of  intelligence  with  a  view  to  an  end. 
Approximately,  it  is  the  abstract  exercise  of  intelli- 
gence. Thus  it  is  that  formal  or  abstract  studies 
discipline  much  more  surely  and  effectively  than 
real  studies  do :  they  demand  self-sustained  and  self- 
directed  application. 

Every  mental  act  which  involves  self-conscious  un- 
aided effort  is  of  the  nature  of  discipline. 

Training  and  discipline  are  thus  constantly,  in  prac- 
tice, passing  into  each  other. 

Let  it  now  be  admitted  that  if  a  master,  when  in- 
structing in  a  subject,  does  so  in  such  a  way  as  to  train 
and  discipline  the  intelligence  by  means  of  the  subject, 
he  will  thereby  not  only  best  accomplish  this  impor- 
tant part  of  his  educational  task,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  best  give  instruction.  A  "  war  "  is  a  "  method,'-' 
and  we  are  now  brought  face  to  face  with  METHO- 
DOLOGY —  i.e.  the  way  of  best  instructing,  that  so  we  may 
best  train  and  discipline,  the  intelligence. 

[I  postpone  the  question  of  the  Training  and  Dis- 
cipline of  the  moral  and  spiritual  nature.] 


LECTURE   VIII. 

METHODOLOGY  AND  ITS   SCIENTIFIC   BASIS. 

IT  now  appears  that  we  best  instruct  if  we  pursue 
the  method  of  instruction  which  best  trains  and  dis- 
ciplines, and  that  we  best  train  and  discipline  if  we 
pursue  the  best  method  of  instruction. 

Now,  the  way  or  method  of  instruction  is,  in  brief, 
the  way  or  method  of  knowing,  or  learning.  To  teach 
with  perfect  success,  the  teacher  must  put  himself  in 
the  position  and  attitude  of  the  pupil  who,  being  igno- 
rant, desires  to  know. 

It  is  beyond  all  question  that  we  can  say  nothing 
rationally  of  the  method  of  knowing  without  analys- 
ing the  process  whereby  mind  as  a  matter  of  fact 
knows ;  that  is  to  say,  appropriates  and  makes  use  of 
the  raw  materials  presented  to  it  with  a  view  to  the 
building  up  of  the  fabric  of  knowledge.  Doubtless 
we  might  collect  together  the  results  of  such  an 
analysis,  as  propounded  by  some  well-known  writer 
on  philosophy,  and  give  them  to  you  as  a  dogmatic 
system,  under  the  name  of  "  Rules  of  Procedure,  or 
Methods."  We  might  then  apply  these  rules,  one  by 
one,  under  the  head  of  "  Applied  Method,"  to  instruc- 
tion in  this,  that,  or  the  other  subject,  and  show  how 

40 


50  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

they  worked  out.  And  this  would  itself  be  a  great  gain. 
But  it  would  not  be  the  Science  of  method,  or  the  scien- 
tific study  of  method,  but  only  the  more  or  less  slavish 
acquisition  of  the  rules  of  the  art  of  instructing 
and  disciplining  the  intelligence.  These  rules,  when 
further  extended  to  moral  and  religious  instruction 
and  training,  would  constitute  the  whole  art  of  educa- 
tion—  an  art  based  on  science,  it  is  true,  but  not 
studied  as  a  science  by  you,  the  teacher,  and,  therefore, 
dead,  as  mere  dogma  always  must  be. 

Accordingly,  if  we  are  to  proceed  scientifically  and 
introduce  the  teacher  to  the  science  or  philosophy  of 
his  art,  enable  him  to  see  the  principles  which  guar- 
antee and  inspire  method,  and  how  it  is  that  they 
contribute  effectually  to  our  supreme  ethical  end,  we 
must  ask  him  to  analyse  with  us  the  process  of  know- 
ing :  in  other  words,  we  must  ask  him  to  study  the 
psychology  of  intelligence  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  growth  of  intelligence.  While  dwelling  for  a 
time  in  this  abstract  region,  we  shall  always  keep 
steadily  in  view  our  practical  aim.  It  is  not  psycho- 
logy as  an  abstract  study  that  here  concerns  us,  but 
psychology  in  its  relations  to  the  education  of  mind, 
that  is  to  say,  psychology  in  so  far  as  it  yields  the 
Art  of  education  as  a  system  of  principles ;  or,  briefly, 
as  Methodology. 

I  have  now,  accordingly,  to  ask  you  to  accompany 
me  into  the  abstract  field  of  the  philosophy  of  mind 
with  special  reference  to  education.  Apart  from  its 
professional  importance  to  you,  it  must  be  accepted  as 
part  of  your  academic  discipline.  For  I  hold  that  the 


vni.]      Methodology  and  its  Scientific  Basis.        51 

study  of  education  is  itself  an  education,  and  rightly 
claims  a  position  among  university  disciplines;  and 
that  not  in  the  interests  of  school-teaching  alone  :  for 
the  philosophy  of  education  is  a  philosophy  of  life. 

Note.  —  It  will  be  said  that  all  of  us,  whether  boys  or  men, 
learn  something  somehow,  whatever  the  method  of  teaching, 
and  that  very  clever  boys  learn  a  great  deal.  If  scientific 
method  is  of  so  much  importance,  how  is  this  to  be  accounted 
for?  In  answer  to  this  question  I  would  submit  the  follow- 
ing considerations :  — 

1.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  great  majority  of  boys  learn 
very  little,  and  get  no  mental  discipline  worth  mentioning. 

2.  The  proportion  of  those  who  learn  anything  is  greater 
in  primary  schools  than  in  secondary,  and  this  simply  be- 
cause primary  teachers  are  as  a  rule  alive  to  method  (such 
as  it  is). 

3.  All  boys  learn  something,  it  is  said,  and  some  boys 
learn  a  good  deal  spite  of  bad  teaching.     True,  and  the  ex- 
planation of  this  is  that  human  reason  is  a  pure  activity, 
and  that  it  either  shirks  a  difficulty  and  turns  to  something 
else,  or  it  seeks  of  itself  io  reduce  to  order  and  method  the 
confused  lessons  of  the  master.     The  abler  minds  accom- 
plish this  task :  the  great  majority  cannot  do  so,  and  never 
do  so. 

4.  It  is  universally  admitted  that  boys  learn  more,  and 
get  better  discipline,  from  a  good  teacher  than  from  a  bad 
one,  and  that  many  good,  and  some  admirable,  teachers  have 
been  untrained.     But  if  we  look  closely  we  shall  find  that 
the  "  good "  teacher  is  a  man  who  instinctively  follows  good 
methods,  whether  he  knows  it  or  not.     The  philosophy  or 
theory  of  education   includes  the   questions  of  end,  of  the 
educative   process,  of  the  materials  of  instruction    and  of 
method.     Now,  the  earnest  teacher  has  always  in  his  mind 
some  theory  more  or  less  vague;    and  having  end,  general 
process,  and  materials  clearly  present  to  him,  he  instinctively, 
if  he  is  as  able  as  he  is  earnest,  finds,  ere  long,  a  way  or 


52  Institutes  of  Education.         [LECT.  vm. 

method  of  instruction  which  is  fairly  good.  Also,  because 
he  is  earnest  in  his  work,  he  relies  largely  on  moral  stimulus. 
This  is  the  sort  of  man  we  call  a  "  good "  teacher,  and 
whose  success  we  admire.  The  object  of  the  study  of  ed- 
ucation as  a  science  and  an  art  is  simply  to  bring  the  end, 
process,  and  materials  early  into  clear  consciousness  in  the 
case  of  this  naturally  good  teacher,  and  to  show  him,  before 
he  begins,  the  best  way  or  method  of  doing  his  daily  work, 
and  so  making  it  even  more  effective  than  it  is.  As  regards 
all  other  teachers  (the  vast  majority),  the  object  is  to  raise 
them  to  the  level  of  the  "  good  "  teacher  —  a  level  which  they 
could  never  attain  but  by  the  help  of  instruction  in  their 
professional  work.  The  study  of  education,  in  short,  makes 
the  good  master  better  and  brings  the  inferior  master  up  to 
a  fair  average,  and  in  very  many  cases,  indeed,  makes  him  a 
thoroughly  good  teacher,  as  the  results  of  our  primary  train- 
ing colleges  have  amply  proved. 

Then,  quite  apart  from  this  practical  aim,  the  study  of 
education  places  the  whole  profession  on  a  higher  intellectual 
plane.  Whatever  raises  the  schoolmaster's  conception  of 
his  task  makes  him  a  better  man.  Whatever  instructs  him 
as  to  his  duties,  makes  him  a  better  teacher.  A  firm  hold, 
moreover,  of  end,  principles,  and  method  gives  him  faith  in 
his  daily  work. 


53 


SECOND    PART. 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  INTELLIGENCE  AS 

YIELDING    THE  METHODOLOGY 

OF  EDUCATION. 


LECTURE   I. 

THE   ANIMAL  MIND. 

POET  and  peasant  are  alike  in  this,  that  they  are 
dependent  on  tradition.  Differ  as  they  may  in  tem- 
perament and  in  the  quality  of  nerve-tissue,  their 
minds  would  at  the  beginning  of  their  life-career  be 
blank,  were  it  not  for  the  inheritance  which  parents 
and  society  pass  on  to  them.  The  form  and  outer 
expression  of  a  man's  poetic  possibilities  are  as  de- 
pendent on  the  imagery  of  feeling  and  of  thought, 
and  on  the  store  of  language  to  which  he  succeeds,  as 
on  the  materials  of  his  present  environment.  The 
peasant,  again,  finds  his  standard  of  life,  and  a  way 
of  judging  things  and  of  using  the  instruments  of  a 
struggle  with  nature,  ready-made  for  him.  Tradition 
is  the  handing  on  of  the  achievements  of  the  past,  and 
all  are  alike  dependent  on  it.  The  schoolmaster  plays 
an  important  part  as  one  of  the  chief  vehicles  of  trans- 
mission. Whether  aptitudes,  moral  and  intellectual, 
acquired  during  each  generation's  life  are  also  handed 
on,  has  lately  been  doubted  by  the  biologist.  If  it  be 
really  so,  the  progress  of  humanity  is  less  assured 
than  it  was  thought  to  be  ten  or  twenty  years  ago. 
The  power  of  the  existing  generation  in  influencing 
the  future  of  our  race  is  lessened ;  but  the  teacher's 

55 


56  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

responsibilities  as  the  transmitter  of  the  past  are  not 
thereby  diminished,  but  rather  increased. 

With  animals  there  is  no  tradition  of  recorded 
victories ;  and  if  the  new  theory  be  accepted,  no  tradi- 
tion even  of  acquired  aptitudes.  They  simply  inherit 
a  certain  constitution,  and  they  have  to  make  the  best 
of  it  in  an  ever-renewed  contest  with  nature.  They 
have  mind  as  we  have ;  but  mind  within  certain  re- 
strictions of  faculty. 

If  we  are  to  understand  the  human  mind,  we  cannot 
do  better  than  try  to  understand  and  to  interpret  the 
animal  mind  in  its  highest  forms,  for  we  shall  thereby 
ascertain  in  what  respects  we  differ  from  animals. 
We,  too,  are  animals;  but  something  more.  It  is 
because  we,  as  self-conscious  subjects,  are  animal  and 
something  more,  that  we  are  able,  by  observing  the 
lower  organisms  around  us,  to  say  something  regarding 
them,  and  get  some  light  on  what  man  is  and  can  be. 
If  we  take  the  human  mind  by  itself,  without  regard 
to  other  and  lower  stages  of  mind,  we  are  apt  to  com- 
mingle elements  which  ought  to  be  kept  distinct,  and 
to  interpret  phenomena  in  a  confused  and  often  self- 
contradictory  way. 

We  certainly  share  with  the  higher  class  of  animals, 
not  only  the  feeling  of  life-activity  and  life-impulse 
generally,  but  specific  forms  of  these.  All  our  ap- 
petites, as  determined  by  our  bodily  needs,  the  out- 
going feelings  and  desires  which  enter  into  our  scheme 
of  moral  motives  —  e.g.  the  feeling  of  goodwill  or 
kindness  to  others,  a  feeling  of  the  supremacy  of 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  57 

certain  things  over  us  (in  animals  little  more  than 
fear,  which  suggests  escape  from  the  presence  of  that 
which  is  felt  to  be  more  powerful),  and  a  feeling  of 
satisfaction  or  complacence  in  the  goodwill  or  kind- 
ness of  others  towards  us. 

Let  me  illustrate.  When  a  lion  and  lioness  are 
lying  with  their  cubs  in  a  cavern,  the  lioness  licking 
her  young  or  giving  to  them  of  the  fruit  of  her  own 
body,  or  such  fragments  of  the  chase  as  she  may  have 
brought  home  from  her  last  raid,  while  the  attendant 
lion  growls  defiantly  on  hearing  a  crackling  among 
the  reeds  which  he  associates  with  a  wild  elephant 
or  boa-constrictor,  we  have  all  the  primitive  feelings 
which  I  have  above  summarised  in  one  tableau.  In 
addition,  we  have  the  feeling  of  resistance  to  an  exter- 
nal power  as  threatening  the  life  of  the  family.  Nay, 
more,  we  must  at  once  see  that  the  community  of 
tenderness  rests  on  a  primary  bond  between  the  mem- 
bers of  this  group,  which  is  Sympathy  —  that  is,  the 
feeling  of  the  feelings  of  others,  and  the  consequent 
presence  of  a  disposition  to  satisfy  the  feelings  and 
desires  of  others,  in  so  far  as  these  betoken  a  need  of 
any  kind. 

This  is  a  picture,  not  only  of  the  animal,  but  of  the 
primitive  man  in  his  primitive  relations,  which  he 
can  no  more  help  than  he  can  help  eating  when  he  is 
hungry  or  drinking  when  he  is  thirsty. 

But  at  this  point  the  lion  stops ;  whereas  the  man, 
his  wife,  and  children  in  the  stone  cave  have  in  them 
possibilities,  which  may  be  said  to  be  (speaking 
loosely)  infinite,  though  always  restricted  by  racial 
characteristics  and  possibilities. 


58  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

Let  me  point  out,  that  in  addition  to  the  bodily 
appetites  which  have  to  do  with  self-preservation, 
propagation,  etc.,  we  have  in  the  above  lion-group 
sympathy,  kindness  towards  others,  a  pleasing  sensa- 
tion in  receiving  kindness  from  others,  a  feeling  of  an 
actual  or  possible  higher  power,  and  of  resistance  to 
that  power  as  threatening  the  life  or  happiness  of 
the  lion  and  his  family.  We  can  easily  imagine  the 
approach  of  a  force  so  great  as  to  overpower  resist- 
ance by  anticipation,  and  cause  fear  for  life  and  a 
rapid  retreat  for  safety. 

What  now  have  we  here  as  instincts  ? 

1.  Bodily  appetites  concerned  in  the  preservation 
of  life  and  the  continuity  of  the  species. 

2.  Sympathy. 

3.  Goodwill  to  others. 

4.  Love  of  the  goodwill  of  others. 

5.  Feeling  of  superior  power  and  dependence  on  it. 

6.  Fear. 

7.  Resistance  to  drive  off  danger  to   life  (animal 
courage) . 

If  man  were  no  more  than  this  bundle  of  needs,  in 
the  form  of  appetitive  impulses  and  desires,  which  we 
find  in  the  lion,  he  would  not  be  man ;  he  would  not 
be  even  the  king  of  beasts  (save  in  the  range  of  his 
sympathy,  of  which  more  hereafter),  for  the  lion 
would  soon  make  short  work  of  him.  So  much  for 
the  feelings  and  impulses,  which  we  call  instincts, 
because  they  are  connate.  Let  us  consider,  next,  the 
phenomena  which  we  call  the  intelligence  of  the 
animal. 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  59 

We  have  to  go  beyond  mere  feelings  and  impulses, 
and  their  inevitable  manifestation  in  certain  circum- 
stances, as,  e.g.  when  the  lion  roars  defiance  in  the 
circumstances  we  have  supposed,  viz.  the  approach  of 
an  alarming  power.  This  necessity  of  going  beyond 
mere  feeling  is  forced  upon  us,  if  by  nothing  else 
than  by  this,  that  the  feelings  of  which  we  have  been 
speaking  arise  only  after  something  else  has  happened 
in  the  economy  of  the  lion-mind. 

That  something  else  is  seeing,  hearing,  and  tactile- 
sensation.  Make  your  lion  deaf,  and  blind,  and  in- 
sensible to  touch,  and  nothing  happens  as  we  have 
described  it. 

Certain  impressions  are  made  on  what  we  call  his 
consciousness,  because  he  becomes  conscious  or  aware 
of  them,  through  his  eyes,  his  ears,  and  his  skin.  He 
feels  these  impressions  in  his  conscious  living  subject 
—  the  impression  of  a  crackling  in  the  reeds,  of  the 
sudden  presentation  of  a  wild  elephant  or  boa-con- 
strictor, and  of  the  personal  contact  of  his  lioness  and 
her  whelps.  These  impressions  are  impressions  of 
noise,  touch,  size,  shape,  motion,  colour  (in  this  rudi- 
mentary sense  at  least,  that  the  colour  of  the  elephant 
is  different  from  the  impression  made  by  the  sur- 
rounding atmosphere  and  the  forest). 

The  ear  and  the  tactual  sensibility  thus  furnish 
materials  or  facts  to  the  lion's  consciousness  as  they 
do  to  ours,  but  not  to  the  same  extent,  or  with  the 
same  delicacy  or  variety  as  the  eyes  do,  for  they  are 
the  chief  channels  of  communication  with  the  outer 
world.  We  shall,  therefore,  drop  here  all  reference 


60  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

(except  as  it  may  arise  incidentally)  to  any  channel 
of  sense-impression  save  the  eyes.  This  we  do  in 
view  of  the  task  before  us,  and  because  what  is  true 
of  the  eyes  is  true,  mutatis  mutandis,  of  other  organs  of 
communication  between  the  mind  or  consciousness 
of  the  lion  and  the  external  world  in  which  he  lives, 
and  with  which  he  has  the  hard  work  of  correlating 
himself,  in  the  interests  of  himself  and  his  family,  so 
as  to  secure  a  pleasing  or  instinct-satisfied  existence. 

I  would  at  this  point  emphasise  the  phenomenon  of 
Feeling  in  presence  of  a  presentation  as  the  most  uni- 
versal and  primary  experience  of  animal  being.  It  is 
the  starting-point  of  all  manifestations  of  conscious- 
ness, and  lies  at  the  root  of  all  that  animal  and  man 
are  and  can  be. 

Feeling  cannot  in  any  strict  logical  sense  be  de- 
fined; but  it  can  be  marked  off  from  other  experi- 
ences, and  in  contrast  with  them.  It  is  a  vague  and 
indefinite  awareness  of  a  movement  within  the  subject 
effected  by  a  stimulus  within,  or  from  without,  the 
physical  organism.  Without  feeling  there  could  be 
no  beginning  of  conscious  life,  and  in  the  highest  ex- 
pressions of  even  self-conscious  reason  it  is  the  ulti- 
mate guarantee  that  there  is  anything  present  at  all. 
In  the  most  abstract  mathematical  process  a  man  in 
the  energy  of  pursuit  is  not  self-conscious  of  that 
process,  and  cannot  be  so  until  he  makes  that  process 
an  object  to  himself;  but,  all  the  while,  he  is  sup- 
ported by  the  vague  and  indefinite  feeling  of  conscious 
activity  —  a  feeling  and  nothing  more. 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind,  61 

When  an  animal  or  an  infant-man  (passing  over 
the  preliminary  experiences  of  life)  opens  his  eyes, 
his  nerve  system,  and  through  this  his  consciousness, 
becomes  aware,  through  the  external  stimulus  which 
we  call  an  impression,  of  an  universal  extensity  in 
which  nothing  is  denned,  all  is  confused  and  chaotic. 
Subject  and  object  are,  though  not  identical  in  fact, 
yet  identical  in  feeling.  There  is  no  separation  of 
feeling-subject  from  felt-object,  still  less  is  there 
separation  of  one  object  from  another.  We  know 
that  there  must  be  a  reaction  in  the  nerve-cells,  but  it 
is  not  sufficiently  energetic  to  reflect  the  stimulus  as 
something  not  the  subject  feeling. 

By  dint  of  continuous  and  oft-repeated  impact  the 
reaction  becomes  gradually  more  energetic,  and  the 
external  stimulus  B  is  placed  outside  as  not  the  feel- 
ing-consciousness A. 

Generally  it  will  be  found  that  in  its  earliest  mani- 
festations this  feeling  of  a  not-A  is  restricted  to  a 
single  point,  and  does  not  embrace  the  totality  of  the 
stimulating  or  impressing  B.  For  example,  a  snail, 
instinctively  putting  out  its  organ  of  sensation,  touches 
a  rough  stone  and  turns  aside,  or  a  leaf  and  takes  pos- 
session of  it ;  it  does  not  feel  the  stone  or  leaf  in  their 
respective  totalities  as  stone  or  leaf,  but  feels  only  a 
certain  repulsion  or  attraction  limited  to  a  single 
point.  So,  in  the  vegetable  unconscious  world  we 
have  an  anticipation  of  this  conscious  action,  as  in  the 
fly-catcher.  There  is  more  than  vague  feeling  so  far 
as  the  snail  is  concerned;  there  is  a  definite  feeling 
of  a  "  single "  which  is  not-A ;  and  I  would  call  this 


62  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

punctual  consciousness  "  sensation  "  in  its  lowest  form, 
and  assign  to  it  the  name  Sensibility. 

It  would  require  a  patient,  critical,  and  sympathetic 
observation  of  the  infant  and  animal  mind  to  say  at 
what  point  a  stimulating  object  is  more  than  this  unit 
of  sensation  which  I  have  called  sensibility.  To  de- 
termine the  passage  of  one  stage  of  consciousness  from 
a  lower  to  a  higher  is  probably  impossible,  because  all 
things  progress  by  infinitely  small  steps.  None  the 
less  is  the  step  taken,  as  we  see  from  the  result.  At 
what  fraction  of  a  moment  the  hour-hand  on  a  dial- 
plate  points  to  twelve,  I  cannot  tell,  but  at  one 
moment  it  had  not  arrived  and  at  another  it  had 
passed  it. 

The  next  stage  of  consciousness  of  a  definite  kind 
worthy  of  notice  here,  is  the  feeling  of  total  objects  as 
totals.  But  it  is  manifestly  impossible  to  feel  a  total 
save  in  so  far  as  other  totals  emerge  from  the  chaotic 
confusion  of  the  extended  manifold  and  are  felt  as 
there,  and  yet  as  not  the  particular  total  B,  which  for 
the  moment  specifically  impresses,  attracts,  and  occu- 
pies consciousness. 

The  feeling  of  a  total  as  not-A  (A  being  the  subject) 
but  B,  is  the  feeling  of  B  as  an  object.  There  is  here 
a  distinctly  emergent  duality,  and  we  have  Sensation 
in  full  operation.  This  sensation  involves  a  feeling  of 
diversity  (of  diverse  many  totals),  and  the  particular 
object  specifically  felt  is  that  object  (B)  which  at  the 
moment  most  vividly  impresses  the  conscious  subject ; 
and  B  will  remain  as  the  object  in  the  field  of  sensa- 
tion until  exhaustion  takes  place,  or  until  C  or  D  or  E 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  63 

has  pushed  it  out  and  occupied  the  field  of  conscious- 
ness for  itself  in  turn.  How  long  the  object  B  may  hold 
the  conscious  subject  in  its  grip,  depends  on  the  extent 
to  which  it  interests  the  particular  consciousness  in 
whose  presence  it  is.  The  point  of  special  significance 
here  is  that  sensation  is  still  feeling  in  a  higher  form 
of  reflex  activity,  that  it  is  the  object  which  holds  the 
subject,  and  that  it  is  successive  objects  which  move  it 
hither  and  thither.  The  Subject  is  subject  (in  the 
popular  meaning  of  the  word)  to  the  Object.  We  may 
now,  but  only  now,  talk  of  Sensation  as  a  phenomenon 
of  consciousness,  and  we  may  call  that  which  is  sensed 
the  sensate. 

Some  psychologists  tell  us  that  the  total  object  so  impress- 
ing sense  contains  or  brings  with  it  all  the  categories.  On 
this  see  Note  A,  Appendix.  All  I  would  insist  on  here  is, 
that  the  sensing  of  the  object  involves  externality,  viz.  B 
there  as  extended,  and  the  feeling  of  being  in  B. 

The  sensed  total  there-being  (B)  is  sensed  as  a  total. 
This  is  the  sensate.  Future  experience  tells  us  much 
more  about  it.  We  afterwards  find  that  this  total  is  a 
confused  chaos  of  particulars,  which  we  call  its  quali- 
ties and  relations.  But  in  the  meantime  we  have  to 
be  content  with  the  total  as  a  total. 

This,  however  (as  I  have  already  indicated),  is  not 
all ;  for  the  animal  and  the  infant-man  feel  also  at  the 
same  time  the  diversity  of  objects  outside,  and  in  a 
vague  indefinite  way  their  localised  relations  in  Space 
and  their  successive  relations  in  Time.  I  say  feel, 
simply  to  indicate  that  the  consciousness  of  all  the 


64  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

other  objects  which  crowd  around  B  is  so  incipient  in 
its  character  as  scarcely  to  deserve  the  name  of  sensing 
or  sensation — though  it  truly  belongs  to  this  category. 

Note.  —  To  say  that  an  animal  "  perceives  "  an  external 
object  in  respect  of  its  size,  shape,  colour,  or  relations  to 
other  objects  in  space  or  in  time,  is  to  use  a  term  which,  in 
my  opinion,  is  equivalent  to  knowing ;  and  knowing  is  the 
distinctive  attribute  of  the  man-animal,  as  we  shall  see  in 
the  sequel. 

True,  this  mere  feeling  of  external  objects,  as  objects  and 
as  external,  is  of  every  possible  degree,  and  rises  to  a  point 
of  fineness  and  activity  which  approaches  the  borders  of  per- 
cipience;  but  it  never  crosses  into  percipience  except  in  a 
human  being.  The  sensing  of  external  impressions  is  usu- 
ally regarded  as  the  basis  of  such  intelligence,  intellect,  or 
understanding  as  each  living  organism  may  possess.  Intelli- 
gence in  its  animal  form  is  simply  the  reception  and  arrang- 
ing of  sensates  with  more  or  less  of  reflex  co-ordination  in 
consciousness,  irrespectively  of  the  feelings  or  emotions  which 
they  excite. 

Keeping  to  intelligence,  we  find  that  the  animal  con- 
sciousness receives  the  totalities  of  objects  without 
distinguishing  the  parts  of  these  totalities  and  corre- 
lating them  with  the  total  as  inherent  in  that  total. 

This,  I  think,  is  an  important  point  in  the  natural 
history  of  consciousness.  It  may  be  said,  how  can  an 
animal  see  or  sense  the  whole  of  a  thing  except  through 
the  parts  ?  The  answer  is,  that  the  parts  in  their 
totality  as  a  one  extended  object  —  e.g.  a  stone  —  make 
an  impression  of  a  certain  kind  different  from  that 
which  another  object  in  its  totality  makes  —  e.g.  a 
tree. 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  65 

How,  then,  can  an  animal  possibly,  when  it  sees  a 
stone  for  the  second  or  third  time,  sense  that  object 
as  the  same  object  as  it  has  formerly  sensed,  if  of  the 
numerous  qualities  of  that  object  it  did  not  sense  a 
single  one,  but  only  a  whole  in  which  the  single  "ones  " 
of  quality  were  all  interfused  ?  The  answer  is  to  be 
got  from  your  own  experience.  You  see  a  man's  face 
as  he  quickly  passes  you  in  the  street,  and  if  asked 
five  minutes  afterwards,  you  do  not  even  remember 
that  you  saw  it;  but  to-morrow  the  face  you  saw 
yesterday  meets  you  again,  and  you  are  at  once  aware 
that  you  saw  that  same  face  on  a  previous  occasion, 
although  there  was  no  one  part  of  the  face  —  nose, 
mouth,  eyebrows,  eyes,  chin  —  which  you  could  have 
described  even  approximately  the  moment  before  you 
saw  it  the  second  time  and  became  then  aware  that 
you  had  seen  it  before  —  in  short,  recognised  it.1  So, 
with  your  eye  placed  at  the  hole  in  the  tube,  you  turn 
a  kaleidoscope  and  see  a  certain  arrangement  of  col- 
ours and  forms  in  a  pattern.  You  go  on  turning,  and 
you  see  the  same  pattern  return  within  the  area  of 
your  vision,  and  you  say,  "  I  saw  that  before."  If  I 
ask  you  which  particular  thing  or  things,  character  or 
characters,  in  it  are  the  same  as  that  which  you  saw 
before,  you  cannot  tell  me  one;  but  you  are  none  the 
less  certain  that  it  is  the  same  pattern  or  a  similar 
one ;  that  is  to  say,  the  totality,  or  the  aggregate  of 
impression,  is  quite  similar  to  a  preceding  one,  and 

1  It  is  difficult  to  avoid  this  word  "recognised,"  though  it  is  a 
bad  one,  inasmuch  as  its  etymology  points  to  a  prior  cognition, 
whereas  there  has  been  as  yet  no  cognition  at  all,  but  only  sensation. 


66  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

different,  consequently,  from  all  the  other  totalities 
of  pattern  which  have  been  under  your  eye  during 
the  interval  that  elapsed  between  your  first  seeing  B 
and  then  seeing  the  same  B  return  within  the  area  of 
your  vision. 

Now,  an  animal  does  this.  A  dog  does  not  con- 
found the  second  bone  of  his  experience  with  a  stone. 
He  feels  the  similarity  with  the  first  bone,  although 
none  of  the  specific  qualities  that  go  to  constitute  a 
bone  in  sense  are  sensed  by  him.  No  doubt  he  asso- 
ciates with  bone  No.  2  a  lively  sense  of  satisfaction 
arising  out  of  his  pleasing  relations  of  yesterday  with 
bone  No.  1 ;  but  when  I  hold  out  bone  No.  2  to  him, 
his  recognition  of  it  as  a  bone  is  due  to  the  totality 
of  the  impression  being  similar  to  the  totality  which 
constituted  bone  No.  1. 

And  I  select  this  illustration  because  it  directs  us 
to  the  next  point  which  I  wish  to  note,  which  is 
this  — 

Salient  Qualities  and  Impressions. — While  all  the 
qualities  which  constitute  for  the  dog  the  "  bone  "  to 
sense  are  intermixed  in  a  confused  total,  there  prob- 
ably stands  out  in  relief,  after  some  repetition  at  least, 
one  quality  which  gives  rise  to  a  particularly  lively 
sensation,  viz.  the  smell  or  the  "sweet  edibleness" 
of  the  bone.  This  experience  of  yesterday  with  bone 
No.  1  stands  out  prominently  as  constituting  the  thing 
bone  more  than  anything  else  does,  all  the  other  qual- 
ities gathering  round  this  in  the  confused  aggregate 
of  sensation.  There  has  been  an  unpurposed  selection 
of  what  suits.  Plants  and  animals  alike  are  always 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  67 

selecting  what  suits  them.  The  chief,  the  prominent, 
the  salient  quality  of  the  bone  is  really  the  bone  to 
the  dog,  all  else  being  subordinate  to  the  extent  of 
being  sub-sensational,  by  which  I  mean  within  Feeling, 
or  lying  on  the  border-line  of  mere  Feeling  and  Sen- 
sation proper. 

So  with  other  objects.  With  most  objects  it  is 
simply  the  totality  B,  as  not  C  or  D,  which  has  im- 
pressed the  dog  and  has  clearly  crossed  the  threshold 
of  consciousness,  and  he  senses  the  totality  a  second 
time  with  a  consciousness  of  sameness  or  similarity 
(as  the  case  may  be).  But  with  many  objects  the 
case  is  different :  there  is,  e.g.,  the  bone  in  respect  to 
which  one  salient  quality  ("sweet  edibleness")  im- 
presses him  most  deeply ;  again,  there  is  water ; 
again,  the  specific  smell  of  any  object;  again,  the 
particular  whistle  which,  when  he  hears  it,  calls  up 
into  his  consciousness  the  totality  in  sense  which 
constitutes  his  master. 

Imitation  and  Rivalry.  —  Again  you  will  notice  that 
if  a  dog  runs  at  an  object,  taking  it  for  a  bone,  other 
dogs  will  also  run  and  try  to  be  at  the  object  first, 
although  these  dogs,  or  some  of  them,  may  have  already 
seen  the  object  and  had  not  themselves  sensed  that  it 
was  a  bone.  There  is  here  Imitation.  We  saw  that 
there  was  sympathy  in  the  region  of  the  natural 
feelings ;  we  now,  in  this  incident,  see  sympathy  in 
the  sphere  of  Intelligence. 

And  this  new  phenomenon  further  reveals  a  feel- 
ing in  animals  not  yet  adverted  to  —  the  feeling  or 
emotion  of  rivalry  —  the  desire  to  outstrip  each  other. 


68  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

Imagination.  —  One  point  more  :  the  image  of  what 
has  frequently  been  present  to  a  dog  rises  up  be- 
fore his  consciousness  when  it  is  no  longer  present. 
There  is  evidence  enough  of  this  when  he  is  awake ; 
much  more  when  he  is  asleep  and  dreams  that  he  is 
hunting  or  worrying.  A  dog,  then,  has  Imagination, 
in  its  primary  sense. 

I  have  led  you  through  this  analysis  of  phenomena 
familiar  to  all,  in  order  to  establish  the  following  facts 
regarding  the  sensational  intelligence  of  an  animal  of 
the  higher  order,  viz.  — 

1.  The  animal  senses  a  totality  without  being  con- 
scious or  aware  of    the  separate  qualities  which  to- 
gether go  to  the  making  of  that  totality,  be  it  a  stone, 
or  a  bone,  or  water,  or  anything  else. 

2.  The  animal  may  have,  probably  always  after  a 
time  has,  one  quality  of  that  totality  so  deeply  im- 
pressed on  its  sensory  because  of  its  prominence,  or 
salience,  or  some  specific  relation  which  that  quality 
bears  to  its  own  organic  pleasures  or  pains,  that  the 
total  object  is   to   it  this  particular   quality  plus  a 
vague  and  wholly  unanalysed  agglomeration  of  quali- 
ties which  together  make  a  "total  single"  of  impres- 
sion on  his  sensorium. 

3.  The  animal  senses  the  likeness  and  unlikeness  of 
these  totals  or  objects,  i.e.  it  compares  ;  but  its  com- 
parison is  the  comparison  of  sense  or  sensation,  and 
is  accomplished  on  it  by  the  diversity  of  objects,  not 
by  it. 

4.  The    animal    associates    one    experience    with 
another;   e.g.    when  a  dog  sees   the   cook  open  the 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  69 

kitchen-door,  he  has  a  sensational  image  of  bones,  or 
when  he  hears  a  whistling,  it  calls  up  the  sensational 
image  of  his  master.  The  animal,  then,  has  associa- 
tion of  sensations.1 

5.  The  animal  remembers :  when  he  sees  A  for  the 
second  or  third  time  he  feels  the  resemblance  to  the 
A  of  the  first  time ;  and,  further,  the  association  of  A 
with  B  tends  to  call  up  B  out  of  the  storehouse  of 
recorded  impressions  when  A  presents  itself. 

6.  The   animal   has    imagination :   for  it   not   only 
retains  sensates,  but  these  are  suggested  to  his  con- 
sciousness when  the  actual  object  is  not  present  but 
merely  suggested  by  association.     So  also   when  he 
dreams,  the  image  of  a  sensate  is  clearly  before  him : 
the  dog  hunts  in  his  dreams. 

7.  Two  dogs  seeing  a  bone  at  the  same  moment,  or 
one  seeing  it  and  the  other  instantaneously  interpret- 
ing his  excitement,  run  for  it.     Animals,  then,  have 
sympathy  of  sensational  intelligence. 

8.  Animals  in  presence  of  an  object  of  common  de- 
sire have  a  feeling  of  rivalry  —  a  feeling  of  competi- 
tion one  with  the  other,  which  we  may  call  an  emotion, 
as  it  is  distinct  from  the  desire  for  the  object  they 
pursue. 

But  all  these  characteristics  of  intelligence  are  in 
sensation  alone.  The  conscious  subject  is  moved  hither 
and  thither  by  the  wind  of  the  moment. 

1 1  shall  affirm,  without  further  analysis,  that  the  rule  or  law  of 
this  association  is  fundamentally  this,  that  things  felt  together  (in 
space  or  time),  or  as  immediately  sequent,  tend  to  arise  again 
together  in  the  consciousness, 


70  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

In  short,  an  animal's  intelligence  is  a  reflex  intel- 
ligence. He  receives,  and,  under  the  stimulus  of 
impression  or  recipience  alone,  he  reacts. 

I  am  aware  that  the  term  reflex  is  generally  applied 
only  to  unconscious  response  to  stimulus  in  vegetable 
and  animal.  I  think,  however,  we  need  it  to  mark 
also  a  state  of  conscious  response  to  stimulus.  Ani- 
mals are  conscious  automata. 

The  impressions  of  single  "  totals  "  made  on  consciousness, 
whether  from  within  or  without,  are,  as  we  have  seen,  regis- 
tered for  future  use.  This  means  that  they  involve  some 
process  in  the  nerve-cells.  Consequently,  the  involuntary 
or  accidental  repetition  of  the  process  in  the  cells  (however 
started)  will  place  the  image  of  the  absent  object  before 
consciousness.  Also,  any  particular  stimulus  of  the  nerve- 
cells  may  set  agoing  a  movement  in  another  set  of  cells  in 
a  purely  dynamical  way,  and  without  any  consciousness 
intervening.  This  relation  of  cerebrations,  as  such,  may  be 
held,  and  yet  we  may  also  hold  that  the  particular  "  conscious- 
ness "  set  up  by  stimulus  No.  1  sets  up  a  "  consciousness  " 
No.  2,  which  involves  the  corresponding  nerve  change  as  its 
consequent. 

RECAPITULATION  AND  SUMMING  UP.     ATTUITION. 

By  analysing  a  complex  case  (the  lion-family)  we 
were  enabled  to  collect  together  the  various  inner  feel- 
ings in  animals ;  meaning  by  feelings  those  states  of 
the  individual  which  stimulate  to  activity  of  some  sort, 
and  are  complete  only  in  activity.  These  arose  either 
primarily  from  within,  as,  for  example,  the  appetites, 
owing  to  those  necessary  workings  of  the  animal  econ- 
omy which  we  call  instinctive  or  innate  (and  which 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  71 

we  have  simply  to  accept  as  given  potencies  within  the 
organism  waiting  to  evolve  themselves)  ;  or  they  were 
stimulated  into  existence  from  without  after  a  nerve- 
transmission  of  impressions  through  the  consciousness- 
capacity  of  the  animal  (which  we  call  its  intelligence), 
— the  channel  of  communication  with  the  outer  world. 

We  have  now  also  gathered  together  the  characters 
of  this  animal  consciousness  in  its  relation  to  the  exter- 
nal. It  is  mere  repetition  to  say  that  we  have  assigned 
to  the  animal  mind  the  following  characteristics :  — 

The  animal  has  sensation,  and  senses  as  mere  matters 
of  fact  all  that  affects  its  being  from  within  or  without. 

The  animal  senses  external  objects  as  "  totalities  " 
without  sensing  the  individual  properties  of  these 
objects,  still  less  sensing  them  as  individual  properties 
going  to  make  up  the  said  total  object. 

In  sensing  total  objects  the  animal  senses  them 
as  diverse  one  from  the  other.  Therefore  the  animal 
senses  likeness  and  unlikeness. 

The  animal  senses  an  object,  and  when  doing  so 
senses  its  sameness  or  similarity  with  the  same  object 
as  formerly  sensed ;  therefore,  the  animal  has  memory. 

The  animal  can  sense  vividly  some  specific  quality 
of  an  object  as  involved  in  that  object,  while  all  the 
rest  of  the  said  object  is  in  the  confusion  and  mist  of 
its  original  aggregate  so  far  as  sense  is  concerned. 
Therefore  (and  for  other  given  reasons),  the  animal 
has  association  of  sensations  or  impressions,  and  is 
under  the  influence  of  that  association. 

The  animal,  further,  through  association  remembers, 
and  through  sympathy  imitates,  and  rivals. 


72  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

The  quantity  and  quality  of  an  animal's  relations 
to  the  external  world  (which  external  world  is  to  it, 
as  to  us,  a  various  and  complex  chaos  of  coexistent 
and  sequent  series)  depends  on  the  constitution  of 
the  animal.  Some  animals  may  touch  the  world  only 
at  one  point  at  a  time,  as  the  sea-anemone  and  the 
snail  seem  to  do.  Its  sensations  in  these  cases  are 
units,  and  very  uninstructive  to  us,  though  sufficient  for 
the  preservation  of  the  animal's  own  existence.  But 
as  we  rise  in  the  scale  of  animal  life,  we  rind  a  more 
complex  constitution  bringing  the  conscious  animal- 
being  into  wider  relations  with  the  complexity  of  its 
surroundings ;  and,  above  all,  enabling  it  to  receive  and 
deal  with  a  sense-totality,  a  single  object  as  distin- 
guished from  other  objects,  and  to  have,  simply,  however, 
as  sensation,  Comparison,  Association,  Memory,  etc. 

To  formulate  and  tabulate  :  — 

ANIMAL  MIND  OR  CONSCIOUSNESS. 

I.   As  regards  Intelligence,  we  have  in  animals  — 

1.  Sensation  of  objects. 

2.  Comparison  of    the    diverse   as   a    sensation 

(likeness  and  unlikeness). 

3.  Sensation  of  relations  of  objects  in  time  and 

space. 

4.  Association  of  sensations. 

5.  Memory. 

6.  Sympathy    of    intelligence,    and    consequent 

imitation. 

7.  Imagination. 


i.]  The  Animal  Mind.  78 

II.  As  regards  inner  Feeling,  we  have  in  animals  — 

1.  The  feeling  of  life-activity. 

2.  The  natural  appetites  working  from  within. 

3.  Sympathy  of  being  and  of  natural  feelings. 

4.  The  feeling  of  kindness  to  others. 

5.  The  feeling  of  pleasure  in  kindness  received 

from  others. 

6.  The  feeling  of  a  superior  power  in  presence 

of  anything  that  may  hurt. 

7.  The  feeling  of  resistance  (animal  courage). 

8.  The  feeling  of  fear  or  of  evasion  of  anything 

that  may  hurt  (animal  cowardice). 

9.  The  feeling  of  rivalry. 

All  these  insist  on  manifesting  themselves  as  occa- 
sion arises. 

We  have  now  before  us  the  mental  constitution  of 
the  higher  animals ;  but  I  should  not  have  thought  it 
necessary  to  dwell  on  this  so  long  had  it  not  been  that 
we  have  here  also  our  own  human  constitution  in  so  far 
as  we  are  animals.  Further,  we  have  before  us  our 
own  nature  and  limitations  up  to  the  age  of  twelve 
months,  less  or  more. 

The  animal  is  a  victim  of  its  own  sensations  and 
feelings  and  associations.  It  is  driven  hither  and 
thither  by  them.  It  is,  both  as  a  creature  of  inner 
feeling  and  outer  feeling,  merely  a  bundle  of  stimuli 
and  reactions  or  reflex  activities.  It  does  not  get 
beyond  the  reflex  action  of  the  cerebrum  and  of  the 
conscious  subject,  although  the  constant  repetition  on 


74  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT.  i. 

its  sensorium  of  external  facts,  calling  for  a  constant 
repetition  of  responses,  enables  the  more  finely  organ- 
ised animals  to  do  things,  by  virtue  of  memory  -and 
association,  that  approximate  very  closely  to  the 
actions  of  a  rational  being ;  especially  when  they  are 
in  constant  contact  with  rational  beings  and  imitate 
them. 

Now,  the  stage  of  Mind  reached  by  the  highest 
animals,  whereby  they  are  able  to  sense  a  total  object, 
I  call  the  ATTUITIOXAL  stage.  It  is  the  highest  form 
of  sensation  (the  lowest  form  of  which  is  merely 
sensibility  to  a  unit  of  impression),  inasmuch  as  it  is 
sensation  of  an  aggregate  of  qualities  (impressions) 
constituting  in  their  aggregate  a  single  object,  and 
sensed  by  the  animal  as  an  externally  existent  whole. 
There  is,  in  truth,  a  sensational  reflex  synthesis ;  for 
which  the  proper  name  is  Synopsis. 


LECTURE   II. 

THE   MAN-MIND.     WILL:   PERCIPIENCE. 
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. 

WHEN  we  speak  of  educating  a  man,  the  question, 
after  all  has  been  said,  comes  to  this :  How  shall  we 
make  a  man  of  him  ?  and,  in  the  case  of  a  girl,  How 
shall  we  make  a  woman  of  her  ?  We  do  not  propose 
to  make  a  woman  of  a  boy,  nor  yet  to  make  a  man  of 
a  girl.  They  are  different  from  the  beginning,  and 
they  are  to  be  as  different  in  the  end  as  they  are  in 
the  beginning,  neither  more  nor  less. 

But  boy  and  girl  share  something  in  common,  and 
that  something  is  neither  the  male  nor  the  female 
element,  but  the  human.  Thus  far,  the  aim  of  edu- 
cation is  the  same  for  both;  and  when  we  use  the 
phrase,  "the  education  of  a  man,"  we  use  the  word 
man  in  a  generic  sense  as  signifying  humanity.  The 
"  worthier  "  gender  stands  for  both  male  and  female. 

Now,  if  I  desire  to  "make  a  man  "  of  a  boy,  I  do 
not  wish  to  train  him  up  to  be  like  this  man  or  that 
man ;  but  to  be  a  true  man.  My  standard  of  man  is 
not  Jones  or  Brown  or  Robinson,  but  the  ideal  of 
man.  It  is  something  universal,  not  particular.  And 
this  ideal  of  man  must  contain  the  essence  or  idea  of 
man  —  that  whereby  he  is  not  anything  else,  but 

76 


76  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

only  himself;  not  a  wolf,  nor  a  pig,  nor  a  bear,  but  a 
man. 

Clearly,  then,  if  I  am  to  educate  a  boy  I  must  have, 
in  my  thought  the  ideal  or  complete  notion  (to  call  it 
so  for  philosophical  consistency)  of  a  man;  not  of 
Jones  or  Brown  or  Robinson,  as  I  have  said,  who  are 
poor  specimens  enough,  but  of  man  universal  —  of 
man  as  not  anything  else  but  himself. 

Now,  in  building  up  the  complete  notion  of  "  Man," 
I  have  already  taken  the  first  step,  —  an  important 
one,  too ;  for  I  have  begun  at  the  foundations  of  the 
fabric,  and  shown  you  what  man  is  in  so  far  as  he  is 
animal.  Even  as  animal,  man  is  richly  endowed  by 
nature,  of  which  he  is  still  a  part,  and  with  which  he 
lives  in  the  constant  interchange  of  give  and  take. 
Simply  as  an  animal,  man  is  the  most  capable  of  all 
animals  in  the  sphere  of  feeling  and  sensation.  No 
doubt  an  animal  of  one  kind  develops  for  his  specific 
needs  a  keener  sense  of  sight,  and  an  animal  of 
another  kind  a  keener  sense  of  smell,  another  is 
fleeter,  and  so  on ;  but,  take  him  all  round,  man  is  a 
finer,  subtler,  more  enduring,  and  altogether  more 
admirable  product  than  any  animal  you  can  name  — 
in  brief,  the  "  paragon  of  animals." 

If  we  stopped  short  at  this  point,  then,  we  should 
have  to  consider  what  steps  had  to  be  taken  to  edu- 
cate him  to  be  a  perfect  animal  of  his  kind.  And,  in 
truth,  the  earlier  races  thought  of  little  else,  for 
obvious  and  sufficient  reasons ;  and  even  in  these  days 
you  hear  such  expressions  as  this  coming  with  a  pecu- 


ii.]  The  Man-Mind:  Will,  etc.  77 

liar  gusto  from  those  who  have  not,  probably,  in  their 
heart  of  hearts  got  very  much  beyond  the  stage  of 
barbarism,  viz.  "The  English  public-schoolboy  is  a 
fine  animal." 

To  pass  from  this,  however,  we  must  admit  that  if 
man  were  only  the  finest  of  animals,  our  duty  as 
educators  would  be  to  have  in  our  heads  a  standard 
or  type,  and  to  educate  him  up  to  that.  We  should 
not  think  of  educating  a  cat  into  anything  but  the 
perfection  of  its  own  kind,  any  more  than  we  should 
think  of  educating  a  rose  into  a  vine  or  an  elm,  but 
simply  into  being  the  best  possible  rose.  You  see 
the  labour  and  ingenuity  spent  on  an  ox  or  a  horse  to 
make  them  the  best  of  their  own  kind.  In  short,  we 
educate  a  horse  or  an  ox  or  a  rose  up  to  the  perfection 
of  itself ;  that  is  to  say,  up  to  the  ideal  of  an  ox  or 
a  horse  or  a  rose,  which  ideal  we  have  present  to  our 
consciousness  in  imagination. 

All  animals  and  plants  have  much  in  common :  and 
to  confine  ourselves  to  animals  here,  they  have  the 
greater  part  of  their  nature  in  common.  But  each 
has  something  whereby  it  is  itself.  A  horse  and  an 
ox  have  a  great  deal  in  common :  indeed  everything 
except  that  which  finally  differentiates  the  one  from 
the  other,  and  makes  the  ox  an  ox  and  not  a  horse, 
and  the  horse  a  horse  and  not  an  ox.  This  differen- 
tiating "somewhat,"  which  is  a  secret,  but  which  I 
infer  from  outer  manifestations  in  appearance  and 
in  action,  I  call  the  "  idea "  of  the  ox  or  horse ;  and 
if  I  am  to  educate  either  of  these  animals  truly,  I 
must,  while  paying  due  regard  to  all  other  facts  and 


78  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

conditions  of  their  existence,  specially  direct  my 
attention  to  the  "idea."  To  this  I  must  educate 
them,  so  that  they  may  be  the  best  of  their  specific 
kind  respectively.  The  total  conception  I  have  of  an 
animal  is  to  be  called  its  NOTION,  the  differentiating 
character  or  characters  are  the  "idea"  within  the 
notion. 

Now  man  is  not  only  the  paragon  of  animals,  he  is 
something  more  and  different.  If  I  am  to  educate 
him  aright,  then  I  must,  while  paying  due  attention 
to  all  other  conditions  of  his  existence,  —  to  the  total 
concept  of  him,  the  Notion,  —  educate  him  up  to  that 
"  something "  which  differentiates  him,  and  lifts  him 
above  and  distinguishes  him  from  other  animals,  if 
there  be  any  such  characteristic.  And  as  this  differ- 
entiation is  a  differentiation  which  lifts  him  above 
animals,  it  must  govern  all  I  do  in  educating  him  as  a 
whole,  because  it  is  placed  there  by  his  Creator  to 
govern  all  else  that  goes  to  constitute  him,  inasmuch 
as  it  constitutes  him  what  he  really  and  truly  is. 
The  idea  in  a  thing  always  governs,  always  must 
govern  and  control  the  parts  of  the  whole ;  otherwise 
the  thing  would  not  be  itself. 

What  is  that  "  idea  "  in  the  notion  man  ?  Here  we 
have  him  an  attuitional  animal  of  a  very  fine  sort 
placed  in  numberless  relations  to  nature  and  to  other 
animals  like  and  unlike  himself,  and  instinct  with  all 
those  feelings,  and  innate  impulses,  and  sensations, 
and  connate  capacities,  which  I  have  already  enumer- 
ated. But  all  these  feelings  and  sensations  are  on 
an  equal  level  —  in  so  far  as  he  is  an  animal.  He 


ii.]  The  Man-Mind:  Will,  etc.  79 

gratifies  first  one  then  another  as  the  fit  seizes  him 
or  necessity  demands,  just  as  an  animal  does.  He  is 
a  bundle  of  particulars ;  he  is  without  order  in  him- 
self; he  is  an  anarchy  or  chaos.  Beasts,  it  is  true, 
have  instincts  to  this  or  that,  or  away  from  this  or 
that,  so  strong  that  they  manage  fairly  well  to  adapt 
themselves  to  their  environment,  and  live  and  act  in 
a  satisfactory,  though  beastly,  way.  But  man,  alas ! 
has  no  such  certainty  of  instinct  to  guide  him,  but 
has  instead  an  endowment  which  specifically  charac- 
terises him  — "  whence  all  our  woe  !  "  This  endow- 
ment confounds  the  natural  operation  of  instinct. 

The  specific  endowment  which  makes  man  different 
from  other  animals,  lifts  him  above  all  animals,  and, 
consequently,  above  his  own  animal  nature,  is  essen- 
tially and  primarily  WILL.  If  I  had  asked  you  for 
the  differentiating  characteristic  which  constituted 
the  "idea"  of  man,  you  would  doubtless  have  at 
once  said  Reason;  and  you  would  have  been  right. 
But  for  the  sake  of  simplicity  itself,  I  beg  you  to  go 
deeper  down  and  see  in  Will  the  root,  possibility,  and 
essence  of  this  very  endowment  which  in  its  fulness 
is  called  Reason. 

When  some  speak  of  Reason  as  being  the  specific 
endowment  of  man,  they  would  almost  seem  to  think 
that  a  piece  of  clockwork  had  been  put  inside  him, 
on  the  top  of  his  animal  mind,  to  regulate  that  mind; 
and  then,  when  you  come  to  the  moral  sphere,  —  the 
sphere  of  conduct,  and  encounter  Will,  they  seem  to 
speak  of  Will  as  if  it  were  a  bare  force  subsisting  on 
its  own  account,  and  working  in  more,  or  (generally) 


80  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

less,  harmony  with  the  clockwork  Reason,  side  by 
side  with  which  it  stands  like  a  sentinel  at  an  "  out  " 
barrack's  gate. 

Now,  if  you  desire  simplicity,  —  the  simplicity  of 
truth, — try  to  get  rid  of  these  inadequate  conceptions 
of  Reason  and  Will.  If  you  do,  you  will  attain  to  a 
fundamental  point  of  view  which  will  give  unity  to 
your  whole  conception  of  man  as  a  being  to  be  edu- 
cated whether  you  regard  his  intellectual  or  his  moral 
relations. 

Imagine  yourself  to  be  a  conscious  subject  or  being 
such  as  an  animal  is,  looking  out  on  the  world,  re- 
ceiving impressions  from  it,  and  having  sensation  of 
them  and  of  the  various  objects  by  which  you  are 
surrounded  and  to  which  you  are  related.  You  re- 
ceive these  in  sensation  simply  as  they  present  them- 
selves, and  you  sense  and  do  this  or  that  according 
as  objects  impress  and  stimulate  you  to  reaction. 
This  is  the  attuitional  condition.  It  is  summed  up 
in  the  words  "  reflex  consciousness." 

Again,  throw  yourself  into  a  rudimentary  state  of 
mind,  and  feel  the  dreaminess  and  confusedness  of  it 
— the  condition  in  which  you  are  when  the  brain, 
exhausted  by  illness,  takes  slight  note  of  things,  or 
when,  recovering  from  a  faint,  the  outer  has  more 
power  over  your  mind  than  any  inner  energy  you 
can  bring  to  bear  on  it,  when  the  vital  centres  fail  to 
react,  and  you  cannot  distinguish  object  from  subject, 
and  all  is  dreamily  subjective.  This  would  seem  to 
be  the  condition  of  a  babe  in  arms. 


ii.]  The  Man-Mind:  Will,  etc.  81 

Better  still,  perhaps,  imagine  yourself  coming  from 
another  and  wholly  different  planet,  suddenly  planted 
on  a  clear  night  on  Edinburgh  Castle  with  the  stars 
above  you,  the  brilliantly  lighted  town  spread  out 
beneath  you,  girded  by  a  moonlit  sea  and  backed  by  a 
misty  suggestion  of  the  distant  northern  hills.  You 
have  not  had  time  to  recover  yourself,  your  conscious- 
ness is  overpowered,  you  are  aware  of  a  multiplicity 
and  diversity  of  objects  and  qualities ;  but  that  is  all. 
Sensation  in  an  elementary  chaotic  form  barely  one 
step  beyond  Feeling  (in  which  subject  and  object  are 
inseparable)  occupies  the  field.  This  gives  place 
quickly  to  a  vivid  sensation  of  this  or  that  particular 
object,  and  sub-sensations,  or  feelings,  of  all  else. 

Soon  you  rouse  yourself  out  of  this  sensational  or 
attuitional  condition,  and  bring  the  energy  lying  within 
your  consciousness  to  bear  on  all  these  sensations. 
You  move  out  of  yourself  to  seize  them  one  by  one, 
separate  one  from  another,  discriminate  them  as  sepa- 
rate totals,  and  reduce  them  all  to  some  kind  of  order 
—  though  it  be  only  an  order  of  locality. 

Now,  this  movement,  from  within  your  conscious 
subject  outwards,  to  seize  each  separate  thing  by  itself 
and  for  itself,  is  to  be  called  Will.  If  any  weak  per- 
son, calling  himself  a  "scientist,"  has  a  superstitious 
dread  of  the  word  Will,  let  him  call  it  Spontaneity. 

This  state  of  consciousness  is  no  longer  the  mere 
reflex  action  of  animal  consciousness  stimulated  by 
external  impressions ;  it  is  that,  but  it  is  something 
more.  It  is  the  free  outgoing  of  your  conscious  subject 
to  take  possession  of  these  various  and  varied  objects, 


82  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

and  make  them  your  own  by  distinguishing  one  from 
the  other,  and  placing  them  back  in  your  conscious 
subject  as  your  own  —  re-ducing  them  to  the  conscious 
subject.  Along  with  this  act  there  arises  the  impulse 
of  naming.  This  is  true  doctrine  unless  you  accept 
the  only  alternative,  viz.  that  the  mind  of  man  is  to  be 
explained  as  a  bundle  of  impressions  and  reflex  actions 
determined  always  and  at  all  times  by  something  not 
himself,  and  that  what  you  imagine  to  be  the  purest 
and  loftiest  act  of  Will  is  merely  (as  some  would  call 
it)  the  resultant  of  a  "  complex  of  sensations."  It  is  at 
this  point,  and  at  no  other,  that  the  battle  of  Free  Will 
as  a  moral  question  must  be  fought,  and  either  gained 
or  lost.  If  Will  be  not  root  of  pure  reason,  it  is  an 
illusion  to  imagine  it  free  when  directed  to  moral  ends. 

Now  this  movement  of  will,  prehending  and  bring- 
ing back,  or  reducing,  to  your  conscious  subject  an 
object  which  is  already  in  the  subject  as  a  sensation 
(or  thing  sensed,  a  sensate),  is  PERCEIVING  or  Ele- 
mentary Knowing. 

The  very  word  perception — per  and  capio,  to  take 
—  points  to  the  nature  of  the  act  as  an  act :  so  does 
apprehension  —  ad-prehendere,  to  seize  to  yourself. 

Through  the  evolution  of  this  Will  in  your  conscious 
subject  you  have  emerged  out  of  and  beyond  animal 
sensation  in  its  highest  form  (Attuition),  and  are  now 
a  percipient  being,  a  knowing  being,  a  man-being,  a 
self-determining  being,  and  no  longer  a  mere  victim  of 
the  dynamical  interplay  of  feelings  and  sensations. 

Perception  or  percipience,  then,  is  the  separating  of 
an  object  already  in  sense  from  other  objects,  seizing  it, 


ii.]  The  Man-Mind:  Will,  etc.  83 

and  placing  it  in  your  own  conscious  subject  as  then 
and  thus  known,  and,  in  the  crisis  of  being  known, 
affirmed ;  and  thus  urgently  demanding  a  name. 

To  ascertain  what  it  is  that  you  first  perceive,  you 
must  go  back  to  the  record  of  attuitional  consciousness, 
and  you  will  find  that  you  first  perceive  totals  as  totals 
—  total  objects,  diverse  one  from  the  other,  e.g.  the 
guns,  walls,  trees,  streets,  lights,  houses,  sky,  sea,  hills. 

Now,  suppose  you  fall  asleep,  outworn  and  over- 
whelmed by  the  multitude  of  objects  that  oppress  you, 
and  awake  refreshed,  you  re-perceive  these  "totals" 
and  recognise  them  —  the  guns,  the  walls,  the  build- 
ings, and  so  forth.  Remember  that  merely  as  an  ani- 
mal you  are  already  endowed  with  memory,  association, 
a  sense  of  likeness  and  unlikeness,  and  so  forth :  I 
pass  all  this  as  known  to  you  from  our  previous 
arialyis. 

Now,  if  you  were  asked  to  specify  by  what  qualities 
you  recognise  this  to  be  a  gun,  that  to  be  a  ball,  and 
that  a  wall,  you  could  not  name  one.  You  would 
simply  be  able  to  say,  "  the  total  impression  made  on 
my  sense  was  that  which  you  call  here  a  gun,  there  a 
ball,  and  there  again  a  wall."  You  have  discriminated 
and  fixed  each  total.  Perception  is  always  of  the 
single.  This  distinct  differentiation  of  an  object  is 
the  reduction  of  the  object  to  consciousness,  in  which 
act  se£/-consciousness  is  involved,  though  it  does  not  yet 
quite  emerge.  Of  this  differentiation  and  reduction, 
affirmation,  viz.  "  that  thing  is  "  —  is  the  issue ;  and  if 
we  go  on  thinking  for  ever,  our  last  question  will  still 


84  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

be  our  first  question,  viz.  what  is  the  object  ?  Along 
with  the  affirmation  that  A  is,  we  have,  I  have  said,  an 
impulse  to  name  A.  Without  a  word  to  fix  the  deter- 
mination of  the  thing,  and  externalise  our  conscious- 
ness of  it,  we  should  probably  have  to  go  through  a 
fresh  process  every  time  we  saw  the  same  object ;  and 
progress  would  be  impossible.  The  articulated  sound 
fixes  and  symbolises  an  accomplished  process,  which, 
though  it  be  in  a  sense  repeated  every  time  we  subse- 
quently perceive  the  object,  is  yet  repeated  with  ease 
and  rapidity  by  the  help  of  the  familiar  symbolic  utter- 
ance.1 

[There  seems  to  be  a  general  law  in  the  universe  that 
impression  completes  itself  in  expression,  and  that  the 
former  is  incomplete  without  the  actuality  of  the  latter.] 

Conscious  subject,  as  now  freely  willing,  moves 
about  prehending  all  that  comes  within  the  range  of 
the  tentacles  of  sense.  Further,  the  conscious  subject, 
thus  spontaneously  moving  or  willing,  has,  within  this 
movement  (Will),  an  end  towards  which  it  moves,  and 
that  end,  at  first  unself-conscious  and  terminating  in  a 
percept,  is  (after  a  slight  experience)  knowledge  itself 
as  such  (a  universal).  Of  this  again. 

The  bringing  of  the  sensate  a  second  time  into  con- 
sciousness as  a  discriminated  and  affirmed  object,  is 

1  According  to  this  theory,  a  deaf-mute,  hefore  he  attains  to  the 
iise  of  manual  signs,  affirms  when  he  perceives.  The  affirmation  is 
arrested  hy  the  inability  to  articulate ;  but  there  is  an  accentuation 
of  the  affirmation,  not  only  in  consciousness,  but  also  physiologically, 
by  an  inner  movement  or  outer  gesture.  The  percept  is  thus  in 
some  material  way  fixed,  but  always  inadequately. 


ii.]  The  Man-Mind:  Witt,  etc.  85 

called  reducing  it  to  the  unity  of  consciousness,  —  to 
that  basis  which  remains  a  "  one  "  in  the  midst  of  end- 
less receptivities  and  activities. 

Perception,  then,  may  also  be  defined  as  the  seizing  of 
an  object  as  a  total  and  a  single  and  reducing  it,  as  itself 
and  nothing  else,  to  the  conscious  subject1 

We  have  now  passed  from  passive-activity  to  active- 
activity.  We  have  got  pure  Will  as  the  differentia 
or  idea  of  man  as  distinguished  from  other  animals. 
Let  us  keep  fast  hold  of  it  as  the  clue  which  can 
alone  guide  us  through  the  labyrinth  of  mental  evo- 
lution, and,  by  reducing  all  to  unity,  give  simplicity 
of  view.  The  "idea"  in  a  thing,  remember,  governs 
by  inherent  right  all  the  elements  in  that  thing.  It 
is  supreme  in  all  its  relations  to  the  thing,  and  all 
the  relations  of  that  thing  to  other  things. 

We  have  now  passed  from  Nature  (with  its  impres- 
sions and  reflex  activities)  to  SPIRIT  and  FREEDOM. 

Note  now:  1.  The  definition  of  Percipience;  2. 
That  percipience  is  of  singles;  3.  That  it  is  an  act  of 
discrimination  whereby  one  is  separated  from  all  else 
—  all  else  being  meanwhile  in  attuent  sensation  alone ; 
4.  That  percipience  as  above  defined  is  of  inner 
sensates  as  well  as  of  outer  sensates ;  5.  That  the 
knowledge  of  all  we  can  finally  know  begins  with 
percipience ;  6.  That  this  percipience  is  the  first 

1  There  is  here  manifestly  a  process  which  is  a  dialectic  process ; 
but  for  this  I  refer  to  my  book  entitled  Met.  N.  et  V.,  merely  say- 
ing here  that  this  first  and  elemental  process  of  percipience  is  the 
process  of  Reason  generally,  or,  as  we  say,  its  Form,  Essence,  or 
Idea. 


86  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

movement  of  Reason  in  taking  the  universal  com- 
plex we  call  experience,  and,  subsequently,  each 
individual  complex,  to  pieces  with  a  view  to  building 
up  these  elementary  percepts  into  a  known  unity,  and 
so  superseding  the  sensed  whole,  the  mere  attuit; 

7.  That  after  the  first  act  of  percipience  is  performed, 
the  total  sensate  or  attuit  is  converted  into  a  percept ; 

8.  That  an  attuit  involves  consciousness ;  a  percept, 
self-consciousness ;   9.   That  the  mere  separation  of 
sensates  (singles  or  aggregate  wholes)  as  diverse  in 
attuition,  is  a  separation  effected  by  reflex  action  in 
response  to  an  impression  or  stimulus ;  while  the  dis- 
crimination effected  in  percipience  is  through  an  act 
of  Will,  and  involves  affirmation  and  speech.     But, 
above  all,  note  that  the  movement  in  percipience  is  a 
free  movement  of  Will  —  a  differentiating,  pure,  sub- 
ject-generated act  which  lifts  man  out  of  the  animal, 
and  is  thus,  as  idea  of  man,  the  key  to  all  intellectual 
operations  (e.g.  Concept,  General  Concept,  etc.),  the 
governing  principle  in  Ethics,  the  guide  in  the  maze 
of  Political  Philosophy,  the  master-conception  in  the 
education  of  a  human  being.1 

The  educational  deduction  is  this  — 

THE  EDUCATION  OF  MIND  AS  REASON  IS  THE  TRAIN- 
ING AND  DISCIPLINE  OF  «WlLL  AS  A  power /  AND 

1  Not  only  so ;  but  in  an  analysis  of  the  percipient  process  which 
lies  outside  our  purpose  here,  and  of  the  nature  of  the  act  as  a 
differentiating,  negating,  and  determining  act,  lies  the  true  critique 
of  knowing,  and  the  explanation,  though  not  perhaps  always  the 
solution,  of  many  metaphysical  questions. 


ii.]  The  Man-Mind:  Will,  etc.  87 

SECONDLY,     THE     TRAINING     AND     DISCIPLINE     OF     THE 

WILL-MOVEMENT  AS  A  process  WHEREBY  THE  CON- 
SCIOUS SUBJECT  TAKES  THE  WORLD  TO  ITSELF  AS 
KNOWLEDGE. 

But,  we  live  in  a  Meal,  not  in  a  Formal  world;  and 
in  selecting  subjects  for  education  we  have  to  consider 
man's  immediate  needs  and  duties,  while  always  using 
these  subjects  in  such  a  way  as  to  train  and  discipline 
the  Will-Power  and  the  Will-Process. 

I  have  pointed  out  that  what  I  first  perceive  as  a 
one  thing  is  that  which  is  already  a  sensate.  To 
ascertain,  then,  what  it  is  I  perceive,  I  must  under- 
stand what  the  sensate  yields  to  pre-percipient  sense. 
It  yields  —  (a)  The  consciousness  or  sensation  of  a 
complex  extended  total ;  (b)  The  consciousness  of  that 
total  as  being;  (c)  The  consciousness  of  that  complex 
total  as  localised  out  there ;  (d)  A  consciousness  of 
the  spatial  relation  of  that  total  to  other  diverse 
totals. 

None  the  less  is  percipience  the  percipience  of  a 
one  total  sensate.  The  sensate  itself  is  a  complex, 
but  it  is  as  a  fused  complex  that  it  is  first  perceived. 


Note  on  Consciousness  and  Self-Consciousness. 

I  have  said  that  a  sensate  is  an  object  in  sensation.  It  is 
only  when  the  inner  reaction  is  adequate  that  an  impression 
extricates  itself  from  identification  with  the  subject-con- 
sciousness and  becomes  an  "object."  The  fact  and  word 
"object"  brings  necessarily  with  it  the  correlative  fact  and 
word  "subject."  Prior  to  this  there  is  a  state  of  what  we 


88  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

may  call  subjective  feeling,  but  there  is  no  experienced 
subject,  because  there  is  no  experienced  object. 

Now  in  sensation  I  do  not  in  any  sense  know  the  object. 
The  subject  is  at  this  stage  merely  a  basis  or  point  of  sup- 
port for  the  object.  I  sense  the  sensate  (object)  as  a  some- 
thing not  the  subject,  but  the  subject  itself  is  not  objectified. 
The  subject  is  sunk  in  the  lower  state  of  Feeling  simply. 
The  subject  senses  the  sensate,  but  it  only  vaguely  feels  itself. 
That  is  to  say,  the  subject  is  not  yet  extricated  from  the 
whole  of  being  and  made  to  stand  out  as  itself  a  substantive 
and  specific  being.  This  is  possible  only  at  a  subsequent 
stage  of  mind  beyond  that  of  sensation  and  attuition,  —  the 
stage  at  which  there  advances,  from  within,  the  energy  or 
force  of  which  I  have  spoken  (call  it  Spontaneity  or  Will  as 
you  please),  and  seizes  or  grips  the  sensate  and  takes  it  back 
a  second  time  into  consciousness. 

Note  that  sense  and  the  sensate,  the  conscient  and  the 
conscite,1  are  already  there;  but  the  latter,  the  sensate  or 
object,  is  sensed  as  the  negation  of  the  subject,  the  former, 
i.e.  the  conscient  or  sensing  subject,  is  merely  felt  as  ground, 
and  not,  in  any  strict  meaning,  sensed  as  the  positive  of  the 
negation. 

But,  when  T  a  second  time,  through  a  pure  act  of  Will, 
take  hold  of  the  sensate  or  object,  what  do  I  do  with  it?  I 
replace  it  in  consciousness  as  an  object,  and  at  the  same 
time  affirm  it  to  be  an  object  there-existent  (outside)  and 
not  me  the  subject.  In  thus  placing  the  sensate  a  second 
time  into  the  conscious  subject,  I  affirm  all  that  has  been 
sensed,  including  negation  of  the  subject,  and,  further,  be- 
come aware  of  the  subject  itself  as  that  into  which  I  have 
replaced  the  object.  I  perceive  the  object  and  I  sense  the 
subject ;  and  have  now,  further,  the  power  of  perceiving  and 
affirming  the  subject  when  the  time  is  ripe. 

For  the  affirmation  of  negation  is  the  affirmation  of 
position. 

1  If  I  may  use  such  terms. 


ii.]  The  Man-Mind:  Will,  etc.  89 

Why  then  do  I  not  say  at  once  that  the  perception  of  the 
object  is  also  the  perception  of  the  subject,  instead  of  saying 
that  the  result  is  only  the  sensing  of  the  subject?  The 
answer  is  that  the  potency  of  perceiving  the  conscious  subject 
by  the  conscious  subject,  in  other  words,  self-consciousness, 
is  certainly  now  on  the  field ;  but  the  act  of  perception,  let 
us  remember,  involves  the  discrimination  of  an  object  from 
all  other  objects  through  the  negation  of  those  other  objects, 
and  we  cannot  attain  to  a  clear  perception  of  the  subject  as 
such  by  the  subject,  except  by  an  observation  of  inner  facts 
and  conditions,  —  a  more  difficult  operation  than  the  obser- 
vation of  external  facts  and  conditions.  Accordingly,  the 
state  of  the  case  is  this,  that  we,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  at  this 
stage  do  little  more  than  sense  the  subject  as,  in  a  general 
way,  not  the  object.  Mind  grows  gradually  and  by  infinitely 
small  steps. 


LECTURE   III. 

CONCIPIENCE  AND  THE  SENSE-CONCEFf  OF  THE 
INDIVIDUAL. 

WITH  all  the  celerity  that  belongs  to  Mind,  the  per- 
cept of  the  determined  total  becomes  a  perception  of 
the  elements  in  that  complex  total.  The  moment  the 
subject  is  conscious  of  any  separate  element  in  the 
single  total  before  it  (the  attuit  or  sensate),  it  syn- 
thesises  that  element  with  the  attuit  as  a  one  with  it. 
This  is  the  point  of  transition  from  Percipience  to 
Concipience. 

The  attuited  object,  we  have  seen,  may  have  some 
quality  so  prominent  as  to  impress  sense  more  vividly 
than  the  other  elements  in  it  (e.g.  to  a  dog,  the  smell 
of  the  object);  still,  this  quality  is,  as  yet,  simply  a 
sensation.  But  if,  in  the  percipience  of  the  total,  I 
rapidly  distinguish  in  it  a  specific  character  or  quality, 
the  percept  of  the  total  is  then  affirmed  along  with  its 
most  prominent  mark  thus  distinguished. 

And  this  means  that  the  Percept  of  the  total  attuit 
has  suddenly  become  a  Concept  of  the  total  attuit. 

Why  a  Concept?    Why  not  still  call  it  a  Percept? 

Because  percipience  of  the  singular  or  individual  must 

precede  the  consciousness  of  an  object  as  made  up  of 

many  singulars.     The  holding  together  as  a  unity  of 

90 


LECT.  in.]      Concipience  and  the  Sense- Concept.       91 

differentiated  elements  in  any  total  object  is  Conceiv- 
ing in  its  strict  signification. 

I  have  the  whole  world  present  to  my  consciousness 
as  a  sensational  attuit  and  as  individual  attuits.  Each 
object  comes  to  me  as  a  complex  and  laden  with  all  the 
categories ;  many  of  which  are  blazoned  on  it  and 
simply  received  by  me,  such  as  extensity,  quantity, 
quality,  relation;  others  are  implicit,  and  await  the 
emergence  in  my  consciousness  of  the  capacity  to  see 
them,  which  capacity  is  a  pure  activity,  viz.  "Will.  All 
as  yet  is  in  sense. 

I  then  make  the  first  step  in  knowing ;  for  I  reduce 
this  that,  and  the  other  sensate  or  attuit  to  self-con- 
sciousness, as  discriminated,  perceived,  affirmed.  But 
the  pure  activity  of  Will,  just  because  it  is  pure 
activity,  insists  on  prosecuting  its  work  of  reduction 
to  consciousness,  with  a  view  to  the  ascertainment  of 
the  elements,  relations,  and  implications  of  the  thing 
before  me,  in  order  that  it  may  ultimately  convert  the 
as  yet  complex  chaotic  thing  into  a  rational  unity. 
Finally,  it  strives  to  convert  the  whole  world-presenta- 
tion into  a  rational  unity  or  cosmos. 

In  the  last  word  of  the  Rational  alone  can  Reason 
ultimately  rest.  Will,  and  the  process  whereby  it 
reduces  and  harmonises  sensation,  has  its  own  right 
to  live,  as  much  as  a  rose  or  a  bird  has.  It  perseveres 
in  its  own  existence  for  the  fulfilment  of  its  own  life. 
It  has  a  long  and  difficult  task  before  it;  for  it  has 
not  only  rationally  to  know  things,  but  to  actualise  its 
knowledge  in  conduct  in  the  face  of  an  infinite  number 


92  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

of  obstacles  and  antagonisms.     But  this  it  must  do,  or 
it  will  die  overwhelmed  by  nature  and  sense. 

I  have  reached  this  point,  that  from  among  a  multi- 
tude of  objects  in  sensation  I  have  discriminated,  per- 
ceived, and  affirmed  a  total  object  as  a  total,  e.g.  orange, 
I  thereupon  discriminate  the  most  salient  impressions 
or  qualities ;  and  so,  almost  before  I  am  aware  of  it, 
pass  from  percipience  to  concipience,  from  self-con- 
sciousness of  the  single  or  individual  to  a  self-conscious- 
ness of  that  individual  as  a  unity  of  separate  and  sepa- 
rable elements.  At  this  point  I  have  a  Concept  of 
the  individual — a  true  synthesis  of  activity  (not  of 
mere  sense)  so  far  as  it  goes.  The  attuit  is  no  longer 
merely  a  total  and  single,  it  is  a  Unity  and  a  One. 
Now,  still  following  the  same  lines,  I  begin  to  discrim- 
inate, perceive,  and  affirm  other  parts  or  elements 
which  enter  into  and  constitute  the  complex  orange  to 
sense.  These  I  continue  to  hold  together  as  they  exist 
outside  there  together  in  the  object.  But  the  object 
as  sensate  always  remains  as  a  total ;  that  is  to  say, 
the  general  total  impression  of  the  object  on  sense  is 
not  superseded:  it  is  only,  so  far,  transcended  and 
explicated. 

Let  us  return  now,  at  the  risk  of  repetition,  to  the 
salient  feature  of  the  object.  In  sensation-proper,  a 
dog,  when  sensing  a  man  or  a  wheelbarrow,  has  a 
sensate  of  these  objects  as  totals,  the  particular  quali- 
ties of  these  objects  being  fused  and  confused  in  the 
whole.  But  after  a  sufficient  number  of  repetitions, 
he  becomes  aware  of  one  or  more  particulars  as  asso- 


in.]         Concipience  and  the  Sense- Concept.          93 

elated  with  the  total  in  sense  and  distinguishing  it  : 
it  may  be  the  general  gait  or  swing  of  the  man,  or  the 
revolving  wheel  of  the  barrow.  These  prominent  or 
salient  characteristics  impress  him  most  deeply  (make 
a  deeper  dint,  so  to  speak,  on  his  sensory),  because 
of  their  prominence  and  salience.  Different  animals 
will  have  natural  affinities,  as  determined  by  their 
organisms  and  needs,  for  different  qualities  in  a  total 
thing  present  to  them.  These  salient  qualities  are 
only  associated  in  sense;  not  affirmed  in  percipient 
and  concipient  activity. 

Now,  in  percipience  it  is  the  same  as  in  attuition, 
but  with  a  difference.  In  actively  breaking  up  and 
discriminating  the  qualities  aggregated  in  the  total, 
you  will  perceive,  first,  the  deepest  impression,  that 
is  to  say,  the  most  salient  quality.  The  perceived 
total,  the  orange,  is,  no  doubt,  sensed  as  distinct  in 
number  and  locality  and  relation  from  other  objects  as 
a  single,  but  the  elements  are  as  yet  in  sense  alone,  and 
not  explicated  into  perception :  for  this  they  are  wait- 
ing. It  is  only  retrospectively,  and  after  percipience, 
that  I  am  able  to  say  that  these  elements  ever  were  in 
the  primary  complex  at  all.  You  will  probably  first 
of  all  perceive  the  roundness,  and  then  the  yellowness 
of  the  orange,  as  opposed  to  other  objects  which  are 
not  round  and  yellow.  You  now  are  conceiving ;  that 
is  to  say,  you  are  taking  together  two  or  more  quali- 
ties as  constituting  the  orange  as  a  perceived  "thing." 
Your  concept  is  now  a  "  round  yellow  thing."  Observe 
the  word  thing  —  the  thing  being  the  total  sensate  (or 
attuit),  which  always  persists  in  your  consciousness 


94  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

awaiting  further  dissection  in  percipience,  with  a  view 
to  a  richer  and  ever  richer  concept  of  itself. 

Consequently,  however  many  facts  I  perceive  and  af- 
firm, these  have  always  a  sub-self-conscious  reference  to 
the  total  in  sensation.  (Note  at  end  of  Lecture.)  This 
orange  which  I  perceive  is  not  only  yellow  and  round, 
but  smooth,  thick-skinned,  pulpy,  sweet,  odorous. 
All  these  percepts,  taken  together,  ere  long  constitute 
the  object  in  knowledge,  and  are  held  together  by  the 
force  of  my  Will.  The  total  single  in  sensation  has 
been  transformed  into  a  unity  in  percipience,  or  a  unity 
of  percepts.  These  percepts  are  taken  together  —  con- 
cepted  —  and  the  unity  of  the  perceived  object  is  now 
the  CONCEPT  of  the  object. 

To  CONCEIVE  ANY  OBJECT,  THEN,  IS  TO  TAKE  TO- 
GETHER IN  A  UNITY  THE  PERCEIVED  PROPERTIES  OF 

THAT  OBJECT.     The  Concept  is  a  One  in  Many. 

So  various  and  infinite  are  the  suggestions  of  the 
universal  outside  me,  that  I,  as  a  mind  struggling  to 
know  and  to  use  what  I  know,  am  driven  into  a  habit 
of  mental  shorthand.  When  I  perceive  an  orange  as 
a  total  thing  presented  to  my  consciousness,  I,  after 
the  preceding  analysis  has  been  effected,  also  at  the 
same  moment,  conceive  it  as  a  unity;  but  I  do  not 
rehearse  in  my  mind  the  series  a,  &,  c,  d,  which  make 
up  its  concept.  I  see  a  house:  what  goes  on  in  my 
consciousness?  This:  first,  I  sense  the  house  as  a 
total  object,  separated  from  other  totals  in  space; 
secondly,  I  perceive  a  certain  quality  or  property,  or 
qualities  or  properties,  of  that  house,  e.g.  its  con- 


in.]         Concipience  and  the  Sense-Concept.          95 

figuration,  its  colour,  its  door  and  its  windows  (one  or 
more  of  these),  and  at  the  same  moment  I  conceive 
these  percepts  (take  them  together),  and  say  "that  is  a 
house,"  and  not  anything  else.  But  there  are  numer- 
ous other  formerly  perceived  qualities  of  a  house  quite 
well  known  to  me  which  never  emerge  into  clear  con- 
sciousness at  all.  They  are  sub-conscious,  and  are 
ready  to  be  brought  up  to  the  plane  of  self -conscious- 
ness if  I  should  happen  to  want  them. 

Once  I  have  so  far  analysed  the  total  object  in  per- 
ception, and  affirmed  certain  percepts  as  in  and  of  it, 
I  cannot,  if  I  would,  now  perceive  a  house  except  in  so 
far  as  I  conceive  it;  for  there  is  now  more  than  one 
element  in  my  conscious  experience  of  the  total  as  a 
one. 

The  percepts  by  which  I  recognise  a  house  are,  doubt- 
less, those  which  most  vividly  presented  themselves  to 
me  in  sensation  —  the  salient  and  most  impressive 
properties  (percepts)  which  came  first  in  experience, 
and  formed  a  kind  of  nucleus  round  which  the  others 
clustered.  These  not  only  came  first  in  experience, 
but,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  they  come  first  in  every  suc- 
cessive experience  of  the  same  object.  For  the  mind, 
advancing  by  stages  to  knowledge,  not  only  assumes 
the  prior  stages,  but  repeats  them.  When  I  see  a 
house  and  call  it  a  house,  I  feel,  I  sense,  I  perceive, 
and  I  conceive.  The  ignoring  of  this  fact  leads  to  not 
a  little  confusion  in  psychology. 

Order  in  Concipience.  —  Observe  now  the  order  in  the 
Concipience  of  a  complex  object;  (a)  The  most  promi- 


96  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

nent  and  salient  qualities  are  first  perceived,  and  (b)  these 
remain  with  us  as  a  representative  notation  whereby  we 
recognise  an  object  which  has  been  once  conceived  by  us. 

As  our  experience  extends,  all  our  percepts  of  things 
become  concepts  of  things.  As  total  single  objects  we 
perceive  the  sensate  as  discriminated  from  other  sen- 
sates;  as  a  one  in  many,  we  conceive  the  object  in  its 
parts  relatively  to  itself  as  a  system  of  parts.  It  is  a 
unity.  After  this  stage,  we  never  can  be  said  to  per- 
ceive an  old  object,  whether  in  presentation  or  repre- 
sentation, without  conceiving  it. 

The  parts  of  an  attuit  which  we  first  discriminate 
and  perceive  are,  we  have  seen,  the  most  prominent 
and  salient:  these  being  the  most  impressive  of  the 
qualities  of  the  object,  they  demand  the  minimum  of 
exertion  for  Percipience.  And  these  salient  qualities 
we  hold  in  our  consciousness  plus  the  sub-consciousness 
of  the  totality  as  impressed  on  sensation;  and  these 
together  constitute  the  object  for  us. 

This  psychological  fact  yields  us  guidance  in  the 
Art  of  teaching,  for  it  tells  us  this  — 

Principle  of  Method.  —  TEACH  FIRST  THE  MOST  SALI- 
ENT QUALITIES  OB  CHARACTERS  OF  THINGS,  AND  THERE- 
AFTER FILL  IN,  UNTIL  THE  CONTENT  IN  CONSCIOUSNESS 
EQUALS  THE  CONTENT  OF  THE  THING  OR  SUBJECT 
TAUGHT. 


We  have  now  made  some  progress  in  our  Psychology, 
for  we  have  the  whole  animal  intelligence  before  us, 
which  is  also  ours,  and,  further,  two  movements  of 


in.]         Ooncipience  and  the  Sense- Concept.          97 

mind  which  are  distinctive  of  man,  and  which  are  both 
dependent  on  the  central  energy,  Will. 


Note.  —  The  Sub-Conscious.  —  Without  entering  on  the 
general  question  of  the  Unconscious,  I  would  remark 
here : 

1.  That  conscious  or  attuent  activity,  being  within  the 
sphere  of  the  dynamical,  is  constantly  operative ;  but  that 
se//K;onscious  activities  (which  are  all  on  a  higher  plane), 
when  they  are  intense  and  concentrated,  suppress  the  merely 
conscious  or  sensational  solicitations.     Where  there  is  no 
self-concentration,   these   conscious  or  attue'nt  solicitations 
and  suggestions  occupy  the  whole  field,  being  granted,  when 
vivid,   a   certain    dreamy   admission    to    the    self-conscious 
sphere.     These  consciousnesses,  which  never  cross  the  boun- 
dary line  of  self -consciousness,  fulfil  a  function  in  the  growth 
of   the  fabric  of   mind  generally,  as  regards  its  material. 
They  doubtless  enrich  the  soil  of  mind  (so  to  speak). 

2.  That  it  seems  to  be  an  error  to  speak  of  sub-conscious 
operations  ;  for  unconscious  consciousness  is  a  contradiction 
in  terms.     There  may  be,  of  course,  cerebration  going  on 
which  does  not  rise  to  consciousness.     There  seems,  how- 
ever, to  be  no  limit  to  sub-self-conscious  operations,  which 
may  be  going  on  unheeded  by  the  self-conscious  subject 
when  it  is  concentrated  or  asleep.     Suspend  self-concentra- 
tion, and  we  constantly  become  aware  of  the  fact  that  con- 
sciousness as  sensation  has  been  going  on.     Harking  back 
a  little,  we  recall  that  the  "clock  has  struck  without  our 
knowing  it"  (as  is  said)  —  the  retrospective  perception  of 
a  dying  sensate. 

3.  That  a  knowledge  or  volition  which  has  been   self- 
consciously achieved  becomes,  by  frequent  repetition,  a  con- 
stituent element  in  the  merely  conscious  or  dynamical  life. 
Effort  is  no  longer  necessary,  and  the  act,  whether  intellectual 
or  moral,  is  accomplished  with  only  a  minimum  of  self -con- 


98  Institutes  of  Education.         [LECT.  m. 

sciousness  being  present.  It  is,  secondarily-automatic.  The 
product  of  the  higher  energy  of  self-conscious  mind  would 
seem  to  sink  down,  as  a  permanent  possession,  into  the 
merely  reflexive  conscious  sphere  of  natural  action  and 
reaction,  and  become  an  integral  part  of  our  nature  and 
character. 


LECTURE    IV. 

UNITY  OF  THE  RATIONAL  MIND:   IN  ITS  EDUCATIONAL 
REFERENCE.* 

RATIONAL  intelligence,  as  yre  have  seen,  is  the  con- 
scious subject  freely  functioning  Will  as  its  instrument 
in  dealing  with  the  multifarious  presentations  in  sen- 
sation or  attuition.  The  subject,  as  functioning  Will, 
is  like  Neptune  raising  his  head  above  the  troubled 
ocean  to  see  what  is  going  on,  and  to  regulate  and 
direct.  The  conflicting  waves  have,  however,  dynam- 
ical laws  of  their  own,  which  they  are  obeying :  the 
sea-god  has  to  accept  these  laws,  and  by  his  will  to 
control  them  to  certain  ends.  This  energising  of  Will 
is  at  once,  accordingly,  an  intellectual  and  an  ethical 
movement;  for  an  ethical  act  is  simply  Will  effect- 
ing a  thought  end,  which  end  is  conceived,  made 
one's  own,  and  projected  by  mind,  as  motive  of 
action. 

You  will  observe,  then,  that  this  fundamental  con- 
ception of  rational  psychology  has,  because  of  its 
ethical  bearing,  a  very  great  significance  in  education. 

In  psychology  as  a  science,  also,  apart  from  its  edu- 
cational reference,  the  conception  is  pregnant  with 

1  See  also  Appendix,  D. 


100  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

results.  The  most  important  is  this,  that  it  gives  a 
clue  which  guides  through  the  labyrinth  of  mental 
phenomena.  Fix  your  attention  on  this  Will,  take 
hold  of  it,  and  follow  it  as  it  moves  step  by  step  in  its 
triumphant  progress  towards  the  reduction  of  all  pres- 
entations to  consciousness  from  without  and  from 
within.  In  contemplation  of  this  one  movement,  you 
see  revealed  the  fact  that  reason  is  essentially  a  one 
faculty,  and  not  an  aggregate  of  many  faculties.  And 
yet,  there  are  steps  to  be  taken  by  it  which  must  be 
taken  one  after  the  other,  viz.  Percipience,  Concipi- 
ence,  etc.,  and  these  involve  prior  attuition,  compari- 
son, discrimination,  analysis  and  synthesis.  The  steps 
have  to  be  looked  at  by  us  in  order  of  time ;  but,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  these,  and  all  further,  steps  are  already 
contained  in  the  mere  knowing  of  any  one  object. 
This  knowing  is,  in  short,  a  one  complex  act;  but  in 
order  that  we  may  understand  it,  the  act  has,  as  being 
a,  process  of  Will,  to  be  resolved  into  its  parts  —  broken 
up  into  its  elements.  When  we  speak  of  Percipience, 
Concipience,  and  the  further  steps  of  Reason  yet  await- 
ing our  consideration,  we  are  simply  analysing  the 
complex  unity  of  the  act  of  knowing  any  one  thing  as 
it  may  be  known.  Since  these  steps  are  elements  in  a 
complex,  they  are  to  be  called  "  moments, "  in  the  one 
Will-movement  or  process.  But  we  separate  them 
logically,  and  as  the  first  is  necessary  to  the  second,  so 
we  place  them  in  a  time-order. 

Conceive,  then,  Reason  (as  distinguished  from  and 
transcending  feeling  and  sensation  —  the  whole  sphere 
of  Attuition)  as  — 


iv.]  Unity  of  the  Rational  Mind.  101 

1.  WILL-POWER,  pure  and  simple. 

2.  WILL-PROCESS,  with  all  that  it  involves. 

Do  this,  I  say,  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  that, 
whether  true  or  not,  the  conception  will  give  simplic- 
ity and  unity  to  your  grasp  of  Keason  in  all  its  active 
successive  manifestations  on  the  way  to  its  end,  which 
end  is  knowledge  and  consequent  action.  Once  grasp 
the  central  thought  and  your  future  study  is  shortened 
as  well  as  simplified :  the  theory  of  the  education  of 
man's  intelligence  is  revealed. 

To  work  out  fully  all  that  is  contained  in  the  above 
conception  of  reason,  would  be  to  lead  you  into  what  is 
called  metaphysics;  but  it  would  be  also  to  lead  you 
away  from  the  practical  aim  of  these  lectures,  which  is 
the  doctrine  of  rational  mind  in  the  definite  and  re- 
stricted field  of  the  education  of  rational  mind.  It  is 
evident  that  if  mind  grows  to  maturity  after  a  cer- 
tain way,  the  education  of  mind  must  follow  that  way. 
Method  in  education  means  simply  a  "  way  " ;  and  the 
method  of  educating  mind  must  be  the  way  of  mind 
itself  as  it  grows  from  infancy  to  maturity.  Accord- 
ingly, the  Theory  of  Education,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
Methodology,  is  simply  the  governing  principles  of  the 
method  of  discipline  and  instruction,  as  these  can  be 
shown  to  flow  from  the  way  mind  grows. 

You  will  find,  as  you  go  on,  that  many  of  these 
principles  have  been  empirically  ascertained,  and  have 
received  the  support  of  every  writer  on  education, 
without  regard  to  the  question  whether  they  have  a 
scientific  basis  in  the  laws  of  the  growth  of  mind  or 
pot.  Our  business  here  is  to  bring  to  view  the  scien- 


102  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT.  iv. 

tific  basis,  and  make  you  conscious  of  it;  and  this  is 
Theory  as  distinct  from  Methodology. 

Let  me  now  sum  up  what  we  have  ascertained  as 
regards  the  animal  or  sensational,  and  the  man  or 
rational  mind  and  also  give  definitions. 


LECTURE   V. 

SUMMING  UP  AND  DEFINITIONS   (THUS  FAR). 
MIND. 

Intelligence  :  Common  to  Animal  and  Man. 

[The  Feelings  and  Desires  of  Animals,  as  collected 
in  Lecture  L,  Part  II.,  are  here  omitted,  because 
they  fall  under  the  ethical  section  of  the  phi- 
losophy of  rational  mind.] 

1.  Sensation  of  objects,  and  a,  feeling  of  the  individual 

subject. 

2.  Comparison  of  objects  in  sensation  (or  as  sensates)  : 

likeness  and  unlikeness. 

3.  Sensation  of  relations  of  objects  in  time  and  space. 

4.  Memory  (involving  retentiveness,  and  a  sensation 

of  similarity  of  a  present  to  a  former  presentate). 

5.  Imagination  (images  of  what  is  not  now  present), 

or  Eepresentation. 

6.  Association  of  sensations  as  sensations,  viz.  asso- 

ciation of  sensations  as  like  and  unlike,  and  as 
coexistent,  or  immediately  sequent,  in  time  or 
space. 

7.  Sympathy  with  the  intelligence  of  others :  conse- 

quently, Imitation. 

103 


104  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

All  this  is  on  the  reflex  or  passivo-active  plane  of 
Consciousness.  The  animal  is  moved  by  the  object, 
tossed  hither  and  thither  by  impressions  as  reflected 
by  its  own  subject.  For  example,  when  an  animal 
seems  to  be  occupied  with  an  object,  it  does  not 
"attend"  in  any  true  meaning  of  that  term,  any  more 
than  it  ever  "  intends  " ;  it  is  detained  by  the  object, 
and  what  we  have  before  us  is  a  detention  of  the  con- 
scious subject,  not  attention  by  it.  Again,  the  animal 
does  not  compare  or  discriminate :  objects  compare  and 
discriminate  themselves  on  the  subject.  The  term 
assigned  to  the  reflex  sensational  intelligence  of  the 
animal  is  Attuition,  not  Perception,  still  less  Knowing. 

Man  Intelligence. 

All  the  above  passive  activities  of  mind  are  con- 
stantly operative  in  man,  and  constitute  a  great  part 
of  his  daily  life,  which  is  largely  automatic  both  in 
the  intellectual  and  moral  sphere;  and  they  occupy 
almost  the  whole  field  of  consciousness  in  the  mind  of 
the  infant  and  child. 

But  now,  the  conscious  subject  functions  a  free 
energy  or  power  to  be  called  WILL,  and  the  result  is  a 
movement  towards  the  prehension  or  apprehension  of 
sensates,  and  this  in  successive  steps  or  moments,  by 
which  it  effects  their  reduction  to  consciousness, 
affirmation,  and  rational  knowledge.  Hence  — 

1.  Percipience  and  the  Percept, 

2.  Concipience  and  the  Concept: 


v.]     Summing  up  and  Definitions  (thus  far}.  105 

and  the  other  steps  in  the  one  reason-movement  still 
to  be  considered. 

Definitions. 

At  this  point  it  may  be  well  to  make  clear  our 
terminology,  that  you  may  have  it  for  reference;  and 
the  doing  of  this  will  give  us  an  opportunity  of,  con- 
versationally revising  and  supplementing  what  has 
been  said  in  past  lectures. 

A.  —  Mix D  is  Consciousness  from  the  lowest  animal, 
to  its  highest  man,  manifestation. 

The  fundamental  fact  of  mind  is  FEKLING,  and  this 
is  both  outer  and  inner.  Mind  starts  into  existence 
with  a  presentation.  We  can  get  no  better  name  for 
the  rudimentary  fact  than  Feeling,  whether  we  speak 
of  the  intelligence,  or  of  the  appetites,  of  instincts, 
impulses,  or  emotions. 

(a)  Feeling  is  to  be  denned  as  an  indefinite  aware- 
ness, in  which  mind  as  subject  is  not  yet  differentiated 
from  the  presentation  which  is  the  content  of  the  Feel- 
ing, and  which  may  be  called  the  object.  There  is  as 
yet,  however,  no  Object  and  Subject.  Feeling  may 
be  of  the  single  or  of  the  multitudinous.1 

1  Some  writers  seem  to  have  an  almost  superstitious  delight  in 
exaggerating  the  mystery  of  certain  phenomena,  and  the  impossi- 
bility of  fixing  them.  Not  only  can  this  primal  mental  state  be 
detected  in  the  young  of  animals  and  man,  but  the  most  cultivated 
man,  unless  he  is  wholly  destitute  of  the  emotional  element,  and 
lives  an  exclusively  arithmetical  existence  from  which  everything 
is  excluded  save  what  can  be  numbered  and  measured,  constantly 
experiences  Feeling  as  I  have  denned  it.  Indeed,  it  is  pretty  certain 


106  Institutes  of  Education.  [I.ECT. 

(6)  Sensation  is  feeling  which,  at  the  continued 
solicitation  of  the  presentation,  has  evolved  into  a 
feeling  of  the  presentation  or  content  as  separate. 
This  stage  of  feeling  is  sensation.  Sensation,  becom- 
ing aware  of  a  variety  of  objects,  is  the  sensation  of 
diversity ;  but  this  is  no  new  phenomenon,  but  merely 
a  numerical  addition  to  the  first  sensation,  and  like  it 
in  kind. 

We  now  have,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Subject  and  Object; 
but  we  do  not  have  a  sensation  of  Subject.  For  this 
we  must  manifestly  first  sense  subject  as  an  Object, 
which  is,  at  this  stage,  impossible.  We  feel  the  object 
as  not  subject  (this  is  sensation) ;  but  we  do  not  feel 
the  subject  as  not  object.  We  simply  feel  subject  as  a 
vague  point  of  support  for  object.  To  sense  subject  as 
an  object  is  to  be  se?/-conscious  —  conscious  of  one's 
own  being  as  a  being. 

The  sensing  of  the  "  object "  is  not  simple.  There 
is  contained  in  this  consciousness  —  the  being  of  the 
object  and  the  extensity  of  the  object,  and  the  there- 
ness  or  outness  of  the  object. 

The  organic  appetitive  feelings  we  do  not  at  this 
stage  sense,  but  only  feel  vaguely. 

(c)  Desire  is  to  be  defined  as  a  feeling  from  within, 
so  intense  as  to  cause  movement  and  a  pressing  forward 
to  some  object  for  its  own  filling  or  satisfaction. 

that  even  the  most  rational  adult  has  never  a  clear  perception  or 
conception  of  anything  new,  without  beginning  at  this  point  of 
vague  indefiniteness,  where  subject  and  object  are  undifferentiated. 
This  is  Feeling  in  the  generic  use  of  the  term :  it  is  also  specifically 
used  to  denote  feelings  which  have  an  inner  origin. 


v.]     Summing  up  and  Definitions  (thus  /ar).  107 

(d)  Emotion  may  be  defined  as  desire  to  satisfy 
needs  outside  and  above  the  merely  organic  and  appeti- 
tive; e.g.  the  need  of  satisfying  goodwill  to  others, 
the  need  of  satisfying  the  feeling  (when  "Keason" 
appears)  of  the  beautiful,  of  the  universal  and  rational, 
of  the  infinite,  and  of  God.    All  morality  and  religion 
are    based   on    primitive    needs,    and    corresponding 
impulses  to  satisfy  needs  through  that  which  is  not 
the  subject  itself,  but  something  else. 

(e)  Sympathy  is  a  community  of  feeling  of  one  being 
with  other  beings  (and  with  the  universal  of  Being), 
and  is  the  precondition  of  all  emotion  (though  best 
defined  after  it). 

(/)  /Subject  and  Object.  —  By  Subject  is  meant  the 
one  permanent  conscious  entity  which  receives  pres- 
entations to  sense  from  whatever  source,  inner  or 
outer,  they  come.  The  Object  is  the  presentation  to 
consciousness,  and  is  to-be  called  the  Presentate. 

(g)  The  Representate  is  the  name  to  be  given  to  all 
objects  in  consciousness  which  have  been  previously 
there,  but  which  are  not  ilier> , selves  now  really  present. 
It  is  equivalent  to  image,  but  ought  never  to  be  called 
idea,  which  is  a  word  sacred  to  a  specific  meaning. 

(li)  Analysis  is  the  taking  of  a  complex  whole  to 
pieces;  and  Synthesis  is  the  putting  together  again 
of  the  parts,  and  so  transforming  the  "  whole  "  into  a 
"unity." 

This  involves  the  self-conscious  separating  of  one 
thing  from  another,  and  as  opposed  to  that  other, 
i.e.  Discrimination;  and  Discrimination  is  impossible 
without  an  act  of  will  directed  against  a  complex 
whole. 


108  Institutes  of  Education.  [LKCT.  v. 

(i)  Will  is  the  free  self-generated  nisus  of  the 
conscious  subject. 

(f)  Attention  is  an  act  of  will  sustained  with  a 
purpose. 

Note.  —  EVERY  NEW  MOVEMENT  OF  MIND  PRESUMES 

ALL     THE      PRIOR     MOVEMENTS,     AND      CARRIES     THEM 
WITH  IT. 


LECTURE   VI. 

APPLICATION   OF    THE   PRECEDING   ANALYSIS   TO   EDU- 
CATIONAL METHOD. 

WHEN  we  spoke  of  the  Human  Body  as  vehicle  of 
sensation  and  of  activity  alike, — the  physical  basis  of 
Mind, —  we  showed  that  it  was  the  first  thing  to  attend 
to  in  the  education  of  the  young.  The  first,  because 
the  necessary  condition  of  the  health  of  mind,  but  not 
the  most  important.  We  must  eat  to  live,  but  eating 
is  not  so  important  as  living.  We  also  deduced  the 
lessons  which  the  laws  of  the  body  impose  on  the  edu- 
cator, whether  he  be  a  private  or  public  instructor.1 

We  might  postpone  a  similar  application  of  the 
Doctrine  of  Mind  until  we  had  completed  our  survey ; 
but  it  is,  for  many  reasons,  better  that  you  should  now 
at  this  stage  comprehend  the  educational  and  concrete 
significance  of  the  philosophical  and  abstract,  so  far  as 
we  have  gone. 

The  First  Principle  of  Method,  as  deduced  from  the 
supreme  ethical  end  of  education,  is  — 

TURN  EVERYTHING  TO  USE. 
Corollary  —  Teach  nothing  that  is  useless. 


1  To  save  space,  these  were  not  elaborated,  but  only  indicated. 

109 


110  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

Passing  from  this,  let  us  take  up  in  order  the  vari- 
ous stages  of  conscious  mind.  We  encounter  first  of 
all  Feeling,  as  pre-condition  of  consciousness-proper. 

Feeling. 

I.  The  babe  in  arms  is,  in  its  earliest  stages,  a 
creature  mainly  of  Feeling  —  that  state  in  which  sub- 
ject and  object  are  practically  identified.  So  far  as 
Feeling,  therefore,  is  concerned,  the  philosophy  of 
mind  teaches  us  nothing  as  to  the  education  of  mind. 
All  we  can  say  is,  that  looking  to  the  facts  that  all 
is  always  in  and  through  nerve,  it  is  important  to  a 
healthy  nerve-tissue  that  we  should  protect  the  child 
from  all  painful,  discordant,  or  offensive  impressions. 
Calm  and  placidity,  which  indicate  a  harmonious  equi- 
librium of  nerve  processes,  must  have  some  effect  on 
the  future  mind-life  of  the  babe.  Were  it  possible 
then  (we  speak  of  an  ideal  state  of  things)  to  promote 
this  equilibrium  by  securing  perfect  health  in  the 
organic  functions,  and  by  admitting  to  the  avenues 
of  sense  nothing  but  pleasing  sounds  and  smells 
and  sights,  and  avoiding  all  that  is  sudden,  harsh, 
discordant,  and  offensive,  it  would  be  a  good  thing. 
When  Montaigne's  father  would  not  permit  him  to  be 
suddenly  awakened  from  sleep,  but  roused  him  gradu- 
ally with  gentle  music,  he  was  not  so  far  wrong.  Who 
knows  but  that  much  of  Montaigne's  sweet  reasonable- 
ness of  nature  may  have  owed  something  to  this  deli- 
cate solicitude?  Can  any  one  look  at  the  treatment  of 
infants  by  the  majority  of  well-intentioned  mothers 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.     Ill 

without  being  surprised  that  they  are  so  quiet  as  they 
are?  The  mothers  seem  to  imagine  that  if  they  are 
gratifying  their  own  animal  affection,  the  babe  should 
in  some  way  respond.  Their  general  intelligence  is 
too  low  to  understand  the  dictates  of  sympathy  for 
their  little  charge.  They  think  of  themselves  and 
their  too  explosive  loVe,  and  not  of  the  actual  condi- 
tion and  ne"eds  of  the  babe.  The  instinct  of  animals 
teaches  us  a  lesson.  They  never  seem  to  meddle  with 
their  young  at  this  stage,  save  wisely.  Providing  for 
all  their  wants,  the  parent  seems  to  leave  the  rest  to 
nature.  Men  and  women  are  apt  to  forget  that  mere 
gushing  tenderness  for  helpless  babes  is  a  very  cheap 
matter,  and  that  true  love  shows  itself,  not  in  ill- 
regulated  fondling,  but  in  the  sympathetic  action  which 
understands,  anticipates,  and  satisfies  the  needs  of  the 
infant.  Doubtless,  mothers  and  nurses  more  or  less 
consciously  aim  at  this.  Let  us  wish  them  more 
success. 

Let  us  not  forget  that  the  whole  of  mind,  including 
the  essential  man-characteristic,  is  always  there  in  the 
man-child,  waiting  for  the  conditions  which  make  its 
emergence  possible.  Accordingly,  we  cannot  say  at 
what  specific  point  a  babe  begins  to  perceive,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  the  mere  sensing  of,  objects;  but  this 
is  manifest  enough  that  sensation  comes  first,  and  as  it 
is  the  source  of  all  future  material  of  mind  (save  the 
matter  and  issue  of  the  Reason-process  itself  —  nisi 
ipse  intellectus),  certain  propositions  may  be  advanced 
with  some  confidence.  There  is  an  order  in  the  devel- 
opment of  Faculty.  Accordingly, 


112  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

If  one  Rule  of  Educational  Method  be  more  conspic- 
uous than  another  (so  far  as  we  have  yet  carried  our 
analysis)  it  is  this  — 

Second  Principle :  —  IN  EDUCATING,  FOLLOW  THE 
ORDER  OF  MIND-GROWTH,  WHICH  is  ALSO,  GENERALLY 

SPEAKING,  THE    ORDER    OF    BRAIN-GROWTH. 

An  old  and  empirical  rule  this :  all  we  can  do  is  to 
point  to  its  scientific  vindication.  Doubtless  we  all 
have  to  recognise  this  rule,  whether  we  will  or  not; 
and  in  our  attempts  (which  are  constant)  to  ignore  it 
we  meet  with  signal  failure.  But,  spite  of  this,  we  go 
on  believing  that  we  know  better  than  nature  and  God, 
and  taking  advantage  of  a  child's  memory  for  symbolic 
sounds  we  impart  knowledge  (so-called)  prematurely 
—  a  practice  not  only  useless,  but  hurtful  and  obstruc- 
tive. Take  any  subject  you  please,  you  must  regulate 
your  action  by  the  principle,  or  fail.  Not  only  has 
each  age  its  own  fitting  studies,  but  it  has  its  own  way 
of  comprehending  and  assimilating  the  same  study. 
Take,  for  example,  religion  and  the  idea  of  God.  The 
man-child  is  essentially  a  religious  being,  and  you  have 
to  help  him  in  the  slow  evolution  of  his  religious  life. 
What  can  God  be  to  a  child?  He  can  be  something; 
but  what  ?  Whatever  He  can  be,  He  ought  to  be  by 
your  help;  but  no  more.  And  so  on  with  morality 
and  with  all  intellectual  teachings.  Find  out  what 
things  can  be  to  a  child,  and  limit  yourselves  to  that, 
if  you  wish  to  succeed.  Of  this  more  fully  when  we 
speak  of  applied  method,  which  is  the  Art  of  education. 
I  would  only  make  one  remark  here,  that  if  ever  you 
have  the  mind  of  an  undeveloped  adult  to  deal  with  (a 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.     113 

Central  African,  for  example,  or  a  British  boor),  and 
desire  to  teach  him  anything,  you  must,  even  with 
him,  start  from  the  simplest  child-elements  of  it. 
(Let  the  clergy  and  missionaries  take  note  of  this.) 

The  order  of  mind-growth  in  knowing  is  also  the 
order  of  the  object-growth  in  completing  itself.  Not 
only  does  the  knowing  faculty  move  to  its  end  after 
a  certain  manner  and  by  a  certain  series  of  steps,  in 
other  words,  by  an  evolutionary  process ;  but  we  may 
say  that  the  object  of  knowledge  itself  by  a  kind  of 
parallel  movement  builds  itself  up  out  of  sensation 
into  knowledge.  It  may  be  said  to  separate  itself 
from  other  things,  assume  its  own  percept  and  con- 
cept, and  so  forth:  A  (tree)  differences  itself  as  a 
percept  from  B  (bush)  and  (7  (carrot) .  We  may  look 
at  the  growth  of  knowledge  from  the  side  of  the  object 
as  well  as  of  the  subject. 

Consequently,  we  can  deduce  from  the  Second  Prin- 
ciple these  Rules  — 

Rule  1.  In  the  teaching  of  every  subject  build  it  up 
in  the  mind  of  the  child  in  accordance  with  the  order  of 
mind-growth. 

Eule  2.     Proceed  step  by  step,  and  step  after  step. 

Sensation. 

I  shall  not  at  this  stage  speak  of  those  character- 
istics of  the  conscious  subject  which  follow  the  sensing 
of  an  object,  viz.  retentiveness  and  memory,  imagina- 
tion, etc.,  because  we  have  still  to  consider  to  what 
extent  these  native  capacities  of  all  mind  (if  we  may 
use  that  term)  are  effected  by  the  emergence  and 


114  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

activity  of  Will  and  the  Rational;  and,  consequently, 
anything  I  might  say  now  would  have  to  be  repeated. 
I  speak  here  only  of  the  Sensational  or  Attuitional 
stage  of  human  intelligence. 

At  this  stage  we  have  the  conscious  subject  here  and 
objects  there,  which  objects  as  sensed  we  have  called 
sensates.  It  is  probable  that  this  sensational  life  is 
dominant  (though  not,  of  course,  excluding  Percipient 
and  Concipient  activities)  from  the  age  of  nine  months 
to  about  six  years  of  age  complete — the  period 
(roughly)  of  the  beginning  of  the  second  dentition. 
If  this  be  so,  then  the  educational  lesson  is  that  we 
should  not  interfere  with  free  sensational  life. 

Third  Principle :  —  UP  TO  THE  AGE  OF  six,  WHAT- 
EVER ELSE  IS  DONE  LET  THERE  BE  NO  INTERFERENCE 
WITH  THE  FREEDOM  OF  SENSATION,  BUT  RATHER  EN- 
COURAGE CONTACT  WITH  ALL  FORMS  OF  EXISTENCE, 
AND  PROMOTE  THE  NATURAL  ACTIVITY  OF  THE  CHILD 
IN  EVERY  DIRECTION. 

Sensation  is  observation  of  external  facts  and  rela- 
tions; but  this  of  a  purely  animal  kind.  It  is  not 
human  observation.  Cultivate  the  senses,  we  are  told, 
as  if  this  were  the  sum  of  early  education.  This  is 
one  of  the  results  of  an  inadequate  psychology.  What 
we  have  to  cultivate  —  i.e.  train  and  discipline  —  is 
Percipience  and  Concipience.  But  the  universal  basis 
of  finite  mind  is  sense  (sensations  of  the  outer  and 
sensations  of  the  inner),  and  a  broad  and  liberal  founda- 
tion must  be  laid  if  the  mental  growth  is  afterwards  to 
be  broad  and  liberal  and  sound.  Some  people  would 
make  the  child  exact  from  the  first.  The  exactness  of 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.    115 

Percipience  and  Concipience  is  limitation.  Let  the 
child  alone :  let  him  be  the  victim  of  the  myriad  sen- 
sations which  pour  in  on  him.  The  soil  may  be 
growing  nothing,  but  it  is  being  fertilised  with  a  view 
to  a  future  harvest.  It  is  mere  pedantry  to  interfere 
at  this  stage,  and  the  result  will  be,  or  ought  to  be, 
narrow  and  pedantic.  By  all  means  provide  raw 
material  for  the  child,  but  leave  him  alone  to  make 
what  he  can  of  it.  By  all  means  give  him  paper,  and 
pencils,  and  painting  brushes,  and  colours,  and  bricks, 
and  spades;  but  let  him  alone.  We  were  not  sent 
into  this  world  to  be  manufactured  by  pedants,  but  to 
grow  from  our  own  roots  and  soil.  Nature  in  this 
earliest  stage  is  itself  accomplishing  the  work  that  has 
to  be  done  for  the  individual  mind.  But  we  can  do 
much  to  help  nature  here  as  elsewhere :  and  by  "  help- 
ing "  I  simply  mean  giving  nature  a  chance  and  remov- 
ing the  impediments  which  civilisation  has  put  in  one 
child's  way,  and  giving  to  another  child  the  advan- 
tages of  civilisation. 

For  example,  a  city  child  comes  into  contact  with 
so  many  existences,  —  persons  and  things, —  and  these 
for  the  most  part  in  continual  motion,  that  his  senses 
are  stimulated  to  an  early,  even  precocious,  activity 
beyond  the  possible  experience  of  a  rustic.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  rustic  is  impressed  by  the  comparative 
repose  of  things,  with  the  forms  of  nature,  with  ani- 
mals, and  the  slow  operations  of  agriculture,  and  so 
receives  a  depth  of  impression  which  gives  solidity, 
without  variety  and  alertness,  to  the  future  intelli- 
gence. A  rustic  child,  then,  should  visit  cities  for 


116  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

activity  and  versatility ;  a  city  child  should  visit  the 
country  for  nature  and  repose.  It  is  not  necessary  to 
be  always  directing  the  child  what  to  look  at.  Let 
him  feel  to  repletion,  and  leave  "  Eyes  and  no  Eyes  " 
to  the  copy-books.  Let  him  look  at  what  he  likes, 
but  give  him  opportunities.  This  is  what  I  mean  by 
cultivating  sensation.  Percipience  and  Concipience 
are,  of  course,  going  on  in  the  child,  because  he  can't 
help  it.  He  is  selecting  what  suits  him ;  and  you  may 
depend  on  this,  it  is  not  what  suits  you.  Sensation, 
as  such,  is  the  basis  of  the  future  operations  of  reason, 
and  should  be  rich  and  various  that  it  may  be  fruitful. 
Do  not,  therefore,  limit,  or  in  any  way  restrict,  the 
receptivity  and  natural  free  activity  of  the  child  under 
the  pretext  of  turning  his  knowing  powers  to  account. 
The  Kindergarten  system  may,  as  regards  the  intelli- 
gence at  least,  be  abused  by  the  over-direction,  with 
an  ulterior  purpose,  of  the  free  natural  activities  of 
the  child.  The  chief  gain  in  the  kindergarten  system 
is  its  full  recognition  of  the  activities  of  the  young  in 
the  direction  of  construction.  It  thus  gives  a  city 
child  of  wealthy  parents,  some  of  the  advantages  of 
the  gutter.  It  is  an  extension  and  an  evolution  of  the 
nursery  practice  of  playing  with  bricks,  encourage- 
ment being,  however,  given  to  imitate  definite  forms 
presented  as  drawings.  The  flat  brick  with  toothed 
ends,  admitting  of  one  being  fitted  into  another,  is  of 
more  value  than  all  the  Frobelian  "  gifts."  The  moral 
and  physical  influences,  on  the  other  hand,  of  a  wise 
Kindergarten  are,  considering  the  barbarism  of  the 
lower  stratum  of  our  population,  wholly  good. 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.    117 

And  note :  what  is  true  of  the  child  is  also  true  of 
us  men.  We  are  (if  we  may  so  say)  too  much  the 
victims  of  regulated  and  reasoned  sensations,  and,  con- 
sequently, too  much  the  slaves  of  a  narrow  and  logical 
activity.  We,  too,  should  remember  that  it  is  God 
Himself  who  so  lavishly  offers  to  each  of  us  the  riches 
of  sensation  and  feeling,  and  that  if  we  do  not  keep 
the  sensational  consciousness  open  we  are  guilty  of  a 
"  sullenness  'gainst  nature "  and  God,  and  tend  to 
grow  narrower  as  we  grow  older.  Our  little  person- 
alities shut  out  the  wealth  and  glory  of  the  universal. 
We  do  not  wish  to  rear  poets ;  but  except  in  so  far  as 
a  man  is  a  sharer  in  the  inspiration  of  the  poetic  tem- 
perament, he  is  only  half -born.  Philosophy  and  relig- 
ion are  to  him  sealed  books :  in  the  one  department, 
as  in  the  other,  he  is  fit  onlyjurare  in  verba  (literally) 
magistri.  Reason  gives  interpretation  and  form,  but 
feeling  is  the  inexhaustible  fountain  of  reality. 

Men,  whose  avenues  of  Sensation  have  been  early 
blocked  by  the  limitations  incident  to  definite  knowl- 
edge, have  often  great  force  within  a  narrow  sphere  of 
intellectual  or  moral  activity;  but  their  narrowness 
interferes  with  enjoyment  of  life  in  any  large  sense, 
and  may  even  unfit  them  for  the  administration  of 
important  affairs.  Their  sympathy  and  imagination 
are  cold  and  barren.  True  life,  as  distinguished  from 
departmental  knowledge  and  purposed  activity,  in- 
cludes (always  along  with  these,  of  course)  openness 
to  the  universal  in  all  its  myriad  forms,  and  a  ready 
response  to  its  never-ceasing  solicitations.  Educa- 
tion is  an  extensive  as  well  as  an  intensive  process. 


118  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

The  mind  that  is  the  slave  of  knowledge  tends  to  be 
essentially  obscurantist,  because  it  is  the  slave  of  tra- 
ditionary conceptions  by  which  it  judges  all  things.  It 
is  this  traditionary  spirit  which  is  the  enemy  of 
Humanism,  though,  strange  to  say,  it  is  often  most 
conspicuous  in  men  who  have  been  trained  exclusively 
in  the  (so-called)  Humanities.  The  historical  struggle 
between  Obscurantism  and  Humanism  repeats  itself  in 
every  age,  and,  indeed,  in  the  struggles  of  each  indi- 
vidual with  himself. 

In  the  case  of  the  city  child,  then,  let  him  have  the 
country  as  much  as  possible ;  in  the  case  of  the  rustic, 
let  him  have  the  city :  and  failing  that,  markets,  fairs, 
travelling  circuses,  panoramas  (especially  geographi- 
cal), musical  entertainments,  games,  and  magic-lantern 
exhibitions.  It  is  true  that  the  life  of  sensation  is 
never  more,  intellectually,  than  the  attuition  of  objects 
as  wholes  and  of  their  relations  in  locality;  but  this, 
after  all,  is  the  foundation  of  the  fabric  of  mind,  and 
has  to  be  respected.  But  we  are  not  to  forestall  the 
next  stage  of  mind-evolution. 

Take  note  of  this,  however :  just  because  a  child  is 
a  human,  and  not  a  mere  animal  intelligence,  the  rudi- 
mentary acts  of  Percipience,  Concipience,  Generalisa- 
tion, and  Reasoning  are  all  going  on,  in  a  dim  and 
groping  way,  during  the  whole  of  the  sensational  period 
without  your  interference.  For  example,  the  marked 
and  conspicuous  difference  of  one  thing  from  another 
—  a  stone  from  a  piece  of  wood,  grass  from  trees  —  is 
making  the  percipient  act,  though  it  is  an  act  of  will, 
easy.  So  with  concepts  of  individuals,  which  to  a  child 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.    119 

consist  of  the  most  prominent  characters  only.  So 
with  generalisations,  which  are  rude  and  inadequate 
because  they  deal  only  with  what  most  vividly  im- 
presses sense.  To  hasten  the  ripening  of  these  acts 
is  to  barter  life  for  knowledge,  and  to  cheat  the  child 
of  a  multifarious  experience  which  will  be  afterwards 
in  due  time  turned  to  account. 

Up  to  the  age  of  five  or  six  you  may  introduce  a 
child  to  new  objects  as  sensational  wholes,  which  in 
his  ordinary  experience  might  escape  him;  but  this  is 
all.  He  perceives  these  objects  as  "  wholes " ;  and 
object-lessons  should  never  go  beyond  this.  During 
the  last  two  years  of  infancy  —  the  sixth  and  seventh 
years  —  you  may  safely  give  object-lessons  of  a  more 
extended  kind,  but  they  must  be  given  as  an  exercise 
in  the  perception  of  qualities  which  are  obvious  and 
superficial;  and  objects  not  within  the  range  of  com- 
mon life  should  always  be  avoided.  It  is  in  the 
breaking-up  of  what  is  already  attuitionally  familiar 
that  the  discipline  of  object-lessons  consists.  There 
is  no  good  to  be  got  from  a  lesson  on  copper  ore  or  on 
a  megatherium.  This  is  a  fact  of  ordinary  teaching 
experience,  and  confirms  the  deductions  of  the  theory 
or  science  of  education.  But,  perhaps,  we  somewhat 
anticipate  in  these  remarks. 

When  we  begin  formal  instruction,  the  principle  of 
method  to  be  deduced  from  the  above  considerations, 
which  exhibit  sensation  (inner  and  outer)  as  the  basis, 
and  as  furnishing  the  raw  material,  of  all  subsequent 
processes  of  mind,  is  this  — 

PRESENT   TO    SENSE. 


120  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

The  visible  must  be  seen,  the  tangible  must  be  touched, 
the  odorous  must  be  smelt,  the  audible  must  be  heard, 
the  inner  feeling  or  elementary  emotion  must  be  felt. 


Will  and  Percipience. 

The  characteristic  of  sensation  is  variety,  multi- 
plicity, disorder,  even  confusion,  into  the  midst  of 
which,  as  we  saw,  Will  enters  in  the  form  of  the  rudi- 
mentary reason-ac£  of  Percipience.  The  important, 
nay,  vital  point  in  the  movement  which  we  call  reason, 
is  this,  that  it  is  Will.  I  can  perceive  nothing,  conceive 
nothing,  know  nothing,  save  in  so  far  as  I  do  so  as  a 
self-conscious  subject  that  wills.  The  fact  that  there 
is  no  conscious  effort  in  much  of  our  knowing,  that  it 
is  so  easy  to  begin  with,  and  becomes,  in  the  course  of 
repetition,  almost  automatic,  does  not  affect  the  ques- 
tion. Try  to  perceive  and  conceive,  or  in  any  way 
know,  something  new  and  strange,  like  that  clock  on 
the  wall,  which  you  can  imagine  yourself  seeing  for 
the  first  time  when  totally  ignorant  of  its  purpose  and 
mechanism,  and  you  will  realise  to  yourself  what  Will 
is  as  an  initiating  energy,  and  also  what  it  is  in  its 
process. 

What  principle  of  method  do  we  deduce  from  the 
fundamental  fact  of  reason?  This  — 

EVOKE    THE   WILL    OF    THE    PUPIL. 

This  principle  lies  at  the  root  of  all  true  discipline 
of  the  mind  of  man,  just  as  it  lies  at  the  root  of  that 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.    121 

mind  as  rational  mind.  Sensation  furnishes  the  mate- 
rial and  occasion  of  the  new  movement,  but,  at  the  same 
time,  it  blocks  the  way,  and  has  to  be  overcome. 

It  is  true,  as  I  have  said  above,  that  in  the  case  of 
a  child  as  of  a  man,  the  oft-repeated  and  insistent 
presentation  of  an  object  in  attuition  makes  easy, 
and  almost  unconscious,  the  movement  from  within 
whereby  that  object  is  perceived.  If,  however,  I  pre- 
sent, even  to  a  child,  an  object  which  by  its  novelty 
stimulates  him  to  interest,  he  exerts  himself  to  look 
at  it,  and  to  handle  it,  and  so  forth,  i.e.  attends  to  it, 
and  so  perceives  it  as  a  total,  like  or  unlike  previous 
experiences ;  and  he  then  immediately  advances  rapidly 
to  the  conceiving  of  that  total  through  the  perception 
of  its  most  conspicuous  characters.  The  continuous 
application  of  will  to  an  object  of  knowledge  with 
the  purpose  of  knowing,  is  called  Attention.  Every 
teacher  fails  who  cannot  in  practice  solve  for  himself 
this  problem,  "How  can  I  secure  the  attention  of  a 
class?"  The  general  answer  is,  "By  following  the 
principles  of  method  in  teaching ;  "  but  to  this  has  to 
be  added  regard  for  physiological  conditions,  and  the 
extent  to  which  the  teacher's  manner,  as  sympathetic, 
interested,  and  vivacious,  engages,  by  a  natural  reac- 
tion, the  interest  of  his  pupils. 

In  teaching  a  subject,  I  must  follow  the  process  of 
knowing,  whatever  that  process  may  be.  I  cannot 
advance  by  walking  backwards. 

Manifestly,  then,  in  evoking  will  to  enter  on  the 
path  of  knowledge,  I  must  begin  with  Percipience  and 
go  on  to  Concipience,  and  so  forth.  Percipience  is 


122  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

first,  and  lies  at  the  foundation  of  all  accurate  knowl- 
edge. I  find  accordingly  certain  principles  here  await- 
ing me.  All  is  complex,  but  perception  is  of  the 
single.  Accordingly  we  have  this  priniciple  — 

IN  THE  TRAINING  OF  PERCIPIENCE  CONFINE  YOUR- 
SELF TO  WHOLES  AS  SINGLES,  AND  TO  SINGLES  AS 
WHOLES. 

RULE.  —  One  thing,  or  one  element  of  a  thing,  at  a 
time. 

Let  any  rational  mind  try  to  realise  in  itself  an 
adequate  knowledge  of  any  new  thing  whatsoever,  and 
he  will  fail  until  he  has  analysed  the  complex  in  con- 
sciousness down  to  its  underlying  percepts,  and  dis- 
tinctly apprehended  these. 

It  is  no  mean  element  in  the  work  of  rational  mind, 
this  accuracy  of  Percipience.  It  is  the  foundation  and 
necessary  condition  of  every  subsequent  step,  if  that 
step  is  not  to  be  simply  a  step  into  confusion. 

It  may  be  of  little  moment  to  perceive  distinctly  the 
object  "tree"  as  opposed  to  "shrub,"  or  any  one  qual- 
ity in  tree  as  opposed  to  any  other  one  quality  in  tree, 
so  far  as  mere  substance  of  knowledge  is  concerned. 
But  the  important  point  in  this,  as  in  all  other  edu- 
cative processes,  is  the  training  and  discipline  of 
faculty.  This  has  always  to  be  kept  in  view  as  our 
main  end, —  effectiveness  of  faculty ;  and  we  can  then 
let  knowledge  take  care  of  itself.  This  is  education 
of  intelligence.  Nothing  else  can  be  called  education 
without  involving  ourselves  in  a  contradiction  of  terms. 
One  percept  at  a  time,  then,  and  that  clearly  differ- 
entiated. 


vi.]      Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis,    123 


Concipience. 

The  next  step  in  knowing  an  object  is  the  raising  of 
the  percept  of  the  object  as  a  single  whole,  to  its  per- 
ception as  a  unity.  Mind  has  been  discriminating 
diverse  objects  one  from  another.  It  now  continues 
its  occupation  with  each  object  to  see  what  the  object 
has  got  to  say  for  itself.  The  various  qualities  impress 
themselves  on  sense,  and  have  now  to  be  discriminated 
in  relation  to  the  total  object,  and  as  elements  in  it; 
and  those  qualities  which  are  not  obvious  have  to  be 
sought  for. 

The  mind  in  knowing  will  not  be  hurried.  It  must 
take  one  step  after  another,  and  only  one  at  a  time. 
Like  all  things  in  nature,  it  grows  by  infinitely  small 
steps. 

In  teaching  botany  to  a  school  I  present  a  bluebell. 
To  the  children  it  is  familiar;  but  it  is  little  more,  as 
yet,  than  a  perceived  attuitional  total.  If  they  know 
anything  about  it  beyond  what  they  know  about  all 
other  plants  that  are  becoming  daily  familiar  to  sensa- 
tion and  perception,  it  is  that  on  the  top  of  a  thin 
green  stalk  there  is  a  blue  cup.  To  this  extent  the 
bluebell  is  not  only  perceived  as  a  whole  in  sensation 
discriminated  from  other  things,  but  is  conceived,  by 
virtue  of  certain  qualities  and  characteristics  of  its 
own,  relatively  to  itself. 

It  is  manifest  that  until  Will,  in  the  energy  of 
knowing,  has  reached  the  point  at  which  it  discrimi- 
nates the  various  characters  which  go  to  make  the 


124  Institutes  of  Education.  [LBCT. 

complex  individual  in  sense,  it  has  advanced  only  one 
step  beyond  attuition,  and  that  the  second  step  is  the 
truly  instructive  one.  It  is  now  answering  the  ques- 
tion, What  is  that  complex  object  before  me?  —  the 
first  and  final  question  of  reason.  The  answer  is 
ascertained  by  an  analysis,  which  gives  an  adequate, 
though,  of  course,  superficial,  synthesis  of  the  ele- 
ments in  the  object;  and  this  synthesis  constitutes 
its  (unity  in  many)  concept.  Will  has  here  a  higher 
and  more  difficult  task  to  perform  than  in  Percip- 
ience,  and  greater  demands  are  made  on  its  sheer 
power  of  holding  things  together.  The  discipline  of 
Will  and  the  training  in  the  process  whereby  Will 
reaches  knowledge,  are  here,  accordingly,  higher 
than  they  have  yet  been.  It  follows  the  prior  dis- 
cipline in  simple  percipience.  Consequently  the 
principle  — 

IN  TRAINING  IN  CoNCIPIENCE  PRACTISE  IN  THE  SYN- 
THESIS OF  ONE  IN  MANY. 

But  remember,  meanwhile,  the  magistral  principle 
of  order  in  conceiving,  and  confine  yourself  to  the 
obvious  for  a  considerable  time.  Not  only  must  you 
confine  yourself  to  the  obvious  for  some  time,  but  in 
your  first  exercises  you  must  limit  yourself  to  the 
most  salient  characteristics.  WThy? 

Because  we  discovered  in  our  philosophy  of  mind 
that  it  was  the  salient  characteristics  which  were  first 
apprehended  by  mind  in  building  up  a  concept  of  a 
thing.  Thus  a  second  principle  (not  to  be  called  a 
rule,  because  it  is  not  a  deduction  from  a  prin- 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.    125 

ciple,    but   itself  directly   deduced   from   the   mind- 
process)  — 

IN  TRAINING  TO  ADEQUATE  CONCEPTS  OF  OBJECTS, 
TEACH  FIRST  THE  SALIENT  AND  PROMINENT  CHARAC- 
TERISTICS BEFORE  PROCEEDING  TO  OTHERS. 

Anticipate  a  little,  and  apply  for  yourselves 
this  principle  of  method  to  geography,  history, 
grammar,  language  generally,  etc.,  arid  you  will 
see  how  sound  it  is,  and  how  universally  it  is 
neglected. 

No  doubt  a  human  being,  especially  if  he  has  a 
happy  nerve-basis  and  a  suitable  environment,  may  do 
much  of  all  this  for  himself;  but  if  he  could  do  it  as 
well  as  he  ought  to  do  it,  education,  whether  by  the 
parent  or  the  teacher,  would  be  superfluous.  It  is 
because  the  human  animal  cannot  educate  himself  that 
we  interpose  and  educate  him.  And,  so  far  as  the 
intellect  is  concerned,  it  is  only  by  following  the 
method  of  mind  in  its  process  of  knowing  that  we  can 
teach  any  subject  effectively,  or  as  Comenius  would  say, 
easily,  solidly,  and  surely.  But  far  more  important 
than  the  teaching  of  particular  subjects  is  (let  us  never 
forget)  the  training  and  discipline  of  the  knowing 
function  in  man.  Keason  (which  is  sometimes  called 
divine)  is  in  our  hands,  to  make  or  mar.  Our  respon- 
sibility is  great.  For  on  reason  and  its  sane  activity 
in  search  of  true  knowledge,  depends  ultimately  the 
true  ethical  life  —  the  life  of  conduct  as  well  as  of 
contemplation. 

Far  be  it  from  me,  however,  to  say  that,  without  the 


126  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

formal  training  and  discipline  of  reason,  a  man  cannot 
be  ethical.  He  may  be  so  constituted  as  to  have  a 
natural  affinity  for  the  humane  feelings  which  are  the 
fountain  of  the  ethical,  and  he  may  be  by  nature  so 
open  to  the  spiritual  ideas  which  are  presented  to  him 
in  the  example  and  teaching  of  others,  that  he  leads 
an  exemplary  life  in  all  his  relations.  God  has  not 
left  the  all-important  question  of  conduct  in  the  hands 
of  intellect  alone.  Even  "to  the  poor  (in  mind)  the 
gospel  is  preached."  But  we  cannot  trust  to  such 
casual  results.  The  very  purpose  of  all  education  is 
to  strengthen  the  ethical  in  the  individual,  for  himself 
and  for  humanity,  by  the  discipline  of  reason,  at  the 
same  time  that,  by  that  discipline,  we  secure  a  more 
effective  discharge  of  all  the  duties  of  life,  individual, 
social,  and  political.  Surely  a  great  work !  An  unedu- 
cated man,  moreover,  however  finely  attuned  by  nature, 
necessarily  has  narrow  interests :  his  horizon  is  limited, 
and  he  must  always  fail  to  rise  to  ethical  conceptions 
in  any  large  sense.  The  world  and  all  its  interests 
are  for  him  his  village  and  his  home. 

It  may  be  said  by  the  hypercritical,  that,  after  all, 
many  of  these  principles  of  method,  so  far  as  we  have 
yet  gone,  are  already  in  the  market.  True ;  but  they 
are  not  bought  and  paid  for  by  those  who  most  need, 
and  ought  to  use,  them.  Experience  in  the  course  of 
the  ages  forces  profound  truths  on  men  with  the  very 
minimum  of  thinking  on  their  part,  simply  by  show- 
ing them  that  certain  things  won't  work  and  certain 
others  will.  Nature,  so  to  speak,  takes  care  of  itself; 
for  there  is  a  Reason  in  the  affairs  of  men.  Our  busi- 


vi.]     Application  of  the  Preceding  Analysis.    127 

ness  is  to  explicate  that  reason,  and  to  find  the  scien- 
tific or  rational  explanation  of  good  practices,  and  to 
show  the  untruth  and  ineptness  of  bad  ones.  This  in 
education  is  called  theory,  and  it  is  this  which  every 
man  who  proposes  to  educate  a  mind  is  asked  to 
study. 


LECTURE   VII. 

THE  GENERAL  CONCEPT. 

THE  process  of  mind  on  its  way  to  knowledge  has 
been  our  theine;  but  our  work  is  as  yet  only  half  done. 
The  moments  of  sensation,  of  perception  of  sensates, 
and  the  conception  of  the  percepts  inherent  in  the  com- 
plex sensate,  take  us  a  considerable  step  on  the  reason- 
road.  We  can  imagine  an  intelligence  so  constituted 
as  to  stop  at  this  point ;  but  if  so,  its  reduction  of  the 
material  in  sense  to  self-consciousness,  and  consequent 
knowledge,  would  be  partial  and  inadequate.  The 
concept,  even  supposing  it  complete,  would  give  us 
only  the  separate  parts  of  a  single  thing  in  unity. 
These  are  in  the  object  fused,  for  we  cannot  locally 
separate  the  colour  from  the  form  or  hardness  or, 
odour :  they  are  not  separated  parts  of  the  thing  stand- 
ing side  by  side  as  a  collocated  aggregate.  Still  they 
are  collocated  parts  of  an  aggregate  in  the  sense  of 
elements  in  the  total  thing.  We  may  regard  them  as 
the  anatomical  description  of  the  thing.  But  we  are 
not  content  with  this  as  knowledge. 

We  press  forward  to  a  higher  conception  —  the  con- 
ception of  the  relation  of  these  parts,  which  relation 
truly  constitutes  them  into  the  actual  thing  before  us. 
Passing  over  many  subordinate  and  preliminary  analy- 
128 


LECT.  vii.]  The   General  Concept.  129 

ses,  we  ultimately  desire  to  see  the  molecular  elements 
of  the  thing,  and  the  dynamic  force  or  forces  which 
bring  about  that  specific  constitution  of  molecular 
elements  which  we  call  the  "thing."  The  mere  collo- 
cation of  parts  gives  us  no  satisfaction ;  we  desire  to 
detect  the  precise  nature  of  the  energy  which  deter- 
mines that  these  elements  shall  be  here  A  and  there  B 
or  C.  In  short,  we  seek  the  causal  relations  of  the 
elements  within  the  thing  and  "for  itself." 

For,  after  all,  the  question  we  ask  of  each  thing 
(and  of  the  whole  of  experience)  is,  What  are  you? 
You  have  qualities  which  I  find  everywhere  else :  your 
colour  I  find  in  other  things,  your  texture  and  hard- 
ness and  odour  and  form  I  find  in  other  things ;  but 
they  are  combined  in  you  in  such  a  way  as  to  make 
you  a  thing  by  yourself,  and  not  anything  else.  And 
I  want  to  know  what  you  truly  are  —  in  short,  what  is 
your  essence,  which  is  also  your  idea,  and  the  purpose 
or  re'Xos  of  your  existence. 

To  face  me,  I  have  a  quantitative  difficulty :  Will 
is  a  great  power ;  it  can  hold  present  to  consciousness 
several  percepts  and  concepts  at  once,  while,  at  the 
same  time,  more  or  less  vaguely  sensing  a  multitude  of 
subconscious  or  sensational  elements  which  can  be 
made  to  emerge  when  I  desire  to  realise  them  clearly. 
But  the  multitude  of  individual  concepts  is  so  great 
that  Will  exhausts  itself  quickly  in  their  presence, 
and  gladly  catches  at  some  way  of  symbolising  many 
individual  concepts  as  represented  by  one.  Millions 
of  dogs  are  represented  by  the  one  word,  "  Dog  "  or  "  a 
Dog " ;  millions  of  individual  men  by  the  one  word, 


130  Institutes  of  Education.  [I.ECT. 

"  Man  "  or  "  a  Man. "  We  say  "  a  Dog  is  a  quadruped, " 
meaning  "all  dogs;"  Man  is  rational,  meaning  "all 
mew."  We  thus  abbreviate  the  work  of  Will-reason. 
This  is  itself  a  great  gain  if  it  were  nothing  else, 
because  it  abbreviates  and  simplifies  thought. 

[To  this  aspect  of  the  general  concept  I  mean  here  to 
confine  myself.  Its  relations  to  Cause,  Essence,  Idea,  lie 
within  the  sphere  of  metaphysics.] 

If  we  can  utter  a  judgment  the  predicate  of  which 
will  cover  at  once  many  millions  of  individuals,  it  is 
manifest  that  we_  have  acquired  an  intellectual  sym- 
bolism which  facilitates  enormously  the  progress  of 
reason  in  knowledge. 

How  then  do  we  get  for  consciousness  the  word 
"Dog"  as  distinguished  from  this,  that,  and  other 
dogs? 

Thus: 

I  have  already  perceived  and  conceived  an  indi- 
vidual object,  differing  from  other  creatures  within 
the  area  of  conscious  experience,  and  named  it  "dog." 
Many  other  creatures  now  pass  before  me  which, 
though  differing  in  certain  respects  (which  are  super- 
ficial enough),  e.g.  size  and  colour,  are  yet  possessed 
of  those  characters  which  made  me  originally  call  a 
particular  creature  a  "  dog "  in  order  to  mark  it  off 
from  the  many  other  creatures  previously  seen.  Be- 
cause they  possess  in  common  those  characteristics 
which  difference  a  dog  from  other  creatures,  I  call 
them  all  "dogs."  While  doing  so,  I  am  gathering  up, 
by  the  force  of  Will,  into  a  unity  in  my  consciousness 


vii.]  The   General   Concept.  131 

these  common  (differentiating)  characteristics,  and  so 
constituting  a  new  reality  (for  consciousness),  the  kind, 
species,  or  genus,  or  class,  DOG.  This  is  the  General 
Concept  which  manifestly  exists  as  an  entity  of  Reason 
only;  its  actual  existence  being  found  only  in  that 
series  of  individuals  in  which  I  have  noted  the  common 
characteristics.  "Dog"  is  all  dogs  and  no  dog. 

General  Propositions.  —  Now  this  General  Concept 
is  the  mother  of  general  propositions,  thus :  The  com- 
mon characteristics,  above  referred  to  as  found  in  the 
series  of  individuals,  are  a,  6,  c,  d.  Consequently  the 
general  concept  DOG  contains  in  itself,  ready  to  be 
explicated  whenever  I  choose,  the  general  proposi- 
tions — 

All  dogs  have  a. 

have  b. 

have  c. 

have  d. 

Note  next,  that  the  affirmation  of  the  general  con- 
cept "  Dog  "  presumes  that  I  have  seen  all  individual 
dogs  and  recorded  their  characteristics.  But  it  is  in 
no  man's  power  to  do  so.  There  is,  then,  manifestly 
lying  buried  in  the  general  concept  "  Dog  "  an  assump- 
tion or  hypothesis,  viz. :  This  dog,  that  dog,  and  a 
multitude  of  creatures  (to  which  I  originally  attached 
the  differentiating  name  of  "dog")  represent  or  stand 
for  "  all  dogs ;  "  therefore,  "  Dog, "  as  a  general  concept, 
contains  all  dogs.  So  firm  and  rigid  is  the  conviction 
that  I  have  got  the  true  general  concept  which  exhausts 
individuals  and  affirms  a  class  or  kind,  that  if  any 


132  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

traveller  sent  me  a  picture  of  a  strange  animal  and 
called  it  a  dog,  I  should  say  at  once,  "  It  is  not  a  dog, 
because  though  it  has  a  and  6  and  also  a  certain  general 
sensational  resemblance,  it  has  not  c  and  d,  and  is 
therefore  not  a  dog,  but  some  new  beast  not  yet  clas- 
sified. 

[Some  may  say  that  the  general  proposition  must  precede 
the  general  concept.  Doubtless  it  is  silently  there,  but  in 
its  explicated  form  as  a  proposition  it  follows  (I  think)  the 
general  concept,  and  is  an  explication  of  it.  For  educational 
purposes  this  matters  little.] 

The  formation  of  the  general  concept,  apart  from  its 
value  as  the  shorthand  of  reason,  is  of  great  signi- 
ficance. It  implies  a  power  of  Will  in  discriminat- 
ing and  holding  discriminations  together  in  a  unity, 
with  a  sub-reference  to  innumerable  individuals,  much 
greater  than  any  yet  brought  into  operation.  The 
abstraction  necessary  in  percipience  and  concipience 
is  here  quite  outdone ;  quantitatively  outdone,  and  also 
outdone  because  in  holding  present  to  consciousness 
the  general  concept,  we  have  now  no  longer  the  support 
of  the  thing  as  there  and  then  present  to  conscious- 
ness, but,  instead  of  this,  only  an  entity  generated  by 
mind. 

The  significance  of  the  General  Concept  is  great, 
because  it  carries  with  it  the  whole  process  of  reason- 
ing or  ratiocination  as  distinct  from  Reason  in  its 
larger  sense:  and  in  reasoning  are  included  both 
Induction  and  Deduction. 


vii.]  The    General  Concept.  133 

Its  importance  in  the  ordinary  life  of  man  is  also 
great;  because  the  true  measure  of  our  power  over 
things  lies  in  the  truth  of  our  general  concepts.  On 
this  the  accuracy  of  our  judgments  in  the  affairs  of 
life  depends. 

Its  ethical  importance  again  is  supreme;  because  the 
general  concept  is  the  "  form "  of  ethical  ideas,  and 
these  constitute  at  once  the  motive  and  the  end  of  all 
conduct. 

Further,  the  importance  of  a  proper  understanding 
of  the  process  of  formation  is  also  great;  because,  if 
understood  as  it  has  been  explained  above,  ethical 
ideas,  however  exalted,  are  not  in  themselves  existent, 
but  are  existent  only  in  so  far  as  they  make  manifest 
their  existence  in  the  particulars  of  conduct  —  the 
daily  and  hourly  life  of  each  of  us.  They  live,  they 
can  truly  live,  only  in  the  particular. 

You  can  understand,  then,  how  it  is  of  all  things 
most  desirable  that  in  the  self -education  of  our  own 
minds,  and  the  education  by  us  of  other  minds,  we 
should  see  to  it  that  they  are  trained  and  disciplined 
in  the  accurate  construction  of  general  concepts.  On 
this  depend  soundness  of  judgment  and  the  validity  of 
concrete  reasoning. 

A  treatise,  De  Emendatione  Intellectus,  might  well 
centre  round  the  general  concept.  Not  only  for  its 
own  sake,  but  for  its  implications;  for  this  stage  of 
the  process  of  Will  in  knowing  rests  on  the  previous 
stages,  without  which  it  could  not  emerge;  and f  it 
contains  also  implicitly  the  ratiocinative  function. 
Without  the  accurate  concept  of  the  individual,  which, 


134  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

again,  depends  on  accurate  or  true  percepts,  and  these 
on  full  and  true  presentation  to  sense,  the  general  con- 
cept would  be  hopelessly  vitiated :  and  the  vitiation 
may  enter  at  any  one  or  all  of  these  stages. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  TRAIN  THE  YOUNG  IN  THE 

FORMATION  OF  GENERAL  CONCEPTS,  AND  IN  THE 
ANALYSIS  OF  THOSE  THEY  HAVE  IMMATURELY  FORMED. 

With  this  object  in  view  obey  the  following  rule :  — 
KULE.  —  Teach   generalisations   as  generalisations; 
that  is  to  say,  proceed  from  the  particular  to  the  gen- 
eral; from  the  concrete  individual  to  the  abstract. 

The  tradition-bound  teacher  of  language  will  say 
that  the  abstract  syntactical  rule  of  grammar  can  be 
learned  quite  easily  by  boys.  Of  course  it  can  —  as 
words;  but  it  can  never  be  anything  but  a  meaningless 
collocation  of  words  until  it  is  filled  with  the  concrete 
individual  "  instances  "  which  the  boy  is  daily  encoun- 
tering in  his  studies.  And  inasmuch  as  the  human 
mind,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  gets  its  general  and  abstract 
proposition  (even  if  it  has  to  do  so  retrospectively,  i.e. 
by  going  back)  through  particulars,  our  duty  is  to  lead 
it  to  its  general  proposition  along  the  road  or  way  of 
particulars.  The  mind  will  thus  make  easier  and  more 
solid  and  more  rapid  progress  in  the  knowledge  of  a 
subject,  and  will  also  have  an  intellectual  interest  in 
the  subject.  But  these  are  not  the  sole,  nor  yet  the 
chief,  advantages;  for  it  is  only  by  following  the  way 
of  reason  that  we  can  truly  train  and  discipline  reason 
to  the  sound  and  effective  exercise  of  its  powers  on 
all  the  affairs  of  life. 

The  same  remarks  apply  to  the  teacher  of  elementary 


vii.]  The   General  Concept.  135 

science.  Even  the  humblest  school-science  consists  of 
generalisations,  or  aims  at  them.  Unless  the  pupil  is 
led,  step  by  step,  to  approach  these  through  particular 
observations,  full  and  exact,  the  conclusion,  be  it  in 
the  form  of  a  generalisation  or  a  formula,  is  not  knowl- 
edge any  more  than  the  case  which  contains  a  diamond 
is  the  diamond.  The  great  facility  many  boys  have 
in  appropriating  the  words  and  propositions  that  for- 
mulate knowledge,  deceives  the  teacher.  Heal  contact 
with  particulars,  so  that  the  boy  himself  can  of  him- 
self draw  the  scientific  conclusion,  is  alone  of  any 
value.  Even  an  unintelligent  knowledge  of  a  Greek 
verb  is  more  disciplinary  and  more  instructive  than 
verbal  scientific  knowledge.  Such  knowledge  is  not 
real;  and  it  is  only  in  so  far  as  it  presents  the 
real  relations  of  things,  and  in  so  far  as  these  are 
clearly  perceived  and  conceived,  that  science  in- 
struction has  any  rightful  place  in  the  school.  The 
Ratichiaii  rule,  "per  experimentum  omnia,"  is  here 
absolute. 

And  yet  words  and  formulation  are  necessary.  If, 
without  the  help  of  language  to  fix  and  symbolise,  we 
could  make  little  progress  on  the  percipient  and  con- 
cipient  planes  of  mind,  how  hopeless  would  be  the 
attempt  to  convey  a  generalisation  and  reasoning  with- 
out it.  Until  we  formulate  thought  to  ourselves  in 
words,  we  are  not,  strictly  speaking,  thinking,  but 
only  striving  to  think,  struggling  with  thought  — 
"licking,"  as  Montaigne  says,  "the  formless  embryo." 
On  this  parallelism,  or  rather  interpenetration,  of 
thought  and  language,  rests  ultimately  all  argument 


136  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

for  language  as  an  educational  discipline ;  apart,  that 
is  to  say,  from  its  ethical  and  aesthetic  aspects.1 

Note.  —  Here  I  may  state  explicitly  what  I  have  elsewhere 
indicated,  that  the  child  —  indeed,  we  may  say  more  truly, 
the  infant  —  begins  with  general  concepts.  By  this  I  merely 
mean  that  the  infant,  having  seen  and  named  an  individual 
(the  totality  of  impression  which  is  the  individual  in  sense), 
forthwith  uses  that  individual  image  and  name  as  a  general. 
Having  once  seen  and  named  a  cow,  he  calls  the  four-footed 
animals  which  thereafter  come  before  him  "cows,"  until  he 
knows  better  (as  we  say).2  So  vague  are  sensates,  and  the 
first  percepts  of  these  sensates,  that  he  sees  a  general  like- 
ness before  he  begins  to  differentiate  in  any  close  analytic 
sense.  Till  he  gradually,  by  the  concurrent  processes  of 
differentiation  and  likening,  builds  up  for  himself  the  con- 
cept of  this  and  that  individual,  he  is  constantly  wrong,  and 
the  resultant  in  his  consciousness  is  always  confused  and 
inadequate.  Still  more  must  this  be  the  case  with  the  proc- 
ess of  forming  the  general  concept,  which  demands  much 
more  energy  of  will  applied  to  things  than  the  individual 
concept  does ;  for  he  has  to  compare,  analyse,  and  discrimi- 
nate with  a  view  to  the  integration  of  a  new  unity  in  con- 
sciousness. Not  only  is  this  process  one  demanding  in  itself 
more  energy  of  will,  but  it  is  vitiated  by  all  prior  errors  in 

1  Dr.  Sully  (i.  p.  420)  refers  to  a  deaf-mute  who,  before  learning 
the  manual  signs,  reached  "  the  highly  abstract  idea  of  Maker  and 
Creator,  and  applied  this  to  the  world  or  totality  of  objects  about 
him."    If  my  analysis  of  percipience  in  Met.  Nov.  et  Vet.  be  correct, 
this  is  not  impossible.    He  had  the  feeling  of  Being-universal,  and 
the  perception  and  conception  of  the  multiplicity  of  objects  as 
grounded  in  Being-universal. 

2  Why  does  a  child  see  generals  vaguely,  and  only  slowly  advance 
to  differentiation  and  true  generals  ?    Because  he  is  in  the  sensa- 
tional stage,  the  victim  of  impression,  whereas  the  analytic  act  is 
an  act  of  Will  directed  against  the  object,  and  is  necessarily  of  slow 
and  gradual  emergence. 


vii.]  The   General   Concept.  137 

percipience  and  concipience  —  nay,  also,  by  the  incomplete- 
ness of  the  primary  sensation.  Concepts  both  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  of  the  general  are  allowed  by  the  inactive  mind 
to  form  themselves  (so  to  speak)  as  vague  impressions,  and 
the  result  is  fatal  to  adequate  and  accurate  thinking.  We 
educate  in  order  to  correct  all  this.  We  do  not,  however, 
wish  to  interfere  too  much  with  the  natural  flow  of  mind, 
but  only  to  regulate  and  direct  it ;  and,  as  the  young  grow 
older,  we  further  wish  to  rouse  in  them  a  self-conscious 
purpose  of  attaining  a  knowledge  which  shall  be  exact  and 
true. 

The  next  movement  of  Mind  in  knowing  is  Reason- 
ing, Inductive  and  Deductive,  already  contained  in  the 
general  concept,  but  now  explicit  and  self-conscious. 

Having  treated  this  briefly,  we  shall  then  speak  of 
Cause  as  ground  of  things,  just  as  Reasoning  contains 
the  ground  of  conclusions. 


LECTURE   VIII. 

REASONING  OR  RATIOCINATION  —  MEDIATE 
AFFIRMATION. 

WE  now  have  to  deal  with  the  final  processes  of 
Reason,  viz.  Reasoning,  and  the  ascertainment  of  the 
Grounds  or  Causes  of  things. 

As  I  am  not  attempting  a  systematic  treatise  on 
Psychology,  but  rather  exhibiting,  in  lectures,  the 
critical  movements  of  the  conscious  subject  in  reduc- 
ing the  world  of  sensation  to  itself,  I  shall  take  the 
privilege  of  a  lecturer  and  briefly  repeat,  though  in  a 
slightly  different  form,  what  I  have  already  said  on 
general  concepts,  because  a  consideration  of  these  is, 
it  seems  to  me,  the  best  introduction  to  the  reasoning 
process. 

Think  what  an  unfortunate  gift  the  power  of  acquir- 
ing percepts  and  individual  concepts  would  be  if  we 
stopped  there.  The  whole  complex  world  would  be 
an  infinite  series  of  individuals.  If  we,  as  endowed 
with  Will,  felt  an  impulse  to  go  further,  memory  would 
break  down.  You  could  not  speak  of  "  hill, "  or  "  dog, " 
or  "  cow, "  but  only  of  certain  individual  objects  one 
after  the  other,  each  with  its  own  specific  name. 
138 


LECT.  viii.]      Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  139 


As  a  matter  of  fact,  individual  things  outside  are 
all  in  community  with  other  things,  and  share  their 
properties.  The  fire  is  hot,  so  is  the  sun;  the  grate 
is  black,  so  is  a  negro's  face  or  a  starless  night  sky. 
Many  animals  are  so  like  each  other  that  we  popularly 
say  they  are  the  same  animal;  not  numerically,  but 
yet  the  same,  e.g.  one  cow  is  like  another.  There  are 
slight  differences  of  size  and  colour,  it  may  be,  but 
they  are  substantially  alike  (whatever  "  substantially  " 
may  mean);  and  we  apply  the  same  name  to  all  of 
them,  though,  as  individual  objects  there  are  hundreds 
of  millions  of  them. 

This  is,  as  we  have  seen,  GENERALISING,  or  the 
forming  of  GENERAL  CONCEPTS;  grouping  individuals 
as  kinds  or  classes. 

When  I  speak  of  a  cow,  e.g.  in  this  way,  "The  cow 
gives  milk,"  "The  cow  is  good  eating,"  and  so  forth, 
I  do  not  specify  in  thought  or  speech  any  particular 
cow  more  than  another,  but  all  cows  whatsoever. 
Thus,  under  cover  of  one  word  used  as  a  symbol,  I 
am  able  to  speak  of  millions  of  things. 

Now,  how  do  I  get  at  this  admirable  time-saving, 
thought-saving  result? 

Thus: 

I  have  perceived  an  individual  cow:  nay  more,  I 
have  conceived  it;  that  is  to  say,  I  have  perceived 
certain  qualities  which  it  possesses,  and  these  quali- 
ties—  e.g.  living,  animal,  four-footed,  cloven-hoofed, 
large-uddered  —  are  grasped  together  as  a  unity  or 
concept  in  my  mind,  which  reality  I  have  called  a 
"cow."  But  numerous  animals  pass  before  me,  and 


140  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

I  perceive  such  a  resemblance  of  qualities  in  certain 
of  them  that  I  feel  that  they  are  not  only  similar 
animals,  but  substantially  the  same,  though  numeri- 
cally distinct.  All  these  similar  individuals  I  call 
cows ;  and  then  I  find  that  I  can  talk  of  cow,  or  "  the 
cow,"  in  a  general  way,  meaning  all  cows,  but  yet  no 
one  particular  cow  more  than  another.  This  thing  of 
which  I  speak  is  the  cow  as  a  class  or  kind.  The  word 
cow  is  now  no  longer  simply  an  individual  sense- 
concept,  but  a  GENERAL  CONCEPT,  and  the  name  "  cow  " 
is  a  general  or  class  name. 

Now,  what  have  we  been  doing  ?  Evidently  com- 
paring one  animal  with  another.  That  is  to  say,  we 
have  held  present  to  consciousness  certain  individual 
sense-concepts,  and  looking  from  one  to  the  other  we 
have  seen  likeness  or  unlikeness,  and  have  gathered 
under  one  general,  or  class,  or  kind-name,  all  the 
similars. 

This  is  COMPARISON.  Comparison,  then,  is  the  basis 
of  generalisation. 

The  general  concept  cow  is  reached  by  us  after  a 
comparison  of  a  large  number  of  individual  or  partic- 
ular concepts.  Looking  at  a  great  number  of  animals 
which  are  prima  facie  like  each  other,  we  have  found 
a  common  expression  for  them  —  which  common  ex- 
pression I  call  a  general  concept.  Spite  of  many 
differences,  each  animal  has  certain  qualities  a,  6,  c, 
d;  therefore,  a,  6,  c,  d  are  the  common  characters,  and 
any  word  may  be  the  symbol  of  these. 

There  is,  manifestly,  in  this  process  a  high  energy 
of  will  as  a  sheer  power  holding  things  together;  and 


viii.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  141 

that,  without  the  advantage  of  a  sensible  support  as 
in  the  sense-concept. 

But  this  general  concept  "cow,"  though  it  is  one 
word  denoting  a  unity  of  particulars,  contains  implic- 
itly the  general  proposition,  "All  animals  called 
'cow '  have  a,  b,  c,  d."  The  general  concept  then  con- 
tains in  it  and  yields  general  propositions,  which  have 
for  their  sign  the  word  "all." 

In  saying  "  All  cows  have  cloven  feet, "  I  merely  say 
out  at  large  what  already  had  been  put  by  me  as  the 
result  of  my  perceptions  into  the  general  concept 
"cow."  "Cloven-footed"  was  one  of  the  qualities 
or  characters  which  we,  on  comparison,  found  always 
present  in  a  certain  number  of  individual  animals,  and 
was  one  of  the  grounds  for  our  throwing  them  alto- 
gether under  the  name,  class,  kind,  or  general  concept 
"cow."  It  is  as  if  I  had  put  ten  pebbles  into  a  bag, 
one  of  them  red,  and  then  said,  that  bag  contains  ten 
pebbles,  and  one  of  them  is  red.  I  knew  what  I  put 
in,  and  so  I  know  what  I  shall  take  out. 

Many  difficult  and  subtle  questions  arise  in  common 
with  this  generalising  operation.1 

Enough  for  our  purpose  to  note  that  I  have  reached 
the  general  proposition,  "All  cows  are  cloven-footed," 
"All  cows  are  large-uddered, "  "All  cows  are  rumi- 
nant," and  so  on,  by  perceiving  these  several  char- 

1  For  example,  as  to  the  complex  of  qualities  which  constitutes 
the  general  concept  cow.  A  gentleman  arrives  from  the  Antipodes 
to  show  me  a  cow  which  has  solid  hoofs  like  a  horse.  Another 
arrives  from  Spitzbergen  to  show  me  one  which  has  a  thick  coat- 
ing of  fur,  and  so  on,  and  so  on.  I  shall  pass  this  question  here 
(advisedly). 


142  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

acters  in  each  of  the  animals  presented  to  me,  and 
which  I  have  classed  as  cows,  or  rather,  under  the 
general  concept  and  name  "cow." 

It  is  thus,  as  we  have  seen,  through  the  perception 
of  the  particular  or  individual  that  we  reach  the  general 
proposition,  and  that  the  general  proposition  has 
meaning  to  us  —  is  -alive  to  us.  If  we  do  not  see  the 
general  proposition,  in  and  through  its  particulars,  it 
is  simply  so  many  words  —  voces  etprceterea  nihil.  Of 
this  again  in  a  minute  or  two,  under  "Induction." 

As  to  Comparison :  —  We  said  that  animals  were  able 
to  compare;  but  it  was  the  comparison  of  one  sensa- 
tion with  another,  —  a  vague  indefinite  process  on  the 
plane  of  sensation,  and  also  very  restricted  for  want 
of  Will  to  separate,  to  perceive,  and  to  hold  percepts. 
They  sense  likeness  and  unlikeness  of  objects.  The 
likeness  and  unlikeness  is  imprinted  on  them.  But 
they  make  no  further  progress,  because  they  cannot 
function  free  Will :  consequently,  they  do  not  perceive 
and  conceive  objects;  that  is  to  say,  know  them  by 
separating,  seizing,  apprehending,  and  placing  them 
back  in  their  conscious  subject,  as  a  thing  taken  pos- 
session of  and  labelled.  What  enables  the  child  to 
shoot  ahead  of  the  animal  and  perform  this  process? 
Will,  and  nothing  but  Will ;  a  free  movement  issuing 
from  the  conscious  subject,  which  spiritual  dynamic 
constitutes  his  differentia,  and  enables  him  to  advance 
and  to  conquer.  By  dint  of  this  Will  he  perceives 
and  affirms  relations,  and  also  the  fact  of  relation  as 
an  abstract.  By  this  he  holds  each  percept  or  concept 


viii.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  143 

close  to  him,  and  perceives  (not  merely  feels)  the  dif- 
ferences. The  holding  of  two  or  more  objects  close 
to  consciousness  in  order  to  perceive  their  likeness  or 
unlikeness  is,  we  have  said,  COMPARISON.  But  it  is 
no  longer  now  the  comparison  of  animal  sensation, — 
a  mere  feeling,  a  comparison  made  by  the  thing  (so  to 
speak)  on  the  reacting  conscious  subject,  —  but  the 
comparison  of  perception  and  conception, — the  com- 
parison in  which  Will,  the  conquering  energy  evolved 
in  the  conscious  subject,  plays  from  first  to  last  the 
leading,  because  the  conditioning,  part.  It  seizes  the 
qualities  which  are  the  common  characteristics  of  indi- 
viduals, and  holds  them  apart  from  the  individuals. 
This  is  the  Abstraction  of  generalisation. J 

Note.  —  But  before  going  farther,  let  me  point  out  that 
while  the  above  is  the  order  of  the  process  whereby  general 
propositions  are  first  reached,  it  is  for  the  most  part  an 
unself-conscious  operation.  The  forming  of  percepts  is  un- 
self-conscious,  the  forming  of  concepts  is  unself-conscious, 
and  the  forming  of  general  concepts  and  the  general  propo- 
sitions implicit  in  them  is  unself-conscious.  By  this  I  mean 
that  we  go  on  doing  all  these  things,  in  the  first  instance, 
without  any  set  purpose,  but  only  under  the  general  stimu- 
lus of  Will-reason.  But  man  being  a  self-conscious  being, 
can  become  aware  of  his  acts  and  propose  to  himself  deliber- 
ately to  perform  these  acts,  with  a  view  to  knowing  things. 
For  example,  I  become  through  sensation  aware  of  a  great 
many  objects  which,  though  somewhat  differing,  yet,  roughly 

1  No  dog  or  horse  can  speak  at  all,  or  name  even  one  quality; 
still  less  can  either  of  them  say  or  think,  "  All  cows  have  cloven 
feet."  And  yet,  I  think  it  by  no  means  impossible  that  certain 
sounds  should  emanate  from  animals  as  associated  with  certain 
individual  things. 


144  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

speaking,  may  all  be  called  "  grass  "  :  and  I  may  deliberately 
proceed  to  collect  all  these  objects  and  endeavour  to  find  out 
what  they  have  in  common.  And  after  careful  observation 
of  each  of  the  different,  yet  similar,  grasses,  I  come  to  the 
conclusion,  "  All  grasses  are  a,  6,  c,  d"  etc.  One  differs 
from  all  the  rest  in  respect  of  /,  another  in  respect  of  g, 
another  in  respect  of  /,  g,  and  so  on,  but  they  all  have  the 
qualities  a,  b,  c,  d,  etc.,  in  common.  Thus  I  reach  a  general 
proposition  purposely  and  self-consciously. 

The  object  of  psychology  of  the  Intelligence  (in  which 
is  necessarily  included  the  fundamental  principles  of  logic) 
is  to  bring  into  view  the  various  operations  which  mind 
carries  on  in  order  to  reach  knowledge  or  truth.  Thereby 
we  extend  knowledge  itself  by  a  knowledge  of  that  which 
is  the  organ  of  knowledge ;  the  most  interesting,  surely,  of 
all  objects  of  inquiry  to  the  being  whose  differentiation  and 
prerogative  it  is  to  know.  And  besides  this ;  by  revealing 
the  process  we  stimulate  to  the  correct  use  of  that  process, 
and  guard  ourselves  against  prevalent  and  almost  inevitable 
abuses  of  it;  for  the  human  mind  is  always  packed  full  of 
generalisations,  a  great  many  received  from  parents  and 
others  —  all  of  them  provisional,  most  of  them  quite  wrong, 
and  leading  to  endless  errors  of  opinion  and  conduct. 

The  lesson  to  be  drawn  by  the  teacher,  as  I  have 
already  said,  is  this,  that  general  concepts  and  gener- 
alisations are  mere  words  and  nothing  more,  except  in 
so  far  as  the  particulars  are  known :  this  is  essential 
to  their  being  distinct  and  clear.  In  other  words,  let 
general  concepts  and  general  propositions  be  taught 
in  the  way  in  which  they  are  formed. 

The  transition  to  the  next  movement  of  mind  is  best 
made,  I  think,  through  a  consideration  of  the  act  of 
judging. 


viii.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  145 

Judgment  and  Deductive  Reasoning.  —  From  the  very 
first  we  have  been  judging  —  always  judging. 

To  judge  is  to  predicate  one  thing  of  another.  But 
even  in  the  first  percept  ever  formed  by  us,  we  affirmed 
the  identity  of  a  thing  with  itself.  Judgment  is  also 
affirmation,  which,  when  put  in  words,  we  call  a  prop- 
osition; e.g.  "  a  horse  is  a  quadruped."  The  first  limb 
of  the  proposition  we  call  the  Subject,  and  the  second 
the  Predicate. 

Every  successive  movement  of  mind  is  by  way  of 
judgments ;  for  of  everything,  whether  it  be  a  percept, 
a  concept,  or  general  concept,  we  say  that  "  it  is, "  or 
"is  not." 

It  is  unnecessary  for  our  educational  purpose  to  go 
farther  into  the  subject  of  judgments.  Indeed,  the 
subject  is  introduced  here  only  because  it  seems  to  be 
the  most  natural  and  easiest  approach  to  the  apprehen- 
sion of  the  process  of  Eeasoning,  or  the  Syllogism. 
For  a  large  number  of  our  judgments  are  mediate 
judgments ; 1  that  is  to  say,  they  acquire  truth  and 
validity,  not  by  the  direct  perception  of  the  fact  before 
us,  but  through  other  judgments.  I  am  referring  to 
those  judgments  which  involve  general  concepts.  For 
example,  I  say,  "This  tree  is  an  oak,"  without  realis- 
ing to  myself  the  ground  of  my  affirmation.  If  I 
realise  that  the  ground  of  my  judgment  has  been  the 
observation  that  it  produces  gall-nuts,  it  is  at  once 
manifest  that  my  judgment  is  mediate  or  syllogistic, 
and  when  explicitly  stated  is  this : 

1  All  judgments  are  at  bottom  mediate ;  but  to  show  this  would 
lead  us  aside  into  metaphysics  (Met.  Nov,  et  Vet.). 


146  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

All  trees  that  bear  gall-nuts  are  oaks. 
This  tree  bears  gall-nuts ; 
Therefore,  this  tree  is  an  oak. 

These  three  affirmations,  propositions,  or  judgments 
we  call  the  major  premiss,  the  minor  premiss  or  sub- 
sumption,  and  the  conclusion. 

Thus,  in  a  multitude  of  ordinary  colloquial  judg- 
ments, we  are  always  syllogising  without  realising 
that  we  are  doing  so. 

The  process  which  has  been  illustrated  above  is 
mediate  judgment,  or  reasoning,  or  ratiocination,  or 
the  syllogistic  process  (deductive).  If  a  traveller  in 
Central  Africa  writes  that  he  met  with  a  strange 
animal  which  was  yet  to  all  intents  and  purposes  a 
cow,  then  I  know  that  that  animal  must  have  the 
qualities  a,  6,  c,  d,  etc.,  which  he  and  I,  and  the  rest 
of  us,  have  agreed  to  regard  as  constituting  a  cow,  as 
distinguished  from  every  other  animal.  I  then  pro- 
ceed thus : 

All  cows  have  a,  b,  c,  d,  etc. 

This  new  animal  is  (I  am  assured)  a  cow ; 

Therefore,  this  new  animal  has  a,  b,  c,  d,  etc. 

Or,  you  may  ask  me  the  question,  Has  a  new  animal 
lately  found  in  Central  Africa  cloven  hoofs  ?  I  say, 
What  does  the  traveller  call  it  ?  You  answer,  He 
says  it  is  a  cow.  Then  I  reply,  It  has  cloven  hoofs ; 
because  cloven-hoofed  is  one  of  the  qualities  which, 
we  have  agreed,  go  to  constitute  the  animal  cow. 
Thus: 


vui.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  147 

All  cows  have  cloven  hoofs. 

This  new  animal  is  a  cow; 

Therefore,  this  new  animal  has  cloven  hoofs. 

This  is  Deductive  reasoning ;  and  its  truth  depends  on 
the  truth  of  the  general  proposition  under  which  you 
conclude  as  to  this  or  that  predicate  of  the  individual 
which  you  range  or  subsume  under  the  general  propo- 
sition. You  are  simply  taking  out  of  the  general 
concept  or  proposition,  in  relation  to  a  particular  case, 
what  you  have  already  put  into  it.  You  see  then 
how  careful  men  must  be  of  their  general  propositions, 
which,  in  truth,  are  mostly  wrong ;  and  even  when 
they  are  right  enough  for  colloquial  and  provisional 
purposes,  they  are  wrong  scientifically. 

Your  syllogism  may  be  in  point  of  form  quite  cor- 
rect, but  if  your  general  proposition  is  defective,  to 
that  extent  your  particular  conclusion  is  defective  and 
really  incorrect. 

How  then  did  we  get  this  general  proposition  on 
which  so  much  depends  ? 

Inductive  Reasoning. — Here  we  must  go  back  to  the 
general  proposition  (p.  141),  "All  cows  are  cloven- 
hoofed,"  which  was  extracted  out  of  our  general  concept 
"  cow,"  the  moment  we  had  made  it.  There  was  here  a 
secret  process  going  on  which  has  to  be  brought  to  light. 

We  had  been  gradually  noting,  as  was  pointed  out, 
the  qualities  which  we  might  predicate  of  an  animal 
called  a  cow  to  justify  us  in  calling  other  animals 
"cows,"  and  not  horses,  or  anything  else.  Among 


148  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

other  things  we  noted  "cloven-hoofed"  in  each  indi- 
vidual animal  that  passed  before  us.  Then  the  general 
concept  cow  yielded  at  the  very  moment  of  its  for- 
mation the  proposition,  "  All  cows  are  cloven-hoofed." 
We  might  not  put  it  in  words,  but  the  proposition 
was  silently  there,  contained  in  our  act  and  the  con- 
clusion of  that  act.  And  it  was  so  contained  because 
we  had  examined,  one  after  another,  a  large  number 
of  instances.  We  had  virtually  said  this  animal,  which 
impresses  us  in  such  or  such  a  way,  we  call  a  cow,  and 
it  is  cloven-hoofed.  Cow  No.  2,  which  similarly  im- 
presses us,  and  which  we  also  call  a  cow,  is  also  cloven- 
hoofed,  and  so  on.  And  then  we  concluded,  "All  cows 
are  cloven-hoofed." 

Now,  had  we  seen  all  cows  ?  Certainly  not.  Accord- 
ingly the  process  was  this : 

This  cow,  that  cow,  and  the  other  cow  have  cloven 

hoofs. 
These  cows  which  we  have  observed  represent  all 

the  cows  not  yet  observed  ; 
Therefore,  all  cows  are  cloven-hoofed. 

This  process  is  evidently  the  same  as  the  syllogistic 
process  whereby  we  affirmed  confidently  that  the  cow 
in  the  African  desert  was  cloven-hoofed,  simply  be- 
cause it  was  a  cow,  and  because  all  cows  are  cloven- 
hoofed.  But  it  is  the  reverse  process.  It  is  a  mediated 
general  judgment,  mediated  through  particulars.  It  is 
a  process  whereby  we  reach  the  general  judgment  or 
proposition  through  particular  propositions  or  judg- 


viii.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  149 

ments.  This  is  Inductive  reasoning,  and  is  the  proc- 
ess by  which  we  formed  the  general  concept,  in  the 
formation  of  which  inductive  reasoning  was  implicit. 

Thus  reasoning  (syllogistic)  goes  inductively  from 
particular  to  general,  and  also  deductively  from  gen- 
erals to  particulars ;  and  the  concluding  judgment, 
whether  particular  or  general,  is  always  mediated. 

Thus  by  means  of  these  general  propositions  as 
induced  from  particular  propositions,  and  by  means  of 
particular  propositions  which  may  be  deduced  from 
them,  we  acquire  a  kind  of  mental  shorthand  which 
gives  us  great  power  over  our  materials  of  perception 
and  conception,  and  enables  us  to  connect  things 
together  in  a  reasoned  whole.  So  strong  is  this 
impulse  of  rational  mind  that  its  ideal  aim  is  always 
a  reasoned  system  of  things  —  a  cosmic  connected 
whole. 

But  we  have  always  to  be  on  our  guard,  because  our 
general  proposition  may  be  on  wrong  lines.  It  may 
be  defective  in  its  particulars,  to  begin  with.  Such 
general  propositions,  in  truth,  are  always  provisional 
in  their  character,  and  to  that  extent  have  an  arbitrary 
look. 

[It  is  only  when  I  am  able  to  name  the  qualities  which 
a  cow  must  have  in  itself  to  be  a  cow,  the  qualities  "  essen- 
tial "  to  a  cow,  that  I  am  entitled  to  say  that  I  have  truly  a 
right  to  a  general  proposition  which  is  irrefragable.  And 
this  "essence"  I  cannot  get  hold  of.  Yet  enough  is  given 
me  for  the  ordinary  purposes  of  life  and  knowledge.] 

Now,  at  this  point  we  might,  as  finite  intelligences, 
rest  satisfied.  We  can  reduce  the  multitude  of  objects 


150  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

by  which  we  are  surrounded  to  percepts  and  concepts : 
we  can  determine  their  relations,  and  gather  these 
together  into  general  concepts  and  general  proposi- 
tions ;  and  further,  we  can  move  freely  from  one  thing 
to  another,  and  arrange  all  our  knowledge  in  a  con- 
venient way,  as  a  connected  rational  system.  But  this 
does  not  suffice:  there  still  awaits  us  the  final  and 
consummating  movement  of  mind  —  the  mediation  of 
the  real;  or  Causal  Induction. 

Before  considering  this  final  reason-movement,  let 
me  again  impress  on  .you  the  bearing  of  these  discus- 
sions on  educational  method.  The  proposition,  "  Grass 
is  a  living  organism,"  in  so  far  as  it  is  the  conclusion 
of  a  deductive  syllogism,  is  entirely  dependent  on 
the  prior  general  propositions,  "all  plants  are  living 
organisms,"  and  "grass  is  a  plant."  The  proposition 
is  manifestly  analytic,  for  it  is  already  contained  in 
the  general  concept  "Plant."  If  grass  be  an  entirely 
novel  experience  to  me,  all  that  I  have  to  ascertain  is 
whether  it  is  a  plant  or  not,  and  then  I  know  the  rest. 
This  is,  as  we  have  seen,  what  is  called  a  mediate 
knowledge  or  mediate  syllogistic  judgment  because  it 
is  not  direct  but  mediated  through  another  knowledge, 
viz.  the  general  proposition.  Now,  the  world  and 
human  affairs  and  relations  are  excessively  complex, 
and,  in  order  to  save  ourselves  from  over-pressure  by 
particulars,  we  are  always  taking  refuge  in  general 
concepts  and  general  propositions.  It  is  evident,  then, 
that  if  we  are  not  excessively  careful  in  forming  our 
general  concepts  and  propositions,  we  shall  fall  into 
endless  error, — error,  too,  of  a  particularly  fatal  kind, 


viii.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  151 

because,  the  logical  form  being  correct,  we  are  apt  to 
stand  by  our  erroneous  conclusion  as  also  really  correct. 
For,  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  show  in  the  specific 
educational  reference,  these  general  concepts,  and  the 
general  propositions  issuing  from  them,  are,  in  truth, 
inductions.  That  is  to  say,  they  are  the  tying  up  in  a 
bundle  and  labelling  of  a  large  number  of  particular 
percepts  and  concepts.  The  general  concept  and  gen- 
eral propositions,  as  such,  thus  give  us  no  new  knowl- 
edge as  regards  the  particulars  (though  they  may  seem 
to  do  so),  for  each  individual  percept  and  concept  is 
presumed  to  have  been  seen  by  us ;  they  merely  give 
us  this  new  knowledge,  viz.  that  all  the  particular 
things  are  the  same,  or  similar,  in  certain  respects. 
Neither  the  inductive  result,  accordingly,  which  is  a 
general,  nor  the  deductive  result,  which  is  a  particular, 
proposition,  give  us  any  new  knowledge  of  things 
beyond  the  fact  that  certain  things  not  within  our 
immediate  purview  are  alike  in  certain  respects.  The 
syllogism,  in  truth,  whether  inductive  or  deductive, 
is  simply  a  way  of  first  formulating  and  then  utilising 
knowledge  already  presumed  to  be  gained  by  the 
observation  of  particular  things.  Accordingly,  the 
truth  of  every  judgment  and  proposition,  whether  it 
be  a  general  or  a  particular,  depends,  ultimately,  on  the 
exactness  or  truth  of  our  individual  percepts,  concepts, 
and  general  concepts ;  and  it  is,  consequently,  difficult 
to  exaggerate  the  educational  importance  of  exactness 
in  percipience  and  concipience.  There  is  a  mediating 
process  of  mind  which  is  universally  recognised  as 
adding  to  our  knowledge, — a  mediation  not  through 


152  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


propositions,  but  through  realities, — the  mediation 
of  Cause ;  but  the  truth  is,  that  if  we  trace  any  propo- 
sition whatsoever  back  to  its  origin,  it  too  exhibits 
real  relations,  and,  only  in  so  far  as  it  does  so,  is  it  of 
any  value. 

The  formation  of  the  habit  of  exact  perceiving  and 
conceiving  is  necessary,  not  only  as  a  foundation  for 
sound  reasoning,  but  also  to  enable  us  to  detect  in  a 
complex  presentation  or  statement  the  important  vital 
points.  Our  knowledge  is  advanced  by  bringing  new 
cases  under  already  known  generalisations.  Accord- 
ingly, in  a  new  case,  we  have  to  detect  in  the  object 
before  us  those  characteristics  which,  spite  of  its 
apparent  novelty,  bring  it  under  some  general  concept 
or  proposition  through  certain  attributes  of  likeness. 
This  demands  an  active  and  penetrating  observation 
of  its  various  features.  A  man  who  can  see  his  way 
to  an  accurate  mediate  judgment,  by  bringing  the  new 
particulars  before  him  under  some  general  head,  is 
said  to  be  a  man  of  sound  judgment.  To  judge  soundly 
is  one  of  the  highest  functions  of  intellect,  because  it 
involves  accurate  discrimination  and  perception  of  the 
elements  in  the  thing  before  us,  the  possession  of 
general  concepts  which  are  in  their  content  clear  and 
distinct,  and  thereafter  the  power  of  relating  the  par- 
ticular to  the  general  with  a  true  insight  into  simi- 
larity. The  man  who  can  do  this  supremely  well  in 
science,  philosophy,  or  politics  is  the  man  of  genius. 

In  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  again,  the  man  who 
can  readily  detect  the  characters,  more  or  less  hidden, 
of  the  particular  case  before  him,  and  bring  it  under 


viii.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  153 


its  solving  universal,  is  the  prince  of  practical  men. 
But  it  is  not  always  an  easy  task.  A  man  may  culti- 
vate a  solemn  expression,  and  have  always  the  air  of 
pronouncing  sound  judgments,  and  may  thus  easily 
acquire  a  reputation  with  undiscerning  people  as  a 
man  of  "common  sense."  But  the  reputation  is  con- 
stantly ill-founded.  The  men  who  "  look  wiser  than 
any  man  ever  was, "  are  often  to  be  distrusted.  Some- 
times they  are  not  truly  in  earnest  in  their  desire  to 
get  the  truth,  but  merely  to  play  the  rdle  of  judicially- 
minded  men,  and  they  will  consequently,  after  due 
shaking  of  the  head,  utter  a  common-place  which 
solves  nothing.  They  are  ambitious,  not  of  truth, 
but  of  a  "reputation."  Then,  again  we  have  men  of 
honest  and  truly  sound  judgment;  but  this  within  a 
very  limited  range  of  principles.  Their  area  of  vision 
is  circumscribed,  and  they  unconsciously  hasten  to 
reduce  the  particular  question  before  them  to  one  or 
other  of  the  few  formulas  which  constitute  their  stock- 
in-trade.  They  are  to  be  respected  as  the  necessary 
ballast  of  society.  A  judge  on  the  bench  is  thus  arti- 
ficially limited,  thoiigh,  personally,  he  may  see  beyond 
the  law-inscribed  horizon.  The  truly  sound  judgment 
on  the  complex  before  a  man  will  be  found  to  be,  for 
the  most  part,  predictive.  It  is  justified  by  the  sequel. 
And  this  remark  applies,  not  only  to  ordinary  affairs, 
to  commerce,  to  politics,  and  ethics,  but  to  scientific 
investigations.  For  such  a  judgment  there  is  needed 
the  greatest  possible  exactness  in  matters  of  fact, 
truthfulness  of  purpose,  and,  above  all,  a  regulated 
imagination.  The  issues,  both  in  the  sphere  of  pure 


154  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


knowledge  and  of  action,  are  always  present  to  the 
supreme  judgment. 

Educationally,  then,  it  is  difficult,  as  I  have  said,  to 
exaggerate  the  importance  of  exactness  of  mind.  It 
is  also  clear  that  a  man  cannot  be  called  educated  in 
the  highest  sense,  unless  his  education  has  been  di- 
rected to  this  end  of  sound  judgment.  The  education 
must  be  not  only  intensive  and  exact,  but  extensive 
in  respect  of  the  material  of  knowledge.  But  both 
combined  will  fail  to  produce  the  educated  man,  if 
there  be  not  the  ethical  impulse  and  the  ethical  aim ; 
so  closely  are  the  intellectual  and  the  ethical  inter- 
woven. There  must  be  a  purpose  of  truth. 

In  teaching,  then,  the  endless  affirmations  or  judg- 
ments current  in  ordinary  intercourse  and  in  literature 
have  to  be  traced  to  their  general  ground  (or  as  it 
is  sometimes  called  "  principle "),  and  not  accepted 
simply  because  they  are  as  propositions  clear  and 
intelligible.  If  a  man  does  not  carry  on  this  process 
while  reading  or  conversing,  he  is  the  victim  of  end- 
less fallacies.  Accordingly,  we  have  to  call  on  the 
mind  we  are  educating  to  analyse  what  is  before  it, 
to  justify  it,  and  to  vindicate  its  truth  by  making 
explicit  its  premisses,  and  so  reconstituting  the  syn- 
thesis for  itself.  Herein  lies  the  training  and  disci- 
plining of  ratiocination;  and,  when  we  do  this,  we 
find  ourselves  thrown  back  on  percepts,  and  individual 
concepts,  and  wholly  at  the  mercy  of  these  primary 
acts  of  intelligence  which  lie  at  the  foundation  of  the 
general.  Keality  is  truth,  and  truth  is  reality.  All 


viii.]  Reasoning  or  Ratiocination.  155 

reality  is  derivative,  save  the  primary  percepts.  Thus, 
let  me  repeat  ad  nauseam,  there  is  forced  upon  us  at 
this  stage,  as  at  all  stages  of  education,  the  supreme 
value  of  exercise  and  discipline  in  accurate  discrimi- 
nation —  not  with  a  view  to  knowledge,  but  to  a  habit 
of  mind.  And  it  is  solely  because  certain  studies  pro- 
mote this  (e.g.  object-lessons  and  science-lessons), 
that  their  place  in  the  school  can  be  justified;  not 
because  of  the  knowledge  they  give. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  TEACH  REASONINGS  AS  REA- 
SONINGS ;  THAT  IS  TO  SAY,  ANALYSE  THE  AFFIRMA- 
TIONS BEFORE  YOU,  AND  MAKE  EXPLICIT  THEIR 
RATIONAL  BASIS. 

[Analysis  and  (syllogistic)  synthesis.] 
Anatytico-  Synthetic. 


LECTURE   IX. 

CAUSAL  INDUCTION. 

THE  proposition  or  judgment,  "Fire  burns  wood," 
is  said  to  be  a  causal  judgment.  And  so  it  is  in  a 
sense.  But  as  it  is  a  mere  observation  of  the  sequence 
of  two  events,  the  former  of  which  controls  the  appear- 
ance of  the  latter,  I  would  prefer  here  (in  view  of 
educational  applications)  to  call  it  a  dynamical  judg- 
ment. 

Now,  the  whole  range  of  statical  and  dynamical 
judgments,  even  were  it  within  our  grasp,  gives  us 
only  a  superficial  and  preliminary  knowledge  of  things. 
The  central  impulse  of  reason  is  towards  the  affirma- 
tion of  the  ground  or  cause  of  things.  The  issue  of 
reason  is  an  answer  to  the  question,  What  is  A,  or  B, 
or  C?  and  the  "is"  involves  Cause.1  The  dynamical 
judgment  does  not  satisfy  us ;  for  it  is  a  mere  obser- 
vation that  one  appearance  always  follows  another. 

The  true  causal  knowledge  of  a  thing  is  the  compre- 

1  When  I  see  a  thing  in  its  identity  of  cause,  process,  and  end,  I 
know  it,  and,  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  there  is  nothing  more  to  be 
done.  I  would  fain  rest :  and,  in  point  of  fact,  I  would  then  lie  down 
and  rest,  were  it  not  for  the  infinite  relations  of  the  said  thing,  and 
the  ultimate  cosmic  question  which  is  always  luring  on  Will-reason 
in  its  free  and  unresting  activity  in  search  of  an  absolute  synthesis. 
156 


LECT.  ix.]  Causal  Induction.  157 

hension  of  the  how  and  why  of  the  sequence;  and  to 
this  all  other  knowledge  is  merely  preparatory.  This 
kind  of  knowledge  is  by  way  of  pre-eminence  called 
Science,  Scientia,  or  the  knowledge.  This  search  for 
causes  of  visible  existences,  results,  or  effects,  is  the 
task  of  the  man  of  science  in  all  the  departments  of 
human  experience  and  endeavour,  and  not  in  physics 
alone. 

We  feel  that  we  truly  know  a  "thing,"  only  when 
we  know  it  in  its  cause  or  causes. 

That  tree,  for  example,  I  perceive,  conceive,  con- 
nect with  its  general  concept  "  Tree "  and  its  higher 
concept  "Plant,"  and,  through  generalised  proposi- 
tions within  whose  sphere  it  falls,  I  can  reason  to 
this  or  that  conclusion  about  it.  For  example,  I  do 
not  see  its  roots;  but  I  know  it  has  them.  Why? 
Because  it  is  a  tree.  I  do  not  see  its  fruit ;  but  I  know 
it  has,  or  will  have,  it.  But  what  I  now  want  to  know 
is,  what  are  the  causes  which  underlie  the  visible,  and 
bring  about  stem,  branch,  leaf,  and  fruit?  Until  I 
have  ascertained  this,  I  do  not  really  know  the  tree. 
I  am  not  yet  at  the  end  of  my  quest.  Why  does  that 
branched  object  before  me  bring  forth  fruit?  You 
answer,  "Because  it  is  a  tree."  I  reply,  not  so;  that 
is  the  reason  why  you  say  that  it  brings  forth  fruit. 

The  true  cause  lies  somewhere  in  the  reproductive 
necessity  of  the  tree's  nature.  Suppose  I  could  name 
this  cause  and  call  it  A.  A  is  the  cause  of  the  fruit- 
bearing;  but  even  of  this  as  the  true  and  necessary 
cause  of  the  fruit-bearing  I  cannot  speak  with  confi- 
dence until  I  have  further  ascertained  how  it  does  it. 


158  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

It  is  necessary  to  see  the  process  at  work,  and  we  shall 
then  see  what  the  sequence  which  we  call  Cause  and 
Effect  must  be. 

How  do  I  proceed  ? 

There  are  many  events  that  precede  what  I  see.  I 
examine  these,  separate  one  from  the  other,  and,  carry- 
ing my  observation  through  a  number  of  instances,  and 
excluding  first  this  antecedent  as  the  cause,  and  then 
that  and  the  other  antecedent,  I  finally  isolate  the  true 
cause ;  and,  by  further  examination  and  experiment,  I 
confirm  what  I  have  detected.  This  is  a  process  of 
analysis  resulting  in  the  synthesis  of  cause  and  effect, 
which  synthesis  now  constitutes  for  me  the  true 
knowledge  of  that  particular  thing.  It  is  an  analytico- 
synthetic  process ;  but  it  is  also  a  process  of  induction, 
because  I  examine  numerous  "  cases  "  in  order  to  find 
the  truth.  I  pile  "  instance  "  upon  "  instance,"  and  I 
also  conclude  with  a  general  proposition,  saying,  "  All 
things  which  are  precisely  similar  to  this  experience 
before  me  are  caused  in  this  particular  way  (uniform- 
ity of  nature)."  And,  at  this  point,  enters  my  previous 
generalisation  of  objects  into  trees,  or  more  generally 
still,  plants ;  and  I  say  with  confidence,  "  All  plants 
grow  thus ;  if  they  do  not,  they  are  not  plants." 

In  ascertaining  the  cause  of  the  visible  thing  called 
fruit,  you  examine  many  trees  which  produce  fruit,  but 
you  do  this  simply  because  you  thereby  see  similar 
objects  in  differing  circumstances.  I  take  advantage 
of  the  experiments  (so  to  speak)  which  nature  makes ; 
and,  if  nature  gives  me  no  ready-made  experiments,  I 
make  them  for  myself,  as  in  physics  and  chemistry: 


ix.]  Causal  Induction.  159 

but  this,  if  I  had  clearer  and  subtler  vision,  would 
probably  not  be  necessary.  One  "  case  "  would  then 
suffice.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  and  as  a  sub- 
stitute for  ray  limited  vision,  I  go  from  tree  to  tree, 
observing  closely  and  applying  my  tests,  in  order  to 
discover  the  cause ;  or  to  verify  what  I  think  I  have 
already  discovered.  At  bottom,  however,  I  have  sim- 
ply been  analysing  or  taking  to  pieces  the  complex 
system  of  antecedents  which  have  for  their  invariable 
sequent,  fruit,  eliminating  what  I  ascertain  not  to  be 
the  true  efficient  antecedent ;  and  this  I  do  until  I 
have  isolated  the  true  antecedent  or  antecedents  which 
being  present,  the  result  or  effect  appears,  and  which 
being  absent,  it  does  not  appear. 

Having  done  this  I  then  (as  has  been  said  above) 
take  advantage  of  my  previous  operations  in  general- 
isation, and  say,  "  All  fruit  is  produced  by  like  causes." 
Why  ?  Because  "  all  fruit "  is  simply  a  gathering 
together  in  thought  of  a  great  many  individual  things 
which  are  already  known  to  be  repetitions  (it  may  be 
with  slight  differences)  of  the  same  thing. 
I  may  now  put  the  process  in  another  way :  — 
We  generalise  the  statical  qualities  of  things.  But 
when  we  seek  the  cause  of  anything,  we  look  at  it  not 
only  dynamically,  but  as  grounded  in  its  antecedent, 
and  necessarily  arising  out  of  that  antecedent.  Yoti 
regard  B  as  an  event  which  is  brought  about  by  some 
antecedent  event.  There  is  a  sequence.  The  antece- 
dent may  be  a,  b,  c,  d,  e,  /,  etc.  You  have  the  thing  or 
event  B  before  you,  and  you  p\it  it  into  ever  so  many 
different  circumstances,  and  detect  that  antecedent 


160  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

circumstance  or  event  which  never  fails  to  appear, 
while  all  the  others  are  sometimes  there,  sometimes 
not  there.  You  fasten  on  this  common  permanent 
antecedent  among  many  variables,  eliminating  the 
variables,  and  isolating  the  common  antecedent  as  the 
Cause,  which  we  shall  call  a.  You  can  then  very 
often  test  your  results  by  putting  a  into  operation, 
and  seeing  whether  B  follows.  But,  although  you 
may  be  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  the  causal  con- 
nection, you  can  never  see  it,  until  you  see  how  it  is 
that  a  must  produce  B.  Your  concept  or  synthesis  of 
B  is  now  aB.  There  are  a  great  many  false  causal 
connections  current  in  the  world.  The  function  of 
Science  is  to  reveal  the  true  and  necessary. 

In  ascertaining  the  necessary  causal  antecedent  of 
any  thing  or  event,  it  would  appear  at  first  sight  that 
there  is  no  inductive  generalisation,  and  that  the  term 
"induction"  is  incorrectly  applied.  And  we  can  easily 
understand  that,  if  possessed  of  greater  intellectual 
power  of  perceptive  discrimination  than  we  actually 
have,  we  should  be  able  to  separate  or  isolate  the  true 
causal  antecedent  of  any  result  by  merely  looking  at 
the  single  experience  before  us  long  enough.  But, 
even  then,  the  process,  however  apparently  intuitive, 
would  be  as  follows :  the  cause  is  not  d  nor  e  nor  /,  but 
it  is  a.  It  is  the  function  of  genius  to  seize  quickly, 
and  almost  by  a  kind  of  intuition,  the  true  cause. 
But  even  genius,  and  still  more  manifestly  the  ordi- 
nary investigator,  is  always  generalising.  For  he 
looks  at  a,  c,  d,  e,  /,  etc.,  and  sees  how  each  behaves. 


ix.]  Causal  Induction.  161 

Now,  this  is  equivalent  to  looking  at  a  series  of  simi- 
lar cases,  and  finding  what  is,  among  many  variables, 
the  common  antecedent  fact  present  always.  Isolating 
that,  he  calls  it  a:  a  is  the  cause  of  B.  The  inves- 
tigator has  thus  generalised  from  the  observation 
of  instances  the  common  invariable  antecedent,  and 
causal  event. 

The  process,  then,  whereby  we  find  the  cause  of  any 
existence  or  change  is,  I  think,  rightly  enough  called 
a  process  of  induction  and  generalisation,  although 
the  fundamental  movement  is  one  of  analysis  and 
synthesis. 

You  will  now  see  that  the  generalisation  which 
yields  a  general  concept  and  general  propositions,  e.g. 
"All  horses  neigh,"  is  an  induction  of  statical  facts. 
The  induction  which  yields  the  causal  antecedent  of 
an  existence  or  event  is  an  induction  of  dynamical 
facts  or  sequent  movements,  which  are  determining 
movements,  e.g.  "Heat  consumes  wood."  We  have 
been  seeking  for  a  common  cause  of  a  great  many  like 
particulars.  Whenever  there  is  a  conjunction  of  heat 
and  wood  we  now  know  what  is  to  happen.  But, 
further,  we  have  not  satisfied  the  causal  impulse  of 
reason  until  we  have  ascertained  how  the  antecedent 
works  so  as  to  make  necessary  the  sequent.  We  thus 
get  the  true  and  final  causal  synthesis  of  the  two 
things. 

Note.  —  This  causal  conception  completes  the  knowledge 
of  a  thing.  In  the  mind-process,  in  so  far  as  rational,  it  is 
the  primary  form  of  knowing  the  particular  in  its  most 
elementary  stage,  and  it  is  also  the  final  and  ultimate  form 


162  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

in  which  we  grasp  the  total  of  things  —  a  One  Cause  out  of 
which  all  differences  emerge  —  the  unity  in  all  difference. 
Until  the  intellect  reaches  to  this  conception  of  universal 
causal  law  as  explicitly  present  to  consciousness,  it  has  not 
completed  its  education,  for  it  does  not  know  God  in  the 
world.  The  religious  idea  is  the  final  aim  of  the  education 
of  the  rational,  as  well  as  of  the  ethical,  in  man. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  COMPLETE  INSTRUCTION 
THROUGH  CAUSES;  FOR  THE  KNOWLEDGE  OF  A  THING 
18  COMPLETE,  AND  INTELLECT  CAN  BE  SATISFIED  ONLY 
IN  THE  APPREHENSION  OF  CAUSE. 

Remember,  however,  that  all  educational  method  is 
governed  by  the  principle  which  requires  us  to  follow 
the  order  of  the  growth  of  mind  (which  is  also  the 
order  of  the  growth  of  brain) ; J  and,  consequently,  that 
the  age  at  which  a  boy  is  to  study  things  in  their 
causes  is  a  question  to  be  anxiously  considered. 

Mere  dynamical  relations  of  sequence,  however,  are 
among  the  earliest  experiences  of  mind,  and  the  causal 
in  this  superficial  sense  may  be  early  introduced  into 
education.  Again,  one  element  in  the  causal  concep- 
tion is  purpose  —  the  use  which  any  concrete  thing 
serves ;  and  this,  being  always  concrete  and  obvious, 
may  also  be  early  utilised  for  educational  purposes. 
The  superficial  aspect  of  cause  I  would  call,  for  educa- 
tional purposes,  the  relation  of  sequence.  For  example, 
in  an  early  object-lesson  on  tea,  I  speak  of  tea  and  its 
uses ;  but  ere  long  I  may  extend  these  sequences  back- 
wards to  the  place  which  yields  tea  and  the  way  it 
comes  to  us,  etc. 

i  See  Lect.  XI.  seq. 


ix.]  Causal  Induction.  163 

Even  when  we  have  made  up  our  minds  as  to  the 
age  for  beginning  strictly  causal  or  science  studies,  we 
must  bear  in  mind  that  sense  and  the  concrete,  and 
percipience,  and  concipience  comparison  must  always 
have  their  claims  satisfied  before  we  proceed  to  abstract 
conceptions.  And,  accordingly,  all  science  teaching 
which  is  not  a  series  of  experiments  and  essentially 
heuristic,  is  simply  word-teaching  and  charlatanism. 
A  so-called  cause  may  be  to  a  boy  merely  one  more 
fact,  which  is  of  no  more  significance  for  discipline 
than  a  second  aorist,  and  of  little  significance  for 
knowledge,  save  in  so  far  as  it  is  experimentally  ascer- 
tained. I  should  say  that  (setting  aside  exceptional 
boys  and  exceptional  teachers)  a  boy  cannot  begin  to 
study  scientifically  with  advantage  even  the  elements 
of  physiography  and  of  plant-knowledge  till  his  fif- 
teenth year.  The  preparation  for  this  will  be  found 
in  object-lessons  which  have  to  do  with  percepts  and 
concepts,  and  relations  of  an  external  and  sequential 
character  merely.  When  he  passes  beyond  the  expla- 
nation of  the  facts  of  everyday  experience,  he,  even  at 
this  age,  wastes  his  time. 


LECTURE  X. 

SURVEY  OF  THE  PROCESSES  OF  REASON  IN  ORDER  TO 
SHOW  THAT  THEY  ARE  EACH  AND  ALL  ANALYTICO- 
SYNTHETIC  IN  THEIR  CHARACTER. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  TEACH  ANALYTICO-SYXTHET- 
ICALLY. 

This,  as  resting  on  a  generalisation  of  the  nature  of 
each  successive  step  in  mind  activity  (the  will-proc- 
ess), is  a  governing  principle. 

See  Appendix,  Note  D,  for  the  materials  of  this  lec- 
ture. To  introduce  the  argument  here  would  weight 
the  text  too  much. 


164 


LECTURE   XL 

UNFOLDING    OF    INTELLIGENCE;    OR   ORDER   OF   INTEL- 
LECTUAL GROWTH  IN  TIME. 

THE  successive  stages  or  periods  of  mental  develop- 
ment from  infancy  to  maturity  have  now  to  be  con- 
sidered. "  V esprit,  non  phis  que  le  corps,  ne  porte  que 
ce  qu'il  pent  porter,"  says  Rousseau.  And  again, 
"  Laissez  mtirir  Venfance  dans  les  enfans"  ;  to  which 
we  may  add,  "  Let  boyhood  ripen  in  boys,  youthhood 
in  youths,  and  manhood  in  men."  Do  not  anticipate. 

We  shall  find  that  these  periods  pass  into  each  other, 
and  can  only  be  roughly  marked  off.  (See  note  at  end 
of  this  lecture.)  Speaking  generally,  the  fo'me-order 
is  indicated  by  the  logical  order  of  the  successive  move- 
ments of  intelligence  in  knowing,  as  these  have  been 
exhibited  in  the  preceding  pages.  If  we  regard  the 
logical  movements  of  intelligence,  as  also  the  chrono- 
logical, we,  manifestly,  simplify  things  very  much. 

The  successive  movements  may  be  roughly  arranged 
thus : — 

1.  Babehood  —  The  period  of  Sensation  and  Attui- 
tion  (one  year). 

2.  Infancy — (a)  Perception;    (6)  Sense- Conception 
(from  the  second  year,   when  speech  begins,  to  the 

165 


166  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


eighth  year,  the  period  of  second  dentition) ;  (c)  Rela- 
tional Conception,  including  superficial  dynamical  se- 
quence, and  involving  crude  Comparison  and  Judg- 
ment. The  whole  of  this  period  corresponds  to  the 
duration  of  the  Infant  School. 

3.  Childhood  —  Conception    (single  and  relational) 
is  now  in  full  activity  with  Generalisation  and  Reason- 
ing incipient  (from  the  eighth  to  the  fifteenth  year,  the 
age  of  puberty).      This   period  corresponds  to  the 
duration  of  the  Primary  School,  and  is  divided  into 
two  parts  —  the  Lower  Primary,  from  the  eighth  to 
the  twelfth  year,  and  the  Upper  Primary,  from  the 
twelfth  to  the  fifteenth  year. 

4.  Boyhood  and  Girlhood,  or  the  Juvenile  Period  — 
Generalising  and  Reasoning  Stage,  when  the  perception 
of  true  Cause  and  Effect  becomes  active  (from  the  fif- 
teenth to  the  eighteenth  year).      This  period  corre- 
sponds to  that  of  the  Secondary  or  High  School. 

5.  Adolescence  —  All  the  faculties  in  full  operation, 
and  with  the  further  tendency  to  form  ideas,  and  to 
co-ordinate  knowledge  into  the  unity  of  science  (to 
the  twenty-second  year).      This  period  corresponds 
to  that  of  University  life.     Thereafter  Manhood  and 
Womanhood. 

The  Physiological  relations  of  this  Development  of  Mind 
have  to  be  considered. 


The  principle  has  already  been  laid  down  that  all 
education   and  all  instruction, —  intellectual,  moral, 


xi.]  Unfolding  of  Intelligence.  167 


and  religious  alike,  —  if  they  are  to  be  effective,  are  to 
be  carefully  adapted  to  the  stage  of  mental  develop- 
ment which  the  pupil  may  have  reached. 

Note.  —  Transition  from  one  plane  of  Mind  to  another.  — 
Perhaps  this  is  the  place  to  point  out,  once  for  all,  that  as 
all  things  in  the  universe  are  related  and  interrelated,  and 
one  state  of  a  thing  passes  into  another  state  by  insensible 
degrees  —  degrees  so  infinitely  small  that  they  elude  us ;  so, 
Mind  is  a  complex  one,  in  which  every  element  and  capacity 
and  possibility  are  present  at  once,  and  that  all  our  analysis 
is  merely  an  attempt  to  discriminate  phenomena  that  shade 
off  into  each  other,  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  detected  to  be 
distinct  and  discriminable.  But,  all  the  while,  the  synthesis 
of  the  whole  is  always  present  in  each  diverse  mental  mani- 
festation. We  speak  of  Feeling,  Sensibility,  Sensation,  Per- 
ception, Conception,  General  Conception,  Reasoning;  but  at 
what  point  and  in  what  circumstances  are  these  not  all  pres- 
ent, and  at  what  point  does  the  one  pass  into  the  other  in  the 
synthesis  of  the  whole?  No  man,  it  seems  to  me,  can  say  at 
what  point  a  mind  that  already  senses,  has  entered  on  percipi- 
ence,  concipience,  etc.,  any  more  than  he  can  tell  at  what  point 
a  bud  is  a  flower.  [And  yet  we  are  not  entitled  to  say,  "  All 
is  becoming  " ;  but  rather,  if  we  are  to  be  accurate,  "  All  is 
at  once  becoming  and  become."]  By  extensive  observation 
of  minds,  animal  and  rational,  and  much  self-reflective  vigi- 
lance, a  thinker  may  put  his  finger  on  distinctions ;  but 
when  it  comes  to  the  actual  working  of  the  mind,  we  can 
distinguish  only  in  a  very  general  way.  Take,  for  example, 
the  state  of  "  dispersed  attention,"  as  it  is  called.  I  should 
call  this  state  one  of  sensational  or  attuitional  dreaming,  in 
which  /  am  carried  on  from  image  to  image  by  the  play  of 
mind  and  the  interactions  of  nerve-cells.  But  all  the  while 
I  am  a  man,  and,  consequently,  Will  is  there  lying  at  the 
heart  of  the  chaotic  series,  and  ever  and  anon  striving  to 
assert  its  own  right  to  existence,  and  to  mastery  over  the 
objects  that  entrain  me.  At  any  moment  this  Will  may 


168  Institutes  of  Education.          [LECT.  XT. 

press  its  way  through,  and  my  attuitional  state  become  a 
percipient  and  rational  state.  So  with  an  infant.  To  the 
age  of  nine  months  he  may  be  regarded  as  an  animal  pure 
and  simple ;  and  yet  he  is  something  else,  for  Will  lies  con- 
cealed there  seeking  its  opportunity  and  gradually  forcing 
its  way  to  the  front.  The  eye  and  face  of  an  infant  already 
reveal  that,  while  he  is  a  victim  to  sensation,  he  is  yet  grad- 
ually bringing  a  reserve  force  into  the  field.  Then,  if  Percip- 
ience  be  elemental  reasoning,  it  may  be  said  that  he  reasons 
even  before  he  can  talk.  And  so  on.  All  the  while,  the 
infant  is  undergoing  the  parturient  labours  of  self-delivery. 
He  is  bringing  forth  himself —  he  is  not  brought  forth.  The 
conscious  subject  is  gathering,  in  silence  and  in  secret,  the 
energy  which  will  soon  proclaim  itself  as  Will,  and  in  full 
Percipience  take  the  first  step  in  seZ/*-consciousness.  [This 
Percipience  is  the  first  movement  to  reduce  the  sensational 
world  to  a  cognitive  world,  and  the  process  is  a  dialectic 
process.] 


LECTURE   XII. 

MATERIALS  AND  DYNAMICS  OF  THE  BUILDING-UP  OF 
THE  FABRIC   OF  MIND  AS  A  REAL. 

WHEN  B  is  presented  to  A  (the  conscious  subject), 
and  A  is  aware  of  it  (I  pass  over  rudimentary  "  feel- 
ing," of  which  we  can  know  little),  we  call  A  mind 
and  B  the  presentation.  But,  further,  Mind  being 
the  subject  of  the  presentation,  we  call  B  the  object. 

Whether  from  within  the  body  or  from  without  the 
body,  the  access  of  presentations  is  through  nerve- 
tissue,  and  the  reactions  are  also  through  nerve-tissue. 
The  terminal  of  the  impression  is  Consciousness,  and 
the  reflex  return  starts  in  and  from  consciousness. 

The  nerve-tissue  (which  may  be  summed  up  in  the 
one  word  cerebrum^),  inasmuch  as  it  is  matter,  obeys 
the  laws  of  matter,  and  as  vehicle  of  consciousness, 
receptive  or  reactive  or  active,  is  probably  the  highest 
department  of  physics.  Whatever  the  laws  be  whereby 
the  nerve-cells  transmit  movements  and  maintain  com- 
munication with  each  other,  and  subsequently  repeat 
for  themselves,  under  some  inner  stimulus,  past  move- 
ments when  the  existing  agent  (the  object)  is  absent,  I 
say  whatever  these  laws  may  be,  it  cannot  be  doubted 
that  they  exist.  As  a  system  these  laws  would  be 

169 


170  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

called  Cerebral  Dynamics,  or  the  Dynamics  of  cerebra- 
tion. 

As  might  be  expected  a  priori,  there  is  little  doubt 
that  there  is  unceasing  cerebration  without  conscious- 
ness as  a  concomitant.1  At  a  certain  point  in  the 
process,  and  under  certain  conditions,  cerebration 
passes  into  consciousness. 

That  cerebrations  exist  and  affect  each  other,  and, 
without  the  presence  of  fresh  stimuli,  set  up  in  the 
subject  a  consciousness  which  is  neither  the  a  of 
primary  impression  nor  the  6,  but  a  resultant  and  com- 
plex c,  is  not  incredible.  The  dynamics  of  cerebration 
we  leave ;  for  little  is  known  about  it,  and  inferences 
are  unfortunately  drawn  from  that  little  which  fill  the 
"  non-scientific  "  and  merely  metaphysical  mind  with 
amazement. 

It  is  with  the  action  of  the  environment  (including 
the  cerebrum  as  part  of  the  environment)  when  it  passes 
into  "  consciousness  "  that  we  are  concerned. 

Here  we  find  a  mutual  involvement  and  reciprocity 
of  mind  and  cerebrum.  Cerebration  sets  up  a  con- 
sciousness, and  consciousness  of  mind  sets  up  a 
cerebration.  It  is  not  a  molecular  disturbance  of 
nerve-cells  which  causes  a  dog  to  seek  water,  but 
the  consciousness  of  thirst  which  results  from  that 
molecular  disturbance,  and  which  sets  in  action  the 
whole  motor  system. 

And  yet,  even  in  this  region  of  mind,  we  are  still 
within  the  sphere  of  natural  action  and  reaction. 

1  Appendix  B. 


xii.]      The  Building-up  of  Mind  as  a  Real.      171 

Mind  has  as  yet  no  inhibit! ve  or  regulative  energy. 
The  appearances  of  this  regulation  in  instinct  are  the 
result  of  certain  innate  impulses,  concrete  aptitudes, 
and  reflex  activity  combined.  If  this  be  so,  then 
there  is  such  a  thing  as  the  natural  dynamics  of  con- 
scious mind  traversed  by  the  dynamics  of  material 
cerebration. 

The  next  stage  of  Mind  is  distinguished  by  the 
advance  of  will  and  consequent  self-consciousness, 
which  profoundly  modifies  the  dynamics  of  conscious 
mind  and  of  cerebration,  and  directs  all  to  ends. 
This  is  Keason. 

Accordingly,  I  must  ask  you  to  go  back  to  the  lec- 
ture on  the  intelligence  of  animals,  in  order  that  you 
may  there  see  how  the  instruments  of  mind,  as  not  yet 
a  self-conscious  mind,  constructs  -its  own  intelligent 
life.  We  find  in  the  animal  the  whole  dynamic  of 
conscious  mind;  and  having  also  found  it  in  ourselves 
as  the  platform  on  which  Will  and  self -consciousness 
stand,  we  have  to  note  to  what  extent  the  natural 
dynamic  is  modified  by  the  intrusion  of  Will  and 
self-consciousness. 

Natural  Dynamics  of  Conscious  Mind  as  Intelligence. 

We  found  that  the  dynamical  movements  might 
fairly  be  generalised  under  the  following  heads :  — 

Conscious  Mind. 
Attuition. 
Sympathy  of  Intelligence. 


172  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

Imitation. 

Imagination. 

Association. 

Memory. 

Comparison. 

Sense  of  relations  in  Time  and  Space. 

By  means  of  operations  dependent  on  these  factors, 
the  animal  mind  builds  itself  up,  and  the  man-mind 
does  the  same,  in  so  far  as  it  is  animal.  As  in  infancy 
and  childhood  the  animal  predominates,  the  considera- 
tion of  these  connate  capacities  or  faculties 1  ought  to 
yield  much  that  will  guide  the  teacher  to  principles 
of  method  and  rules  of  procedure. 

I  cannot,  within  the  limits  assigned  to  this  book, 
treat  adequately  ol these  capacities;  I  shall  only  give 
a  single  brief  paragraph  to  each,  chiefly  that  I  may 
engage  your  interest  in  the  modification  which  the 
emergence  of  Will  effects.  These  paragraphs  will  be 
more  fully  expounded  in  lectures. 

Generally,  it  has  to  be  observed  that  all  the  charac- 
teristics of  mind  which  we  share  with  animals  are 
emphasised  and  accentuated  by  Will-reason,  and  by 
the  purpose  of  thinking  and  doing  which  belongs  to 
Will-reason  alone. 

(1)  IMITATION. 

Were  it  not  for  the  sympathy  of  intelligence  bind- 
ing creatures  of  a  like  kind  together,  and  giving  rise 

1  It  seems  to  me  to  be  quite  unnecessary  to  abandon  the  use  of 
so  useful  a  word. 


xii.]      The  Building-up  of  Mind  as  a  Heal.      173 

to  Imitation,  each  would  have  to  begin  from  the  begin- 
ning for  himself,  and  the  growth  of  mind  in  each 
would  be  slow. 

The  recognition  of  this  fact  gives  us  a  very  impor- 
tant principle  of  method  in  education,  viz.  — 

PKESENT    A    GOOD    MODEL. 

This  principle  is  of  wide  and  various  application, 
and  touches  the  teacher's  work  in  every  subject,  and 
in  all  his  relations  to  his  pupils.  The  child  naturally 
imitates :  but,  he  also  wills  to  imitate.  The  action  of 
others  supplies  him  with  his  concrete  ideal.  Note, 
however,  that  imitation  rests  on  sympathy  of  intelli- 
gence; and,  accordingly,  the  pupil  who  by  bad  man- 
agement finds  himself  in  antagonism  to  his  teacher 
will  not  imitate  him,  or,  at  best,  he  will  confine  his 
imitation  to  mimicking. 

(2)  IMAGINATION. 

This  is  simply  the  reproduction  in  sensation  of  the 
impression  made  by  an  object  which  is  now  no  longer 
present.  We  thus  repeat  and  revise  our  sensations, 
and  are  not  left  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  objects  in 
actual  presentation. 

(a)  On  the  plane  of  sensation  we  have  merely 

Representative  Imagination. 
(6)  When  Will-reason  enters,  we  have 

Productive  or  Constructive  Imagination. 


174  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

Here  the  will  seizes  representations,  or  images 
dynamically  arising,  and  even  searches  for  images 
with  a  productive  purpose. 

The  principle  of  method  which  this  yields  is  — 

CULTIVATE    THE    IMAGINATION. 

And  this  we  do  by  allowing  free  play  to  the  repre- 
sentative imagination  (a  child  educates  himself  even 
by  dreaming),  and  by  evoking  the  productive  imagi- 
nation,'through  the  furnishing  of  the  child  with  pro- 
ductive work,  as  in  fairy  tales,  narratives  of  events, 
simple  poetry,  and  so  forth.  All  this  is  necessary  to 
the  rich  growth  of  mind  as  a  substantive  reality;  and 
this  quite  apart  from  its  ethical  importance. 

(3)  ASSOCIATION. 
1.   Association  as  Condition  of  Knowing. 

Sensations  and  sensates  occur  in  experience  either 
together  or  in  sequence,  and  they  are  thus  linked 
together.  There  is  an  external  linking  in  time  and 
place,  and  there  is  also  an  inner  or  real  linking  of  like- 
ness and  unlikeness.  We  desire  to  reproduce  past 
experience,  and  we  have  to  take  advantage  of  these 
actually  existing  dynamical  relations.  They  go  on  in 
spite  of  ourselves,  it  is  true ;  but  the  introduction  of 
Will-reason  enables  us  to  take  advantage  of  them 
with  a  view  to  recall  past  experiences  for  purposes  of 
knowledge.  Association  as  an  instrument  in  the 
building  up  of  the  fabric  of  knowledge  is  a  subject 


xii.]      The  Building-up  of  Mind  as  a  Real.      175 

demanding  from  the  psychologist  elaborate  analysis. 
One  might  say  that  just  as  all  nature  presents  itself 
to  us  as  an  extension  of  that  which  already  exists,  but, 
in  each  sticcessive  object  in  the  rising  scale,  with  a  dif- 
ference; so,  knowledge  of  one  thing  after  another  is 
essentially  an  extension  of  that  which  is  already 
known,  to  that  which  is  like  it,  but  with  a  difference. 
There  is  no  break  or  leap. 

Hence,  if  we  are  to  instruct  with  effect,  we  always 
must  build  the  new  on  the  old,  i.e.  on  what  already  is 
known. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  LINK  THE  TEACHING  OF  THE 

NEW  WITH  FACTS  ALREADY  KNOWN  WITH  WHICH 
THE  NEW  HAS  A  REAL  RELATION  OF  LIKENESS  OR 
UNLIKENESS  (i.e.  LIKENESS  IN  UNLIKENESS),  SO  THAT 
THE  GROWTH  OF  KNOWLEDGE  MAY  BE  AN  ORGANIC 
GROWTH. 

RULES  :  — 

(a)  When  introducing  a  new  subject  or  a  new  les- 
son, go  back  upon  what  is  already  known. 
(6)  Prepare  the  mind  for  the  lesson. 

[I  say  likeness  in  unlikeness,  for  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  association  of  contrast  does  not  exist  (a  midge 
does  not  suggest  an  elephant),  but  that  when  carefully 
analysed  it  is  likeness  in  unlikeness,  or  unlikeness  in 
likeness,  that  really  associates  experiences.] 

2.  Association  as  aiding  Memory.     (Suggestion.) 

The  dynamical  connection  of  experiences,  which 
brings  it  about  that  one  suggests  the  other  to  con- 


176  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


sciousness,  is  called  the  "  Association  of  Ideas  "  (not 
a  good  name),  and  takes  the  following  forms :  — 

LAWS    OR    RULES    OF    ASSOCIATION. 

(a)   On  the  sensational  plane  — 

1.  Contiguity  in  time  or  place  (co-existent  or 

in  a  series  of  sequence). 

2.  Likeness,  and  unlikeness  in  likeness. 

3.  The  whole  and  the  parts  of  a  thing  in  a 

vague  sensational  way. 

(6)   On  the  plane  of  Will-reason. 

1.  Whole  and  parts,  viz.  individual  concepts 

and  their  elements  or  parts,  suggest  each 
other;  general  concepts  and  their  parts 
suggest  each  other;  reasonings,  i.e.  the 
three  propositions  of  a  syllogism,  suggest 
each  other. 

2.  Cause  and  effect  suggest  each  other. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  ASSOCIATE  TEACHINGS  so  AS 

TO  AID  MEMORY. 

The  growth  of  the  fabric  of  mind,  both  in  the  dy- 
namical sphere  of  sensation  and  in  the  self-conscious 
or  purely  active  sphere  of  will,  is  always,  as  I  have 
said  above,  through  association  of  some  kind.  It  is 
an  organic  growth.  Hence  the  importance  of  the 
principle  which  we  laid  down,  viz.  Link  teachings,  so 
that  the  new  shall  grow  out  of  the  old  (that  which  is 


xii.]      The  Building-up  of  Mind  as  a  Real.      177 

already  known).  This  cannot  be  done  if  we  start  a 
new  subject  or  a  new  lesson  without  bringing  into 
activity  the  existing  material  in  the  memory  of  the 
child,  which  is  the  natural  basis  for  the  next  step. 
Psychologists  treat  Association  too  exclusively  under 
its  second  and  secondary  head  of  Suggestion.  The 
two  aspects  of  Association  taken  together  yield  the 
following :  — 

Principle  of  Method.  —  ENRICH  YOUR  TEACHING 
WITH  AS  MANY  RELEVANT  ASSOCIATIONS  AS  POSSIBLE.1 

(4)  MEMORY. 

The  first  condition  of  memory,  speaking  generally, 
is  the  retention  of  what  has  once  been  present  in  con- 
sciousness. 

It  may  be  defined  as  the  identifying  a  present  con- 
sciousness with  a  consciousness  formerly  experienced. 

1.  On  the  plane  of  sensation. 

Presentations  and  representations  (images  of  pres- 
entations) are  felt  to  be  similar  to  prior  presentations 
and  representations.  This  we  see  in  animals.  They 
have,  however,  to  wait  for  the  action  of  their  environ- 
ment on  them,  or  the  dynamical  movements  in  their 
cerebrum.  This  passivo-active  memory  may  be  called 

Reminiscence. 

2.  On  the  plane  of  reason. 

Here  Will  has  entered,  and  the  self-conscious  sub- 
ject seeks  purposely  to  recover  and  reinstate  past 

1  Education  is  an  extensive  as  well  as  an  intensive  process. 


178  Institutes  of  Education.          [LECT.  xn. 

experiences  with  a  view  to  knowledge.  This  activo- 
active  memory  is  to  be  called 

Recollection, 

and  is,  of  course,  peculiar  to  the  man  or  rational  mind 
alone. 

It  is  manifest  that  in  Reminiscence  we  are  wholly 
in  the  hands  of  environment  and  Association,  and 
that  in  Recollection  we  have  to  follow  the  track  of 
Association  in  order  to  recover  the  past. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  MEMORY  SHOULD  BE  CULTI- 
VATED — 

(a)  As  an  act  of  Will,  and  therefore  a  discipline. 
(6)  As  alone  conserving  the  materials  of  knowledge, 
(c)  As  an  exercise  facilitating  the  acquisition  of 
new  knowledge. 

The  conditions  of  remembering  are  — 

Vividness  of  impression  (and  accentuation  by 

an  act  of  Will) ; 
Duration  of  impression; 
Repetition  of  impression ;  but,  above  all, 
Association  of  the  thing  to  be  remembered  with 
other  things. 

Principle  of  Method.  —  IN  TEACHING  REPEAT  AND 

RE-REPEAT,  REVISE  AND  RE-REVISE;  AND  BE  ALWAYS 
FALLING  BACK  ON  ELEMENTARY  PACTS  AND  PRINCI- 
PLES RELATIVE  TO  THE  SUBJECT  OF  INSTRUCTION, 
SO  AS  TO  MAINTAIN  THE  SERIES  OF  ASSOCIATIONS. 

Note.  —  The  restrictions  connected  with  the  cultivation 
of  memory,  as  such,  demand  consideration. 


PART    III. 
METHODOLOGY. 


METHODOLOGY. 

THE  doctrine  of  Method  is  the  last  chapter  in  the 
theory  or  science  of  the  education  of  a  mind,  and  the 
first  chapter  of  the  Art  or  practice  of  education.  It 
stands  by  itself,  and  consists  simply  of  a  gathering 
together  of  the  principles  which  the  discussion  of 
mind  as  a  growing  or  evolving  organism  has  yielded. 
In  so  far  as  the  theoretical  argument  is  unsound,  the 
principles  of  education  deduced  from  it  are  unsound. 
This  chapter,  accordingly,  merely  brings  together 
results  already  ascertained. 

It  is  true  that  the  human  race,  by  the  combined 
operation  of  inner  tendency,  self-evolved  will,  and 
pressure  of  environment,  has  somehow  educated  itself 
without  the  knowledge  of  these  principles ;  also  that 
successive  generations  of  men  have  applied  many  of 
these  principles  in  the  form  of  empirical  rules  with 
more  or  less  of  mental  confusion  and  more  or  less  of 
success.  The  same  remark,  however,  is  applicable  to 
political  economy,  political  philosophy,  and  indeed 
to  all  science.  None  the  less  do  we  study  the  science 
of  all  subjects ;  and  this  both  for  the  sake  of  knowl- 
edge in  itself  and  for  the  improvement  of  practice. 
If  we  can  by  any  possibility  attain  to  a  wise  prac- 

181 


182  Institutes  of  Education. 

tice  in  the  education  of  the  human  mind,  we  cannot 
doubt  that  it  will  be  of  vital  importance  to  future 
generations  of  men. 

SUMMARY  OF  PRINCIPLES. 

The  supreme  End  of  the  education  of  mind  being 
ethical,  that  is  to  say,  the  expression  of  each  person  in 
self-directed  daily  conduct,  we  fairly  enough  deduce 
from  this  the  principle  — 

1.  TURN  EVERYTHING  TO  USE. 
RULES  :  — 

(a)  Teach  nothing  that  is  useless. 
(6)  Connect  all  that  is  taught  with  the  ordi- 
nary and  everyday  life  of  the  pupil. 

(c)  Call  for  the  reproduction  and  application 

of  what  you  teach.  The  ultimate  test 
of  exact  knowledge  is  the  power  of 
applying  it. 

(d)  Turn  what  is  known  to  use  for  yielding 

new  knowledge. 

2.  FOLLOW  THE   ORDER  OF  MIND-GROWTH  (which, 
speaking  generally,  is  also  the  order  of  brain-growth). 

RULES  :  — 

(a)  In  teaching  every  subject,  and  every 
successive  lesson  on  the  same  sub- 
ject, build  it  up  in  the  mind  of  the 
child  in  accordance  with  the  order  of 
mind-growth. 

(6)  Proceed  step  by  step,  and  step  after  step. 

3.  ENCOURAGE    CONTACT    WITH    ALL    FORMS    OF 
EXISTENCE,  AND   PROMOTE   ALL   FORMS  OK  NATURAL 
ACTIVITY. 


Methodology.  183 


This,  in  order  that  there  may  be  a  rich  sub- 
stance of  mind.  (Education  is  an  extensive 
as  well  as  an  intensive  process.) 

4.  PRESENT  TO  SENSE. 

RULE.  —  Never  teach  anything  that  can  be 
seen,  touched,  heard,  etc.,  without  the 
presence  of  the  object,  or  a  vivid 
representation,  of  it ; l  and  appeal  to 
every  sense,  wherever  practicable,  in 
the  teaching  of  every  subject. 

5.  EVOKE  THE  WILL  OF  THE  PUPIL. 

Note.  — Except  in  so  far  as  a  boy  applies  him- 
self he  knows  nothing,  but  is  a  merely 
passivo-active  creature  of  sensation. 
The  child  attains  to  knowledge,  not  by 
receiving  it,  but  by  taking  it.  He 
instructs  himself.  The  teacher  is  the 
guide,  co-operator,  and  remover  of 
obstructions  only. 

This  mode  of  teaching  by  throwing  the 
work  on  the  pupil  gives  him  a  pleas- 
ing sense  of  power  and  self-achieve- 
ment which  are  in  the  highest  degree 
stimulating. 

6.  TEACH  ALL  THAT  is  COMPLEX  ANALYTICO-SYN- 

THETICALLY,  i.e.  REDUCE  AN   OBJECT  TO  ITS   ELEMENTS, 
AND  THEN  BUILD  IT  UP  AGAIN. 

7.  PERCIPIENCE  is  OF  THE  SINGLE,  AND  PERCEPTS 

LIE    AT    THE    BASIS    OF    ALL    KNOWLEDGE;    THEREFORE, 

1 1  should  expect  that  magic  lanterns  would,  ere  long,  be  added 
to  school  apparatus. 


184  Institutes  of  Education. 

TEACH   ONE   THING   AT   A   TIME,  WHETHER   IT   BE  A 
WHOLE  OB  AN  ELEMENT  IN  A  WHOLE. 
KULES  :  — 

(a)  In  object-lessons,  etc.,  do  not  proceed  to 
the  elements  or  properties  of  a  thing 
until  the  mind  is  accustomed  to  dis- 
criminate and  name  things  as  wholes. 
(6)  Dwell  long  over  the  simple  elements  of  a 
subject.  Confusion  in  the  beginning  viti- 
ates the  whole  after-process  of  learning. 

8.  IN  CONCIPIENCE  PRACTISE   PUPILS    IN  THE  ANALY- 
SIS OF  COMPLEX  THINGS  AND  THE   SYNTHESIS    OF   MANY 
PARTICULARS    IN    ONE  WHOLE,  IN  ORDER    TO    TRAIN    TO 

EXACTNESS  OF  CONCEPTION  (analytico-synthetic  prin- 
ciple). 

Note.  —  This  applies,  first  of  all,  to  object- 
lessons  of  every  stage  of  difficulty  up 
to  science  instruction;  but  also  to  all 
other  subjects. 

9.  TEACH  FIRST  THE  PROMINENT  OR  SALIENT  CHAR- 
ACTERISTICS  OR   ELEMENTS  OF  A  THING  (OR   SUBJECT), 
AND  THEN  PROCEED  TO  OTHER  ELEMENTS. 

RULE.  —  Confine  yourself  for  a  time  to  the 
leading  outlines  of  a  subject,  and  then 
fill  in  gradually  (Geography,  Gram- 
mar, History,  etc.). 

10.  TEACH  GENERALISATIONS  AS  GENERALISATIONS, 
i.e.  ADVANCE  FROM  THE  PARTICULAR  TO  THE  GENERAL, 
FROM  THE  CONCRETE  TO  THE  ABSTRACT. 

Note.  —  When  you  encounter  a  generalisation 
in  the  course  of  reading,  analyse  it 


Methodology.  185 


into  its  particulars,  and  put  it  to- 
gether again  (analytico -synthetic  prin- 
ciple). 

11.  TEACH    REASONINGS    AS    REASONINGS,    i.e.    GET 

THE  PUPIL  TO  MAKE  EXPLICIT  ALL  IMPLICIT  REASON- 
INGS (analytico-synthetic  principle). 

12.  COMPLETE  YOUR  INSTRUCTION  IN  A  SUBJECT  BY 
TEACHING  THROUGH  CAUSES  (analytico-synthetic  prin- 
ciple). 

13.  PRESENT  A  GOOD   MODEL  or  WHAT  YOU  WISH 
THE  PUPIL  TO   DO   (Writing,  Drawing,  Carpentering, 
Composition,  etc.). 

Grown  men  are  imitative,  but  children  most  of 
all;  they  do  what  they  see  you  do. 

14.  CULTIVATE  THE  IMAGINATION. 

15.  ASSOCIATE   TEACHINGS,  i.e.  ALWAYS  LINK  THE 

NEW  WITH  WHAT  IS  ALREADY  KNOWN.  THIS  IS  ESSEN- 
TIAL TO  THE  ORGANIC  GROWTH  OF  KNOWLEDGE  AND 
TO  INTELLECTUAL  INTEREST  ;  AND,  CONSEQUENTLY,  TO 
SUCCESSFUL  TEACHING. 

RULE.  —  Prepare  the  mind  of  the  pupil  for  a 
lesson,  so  that  there  may  be  no  abrupt 
transition.  The  mind  does  not  take 
leaps. 

16.  ASSOCIATE  TEACHINGS  IN  ORDER  TO  AID  THE 

MEMORY. 

The  Association  should  be  a  real  association;  but 
failing  this  the  external  associations  of  conti- 
guity in  time  and  place  may  be  taken  advan- 
tage of. 

17.  As  TO  ASSOCIATION  GENERALLY. 


186  Institutes  of  Education. 

RULES  :  — 

(a)  Support  and  enrich  your  teaching  of 
a  subject  with  as  many  illustrative 
and  relevant  associations  as  possible. 
(This  not  only  helps  the  memory,  but 
gives  breadth  and  pliancy  to  mind.) 
(6)  Let  all  associations  with  your  teaching  be 
pleasing,  so  that  there  may  be  no 
physical  or  moral  obstruction  to  the 
natural  growth  of  knowledge. 

18.  CULTIVATE  THE  MEMORY. 

RULE. —  Repeat  and  re-repeat,  revise  and  re- 
revise,  always  falling  back  on  the 
elementary  facts  and  principles  of  the 
subject  taught.  Thus  the  memory  of 
a  subject  is  the  memory  of  real  rela- 
tions, and  not  of  mere  words  and 
formulae,  which  is  rote  instruction  or 
cram.  Repetitio  mater  Studiorum. 

Our  survey  of  elementary  physiology 
taught  us  the  great  fact  of  physio- 
logical habit  and  its  relation  to  all 
intellectual  and  moral  activity.  All 
functions  of  mind,  intellectual  and 
ethical,  are  strengthened  and  made 
easy  by  use. 

19.  THEREFORE,  REPEAT  AND  RE-REPEAT  THE  SAME 
INTELLECTUAL   OPERATIONS   IN   CONNECTION  WITH  A 
CONTINUOUS  SUBJECT,  WITH  A  VIEW  TO  THE  FORMA- 
TION OF  A  GOOD  INTELLECTUAL  HABIT. 


Methodology.  187 


This  alone  is  true  training  and  discipline,  for  this 
alone  is  permanent  in  its  effects. 

"  Use  almost  can  change  the  stamp  of  nature." 

Hamlet,  iii.  4. 


The  above  scheme  of  Method  is  a  summarised  state- 
ment of  the  Art  of  education,  in  so  far  as  intelligence 
is  concerned,  and  it  is  applicable  to  all  possible  sub- 
jects of  instruction  (including  the  ethical,  as  we  shall 
see). 

To  instruct  well  is  to  instruct  (consciously  or  uncon- 
sciously) in  accordance  with  these  principles  and  rules, 
i.e.  in  accordance  with  Method.  It  is  necessary  to 
instruct  according  to  Method,  if  our  instruction  is  to 
be  sound  and  sure,  and,  above  all,  if  we  are  to  train 
and  discipline  (i.e.  educate)  mind.  And  this  is  the 
point  to  emphasise,  that  training  and  discipline  is 
greater  than  knowledge,  and  that  only  by  sound  method 
can  we  train  and  discipline  faculty.  Method  derives 
its  chief  importance  from  this.1 

The  point  chiefly  to  note  in  connection  with  these 
rules  of  the  Art  is  that  they  are  ascertained,  not 
empirically  (though  many  of  them  had  been  found 
out  long  before  psychology  was  applied  to  education), 
but  scientifically.  That  is  to  say,  they  flow  by  neces- 
sary deduction  from  the  science  of  Mind. 

Thus  it  is  that  we  vindicate  for  the  art  of  education 

1  Strange  that  classical  teachers,  who  are  most  of  all  identified 
with  the  theory  that  discipline  is  all  in  all,  have  been  most  active 
in  the  defence  of  "  No  method." 


188  Institutes  of  Education. 

a  prior  and  governing  science.  Take  any  of  these  rules 
you  choose,  and  go  back  on  our  statement  of  the  pro- 
cesses of  intelligence,  and  you  will  see  for  yourselves 
its  scientific  basis.  If  we  can  ascertain  (as  we  can) 
how  it  is  that  mind  knows  and  grows,  how  it  is  that 
intelligence  intelligises,  it  is  clear  as  noonday  that 
we  have  also  got  the  how  of  teaching,  because  teaching 
is  simply  helping  the  mind  to  perform  its  function  of 
knowing  and  growing. 

These  principles  and  rules,  I  would  repeat,  as  the 
issue  of  scientific  analysis,  form  the  last  chapter  of 
the  Science  of  education,  and  at  the  same  time  the 
first  chapter  of  the  Art.  All  the  subsequent  chapters 
of  the  Art  are  merely  the  application  of  this  chapter 
to  the  various  subjects  which  we  wish  boys  and  girls 
to  learn.  We  have  nothing  to  add  to  them  except 
this,  that  their  practical  application  from  day  to  day 
is  modified  by  two  considerations,  viz.,  First,  the  cir- 
cumstances (by  which  I  mean  mental  rather  than 
physical  circumstances)  of  the  pupil.  Secondly,  the 
subject  we  are  teaching.  Not  that  the  principles  do 
not  apply  to  all  subjects,  but  that  each  subject  will 
suggest  its  own  expedients,  if  not  also  rules. 

I  shall  explain  these  two  points :  — 

As  regards  the  first:  if  the  pupils  to  whom  I  am 
giving  object-lessons  or  any  other  lessons  are  of  the 
more  educated  classes  of  society,  it  is  absurd  to  make 
oneself  a  slave  to  the  rule  of  "  little  by  little  "  and 
"  step  by  step  "  to  the  extent  to  which  we  subject  our- 
selves to  it  when  dealing  with  poor  children  whose 
minds  receive  no  home  cultivation.  In  the  case  of 


Methodology.  189 


the  former,  we  can  take  much  for  granted  and  advance 
more  rapidly  than  with  the  latter.  This  considera- 
tion is  of  greater  weight  in  some  subjects  than  in 
others,  e.g.  in  examining  on  the  reading-lesson.  You 
can  yourselves,  after  a  little  reflection,  supply  all 
that  I  omit  saying  in  this  connection.  The  age  of 
the  pupils,  too,  is  one  of  the  most  important  of  the 
conditions  under  which  we  teach.  Setting  aside  the 
question  of  the  age  at  which  a  natural  science  can  be 
taught  scientifically,  all  will  at  once  see  that  with 
boys  of  fourteen  we  must  proceed  much  more  slowly 
than  with  boys  of  sixteen  or  seventeen.  The  lecture 
on  the  periods  or  stages  of  mental  growth  will  sug- 
gest to  the  thoughtful  reader  all  that  has  to  be  said 
on  the  question  of  rapidity  of  progress. 

As  regards  the  second  point :  —  additions  to  the 
rules,  or  modifications  of  them,  are  naturally  suggested 
to  anybody's  common  sense  by  the  nature  of  the  sub- 
ject he  happens  to  be  teaching.  For  example,  the 
mode  of  procedure  in  teaching  the  English  language 
is  fundamentally  the  same  as  that  to  be  followed  in 
teaching  French  or  Latin.  But  the  fact  that  English 
is  the  native  tongue  admits  of  a  procedure  which  is 
impossible  in  the  case  of  a  foreign  tongue.  The  most 
important  difference  of  procedure  is  suggested  by  the 
fact  that  English  grammar  is,  in  the  mind  of  the  child, 
implicit.  We  are  merely  making  explicit,  and  reduc- 
ing to  order  and  rule,  what  is  already  there.  It  is 
plain  that  we  cannot  do  this  in  the  case  of  French  or 
Latin.  On  the  other  hand,  presuming  that  all  will 
agree  with  me  in  thinking  that  the  native  grammar 


190  Institutes  of  Education. 

must  be  the  basis  of  foreign  grammars  (in  order  that 
the  new  may  grow  out  of  the  old  and  knowledge  be  an 
organic  growth),  then  it  is  absurd  not  to  take  advan- 
tage of  English  grammar  in  teaching  French  or  Latin, 
and  not  to  assume  that  a  good  deal  of  the  grammatical 
work  is  already  done  to  my  hand.  And  so  on,  as 
when  we  pass  from  Latin  to  Greek.  Here  common 
sense  comes  in ;  and  though  it  be  "  the  rarest  gift  of 
Heaven,"  we  must  take  it  for  certain  that  all  teachers 
are  endowed  with  it. 

And  this  allusion  to  common  sense  suggests  that  I 
must  still  make  one  remark  before  I  conclude  this  part 
of  my  subject. 

It  is  possible  to  overdo  method. 

You  may  be  giving  a  lesson  quite  in  accordance  with 
sound  method,  but  you  may  be  pedantically  taking 
step  after  step  with  too  exclusive  an  eye  on  method  of 
procedure,  and  too  little  regard  to  the  subject  you  are 
teaching,  the  mental  condition  of  the  pupil  you  are 
teaching,  and  the  proposed  end  of  your  teaching.  You 
may  forget  entirely  that  the  prime  condition  of  all  suc- 
cessful method  is  the  sympathetic  movement  of  the 
mind  before  you  with  your  mind,  and  your  mind  with 
his.  Indeed,  without  this  sympathy,  subtle  and  deli- 
cate in  its  nature,  your  method  becomes  wooden  and 
lifeless.  This,  now,  is  to  be  a  slave  to  method, 
whereas  method  ought  to  be  your  servant,  not  your 
master.  Sympathy  cannot  be  taught  by  any  professor 
of  education.  It  is  a  thing  of  native  growth,  but  its 
germs  may  be  cultivated.  The  greatest  stimulus  to  a 
young  mind,  you  may  be  sure,  is  your  sympathy  with 


Methodology.  191 


it,  for  this  is  always  accompanied  with  a  genuine 
desire  to  lead  the  pupil  into  the  subject;  and  that 
desire  will  in  all,  save  a  few  cases,  be  reciprocated  by 
the  pupil.  There  is  no  device  for  commanding  atten- 
tion and  no  methodology  which  can  be  a  substitute  for 
interest  in  your  subject  and  sympathy  with  the  mind 
before  you.  In  fact,  one  might  almost  supersede  all 
study  of  method  if  one  could  only  secure  this,  that  the 
teacher  was  able  sympathetically  to  place  himself  in 
the  mental  attitude  of  the  pupil  towards  the  lesson, 
and  advance  along  with  him  step  by  step  to  the  full 
comprehension  of  it. 

It  has  also,  I  think,  to  be  noted  that  it  is  above  all 
that  philosophy  of  mind  which  regards  mind  as  being, 
under  more  or  less  disguise,  a  process  of  sense-agglut- 
ination, which  will  generate  a  method  in  the  forming 
of  mind  as  pedantic  in  practice  as  it  is  unsound  in 
theory.  The  growth  of  a  mind,  even  if  we  regard  it 
as  a  mere  fabric  of  stones  and  cement,  is  not  depend- 
ent on  the  educator.  It  fulfils  its  own  life  in  its  own 
way.  We  merely  fix  the  end,  give  direction,  supply 
defects,  remove  obstructions,  and,  generally,  lend  a 
hand.  Some  would  build  up  mind  as  if  they  were 
laying  a  tessellated  pavement.  Method  which  does 
not  confine  itself  to  the  order  of  studies  and  the  dis- 
cipline and  development  of  faculty  generally,  but  con- 
descends to  the  minutest  details  of  the  order  of 
questions  to  be  put  even  in  a  simple  narrative  lesson, 
is  method  run  to  seed.  The  human  mind,  as  a  living 
energy,  is  always  arranging  its  own  material  for  itself, 
and  children  are  not  so  dull  as  some  method-mongers 


192  Institutes  of  Education. 

seem  to  imagine.  Still  more  clearly  shall  we  see  the 
fallacy  of  the  pedantic  extremist  in  method,  if  we 
recognise  reason  as  at  root  a  will-energy  ever  seeking, 
by  the  necessity  of  its  own  nature,  to  correlate  presen- 
tations and  representations  under  the  stimulus  of  the 
native  form  of  End.  To  stimulate  and  direct  this, 
taking  care  to  keep  to  the  highway  of  mind-process,  is 
more  than  half  our  task. 

In  short,  one  great  advantage  accruing  to  the  study 
of  the  science  of  education,  as  distinguished  from  the 
art  as  a  dogmatic  system,  is,  that  it  makes  the  student- 
teacher  master  of  method,  and  prevents  method,  in 
the  sense  of  rules,  being  master  of  him.  He  sees  the 
ultimate  ground  and  significance  of  the  rules,  and  feels 
free  and  unencumbered  in  his  use  of  them.  His  obedi- 
ence is  the  obedience  of  a  freeman,  not  of  a  slave.  He 
is  the  subject  of  a  constitutional  monarch,  not  of  a 
despot.  We  rightly  despise  "  rule  of  thumb  " ;  but  let 
us  remember  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  a  pedantic 
system  of  rules  which  becomes  a  kind  of  organised 
"  rule  of  thumb  "  —  perhaps  a  more  dangerous  enemy 
of  true  method  than  the  traditionary  practices  which 
make  no  pretensions. 

Note.  —  There  ought  to  follow  Methodology,  a  discussion 
of  the  art  of  examining  and  a  consideration  of  manner  in 
the  teacher  as  distinguished  from  method.  On  these  subjects 
much  might  be  said.  As  to  the  art  of  examining,  I  would 
say  generally,  that  the  moment  it  departs  from  the  type  of 
an  intelligent  conversation  conducted  with  perfect  natural- 
ness, it  goes  wrong. 


PART   IV. 

APPLIED  METHODOLOGY,   OR    THE  ART  OF 
EDUCATION. 


APPLIED  METHODOLOGY,  OR  THE  ART 
OF  EDUCATION. 

METHOD  OF  INTELLECTUAL  EDUCATION,  i.e.  OF  IN- 


STRUCTION  AND   DISCIPLINE.1 

I  DO  not  say  methods  of  instruction,  but  of  "  intel- 
lectual education,"  because  it  has  been  already  shown 
that  all  sound  instruction  of  the  intelligence  involves 
training  and  discipline,  and  all  sound  training  and 
discipline  of  the  intelligence  can  be  secured  through 
sound  instruction  alone.  The  two  taken  together 
constitute  the  education  of  mind  as  intelligence. 

We  divided  subjects  of  instruction  into  two  classes, 
the  Meal,  which  specially  feed  the  mind,  and  the 
Formal  or  Abstract,  which  specially  discipline.  The 
Real  comprised  Naturalistic  and  Humanistic  subjects ; 
and  so  with  the  Formal.  We  shall  take  the  Real 
first.2 


1  The  practical  application  of  Method  to  the  various  subjects  of 
instruction  would  naturally  extend  to  about  twenty-five  lectures. 

2  There  is  also,  doubtless,  a  reality  of  fact  and  relation  in  the 
abstract. 

195 


196  Institutes  of  Education. 


A. — Application  of  Method  to  Instruction  in  the  HEAL,. 

The  Naturalistic.  —  (1)  Object-lessons  and  Nature- 
knowledge.     Elementary  service  generally. 

(2)  Knowledge  of  the  Human  Body. 

(3)  Geography    (as    defined    in    Lecture    V., 
Part  I.).1 

(4)  Physiography. 
The  Humanistic. 

Introductory.  —  Reading  as  a  merely  instrumental 
art.     Writing  as  a  subsidiary  instrument. 

(1)  Language,2  i.e.  — 

(a)  The  Vernacular  language  as  the  expres- 
sion of  the  thought  of  others  —  Liter- 
ature. 

(6)  The  Vernacular  language  as  a  synthetic 
exercise  —  the  expression  of  one's  own 
thought  —  Imitative  Composition. 

(2)  Foreign  Languages  as  Literature. 

(3)  Economics. 

(4)  History  with  Civil  Relations. 

(5)  Moral    Sentiments    and    Precepts    [Minor 
Morals] . 

1  For  a  paper  on  "Method  in  Teaching  Geography,"  see  Occa- 
sional Addresses. 

2  The  substance  of  my  lectures  on  Language  and  Literature  will 
be  found  in  the  book  entitled  Language  and  Linguistic  Method  in 
the  School  (Cambridge  University  Press).    The  student  is  also  re- 
ferred to  "Theory  and  the  Curriculum  of  the  Secondary  School," 
in  Teachers'  Guild  Addresses  (Percival  &  Co.),  and  to  "Liberal 
Education  in  the  Primary  School,"  in  Occasional  Addresses  (Cam- 
bridge University  Press). 


Applied  Methodology.  197 


(6)  Spiritual  Ideas  (including  the  Beautiful) 
and  Religion. 

B. — Application  of  Method  to  Instruction  in  the  FORMAL. 

Drawing.  Language  as  Grammar  (native 

Arithmetic.  and  foreign  languages). 

Geometry.  Rhetoric. 

Logic. 

The  lecturer  on  education  will  treat  all  the  above 
subjects  in  detail.  I  merely  name  them  here. 

Note.  —  The  inclusion  of  drawing  among  "  Formal  "  sub- 
jects may  give  rise  to  question.  I  regard  outline  drawing 
(including  geometrical)  as  belonging  to  the  formal  of  sense, 
and  as  an  essential  element  in  all  education"  of  the  intelli- 
gence. Apart  from  numerous  other  advantages,  the  practice 
of  drawing  must  tend  to  give  a  definiteness  of  outline  to  all 
mental  operations  :  these  have  a  tendency  to  visualisation  as 
they  become  absolutely  clear  and  distinct.  The  effort  also 
to  copy  a  line  or  curve  so  that  it  shall  be  a  true  copy,  is  an 
effort  of  self-directed  will  which  is  of  disciplinary  benefit, 
and  yet  within  the  capacity  of  the  youngest. 

As  to  materials  of  education  generally,  I  would  here  lay 
down  two  propositions  which  ought  to  be  constantly  pres- 
ent to  the  teacher  as  governing  all  that  can  be  said  as  to 
"  materials." 

I.  The  child  of  six  or  seven  may,  without  exaggeration, 
be  said  to  come  to  school  from  the  home,  the  fields,  and  the 
streets  with  his  mind  full  of  the  elements  of  every  department 
of  knowledge  included  in  the  above  classification.  He  is 
already  a  walking  miniature  encyclopaedia.  We  are  much 
mistaken  if  we  think  his  mind  is  waiting  for  us  before  it 
begins  to  work.  It  is  chockful  of  judgments.  The  subjects 
included  above  under  the  heads  Real  and  Formal  are  (with 


198  Institutes  of  Education. 

the  exception  of  foreign  tongues),  if  closely  examined,  merely 
a  generalisation  and  classification  of  the  materials  in  and 
through  which  the  life  of  each  is  being  carried  on  as  a 
matter  of  course. 

II.  The  teacher's  main  business  is  to  take  the  chaotic 
child-synthesis  to  pieces,  make  clear  what  is  confused,  and 
build  on  the  foundations  thus  laid.  But  the  teacher  never 
leaves  behind  him  the  ordinary  experiences  of  child-life ;  he 
simply  interprets  and  extends  them.  It  is  daily  life  which 
gives  material,  and  the  school  which  gives  interpretation, 
direction,  and  form.  Life  and  the  school  should  be  in  a 
continual  reciprocity  —  never  disjoined.  Vitce  non  scholce 
discendum  est. 


We  have  now  come  to  the  end  of  that  portion  of 
the  Institutes  of  Education  which  deals  with  EIGHT 
JUDGMENT,  including  as  elements  of  right  judgment, 
and  therefore  as  materials  of  instruction,  moral  and 
spiritual  ideas.  But  knowledge,  and  even  wisdom, 
which  issue  in  judging  knowingly  and  wisely,  are  of 
little  avail,  save  in  so  far  as  they  express  themselves 
in  "  Good  action  under  a  sense  of  Duty,"  and  find  their 
completion  in  a  "  comprehension  of  the  spiritual  sig- 
nificance of  nature  and  life"  (p.  33).  Thus  alone  do 
we  achieve  the  Ethical  End;  and  we  must  now  indi- 
cate the  lines  and  method  of  instruction,  training,  and 
discipline  in  respect  of  this  the  ultimate  aim  of  all 
our  endeavours. 


PART   V. 

ETHICAL   EDUCATION— SPECIALLY 
CONSIDERED. 


LECTURE   I. 

ETHICAL  IDEAS  AS  THE  REAL,  OR  SUBSTANCE,  OF  LIFE. 

NOTE.  —  The  following  lectures  consist  of  summaries 
and  paragraphs  only.  It  is  presumed  that  the  student 
now  turns  back  and  re-peruses  Lectures  IV.  and  V. 
Part  I. 

THE  problem  of  education  may  be  summarised,  as 
we  have  seen,  under  the  three  heads  of  the  end,  the 
means  (which  comprehends  materials  and  process), 
and  the  agency,  which  sets  the  whole  in  motion  and 
carries  it  out  to  its  completion.  The  agency  is  the 
teacher,  who  passes  into  the  higher  category  of  "  edu- 
cator "  only  when  he  works  under  the  inspiration  of 
an  ethical  purpose.  On  his  personality  so  much 
depends  that  the  determination  of  ends  and  the  dis- 
cussion of  materials  and  processes  seem  to  sink  into 
comparative  insignificance.  But  were  we  to  consider 
this  personality  itself  (which  lies  outside  our  plan  in 
this  book),  we  should  find  that  in  the  teacher,  as  in 
education  generally,  it  is  the  ethical  which  is  of 
supreme  moment.  No  system  of  training  can  guar- 
antee ethical  fitness ;  but  it  can  shape  to  an  excellent 
issue  the  ethical  predisposition,  and  constrain  those 
endowed  by  natiire  with  this  predisposition  seriously 

201 


202  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


to  ponder  the  best  ways  of  fulfilling  their  obligations 
to  their  own  educational  ideal  and  to  the  national  life. 
The  teacher  who  is  ethically  endowed  will  see  that 
the  materials  which  he  uses  for  knowledge,  and  the 
discipline  which  he  gives  by  means  of  these  materials 
have  for  their  ultimate  object  the  fitting  of  the  young 
to  interpret  their  daily  experience,  subduing  all  to  the 
service  of  an  ethical  ideal.  But  knowledge  and  intel- 
lectual discipline  alone,  he  is  well  aware,  even  when 
animated  by  an  ethical  purpose,  will  not  of  themselves 
suffice;  instruction  must  be  given  in  ethical  ideas 
themselves  as  the  true  and  ultimate  realities  of  life, 
and  direct  discipline  must  also  be  given  in  ethical 
habit. 

We  find,  as  the  last  result  of  human  experience, 
certain  moral  ideas  ready  made  for  us.  This  is  ethical 
tradition.  Ethical  Education  consists  in  training  the 
young  so  as  to  put  them  in  possession  of  these  ideas 
as  motives  of  conduct,  and  as  necessary  to  their  ethical 
completeness.  Thus  we  build  up  Conscience  in  them. 
Left  to  his  own  individual  experience,  a  man's  knowl- 
edge would  be  small,  his  conception  of  human  rela- 
tions restricted,  and  his  interpretation  of  them  false 
or  inadequate. 

The  moral  "  ideas  "  are  high  generalisations,  and  (as 
we  now  know)  we  can  introduce  children  effectively 
to  generalisations  only  through  the  particulars  of  con- 
duct. We  build  up  the  idea  through  particular  thoughts 
and  acts.  Children  are  our  modern  instances  of  prim- 
itive man.  Their  minds  have  to  repeat  the  mental 


i.j  Ethical  Ideas  as  the  Real  of  Life.        203 

history  of  the  past,  in  their  conceptions  of  duty  as 
well  as  in  their  knowledge  of  things. 

How  do  we  proceed  with  a  view  to  put  them  in  pos- 
session of  their  inheritance? 

First,  We  take  care  to  instruct  them  in  so  much  of 
the  accumulated  materials  of  knowledge  —  knowledge 
of  things  —  as  will  enable  them  to  form  right  judg- 
ments, and  give  fulness  to  life  by  multiplying  inter- 
ests. The  subjects  we  select  and  the  method  of  giving 
instruction  in  them,  with  a  view  to  the  attainment  of 
our  ultimate  ethical  purpose,  constitute  that  part  of 
educational  theory  and  method  which  has  to  do  with 
the  intellect  primarily ;  that  is  to  say,  the  mere  under- 
standing of  things  and  their  relations.  All  this  we 
have  considered  in  the  previous  lectures;  and  as  we 
enter  on  the  specific  consideration  of  the  ethical,  we  see 
that  a  liberal  and  generous  course  of  instruction  is 
necessary,  if  the  circle  of  thought  and  interests  is  to 
be  so  widened  as  to  give  materials  for  sound  ethical 
conclusions.  The  width,  no  less  than  the  intensity, 
of  a  man's  intellectual  and  ethical  life  is  the  measure 
of  his  education. 

Secondly,  We  regulate  the  conduct  of  the  young  in 
accordance  with  moral  ideas  and  the  sentiment  of  duty. 

Thirdly,  We  instruct  them  in  moral  ideas  themselves, 
and  their  spiritual  significance. 

Our  object  in  these  processes  is  one  and  the  same 
—  to  produce  in  each  human  being  an  ethical  state  of 
mind;  but  this  again  with  a  view  to  expression  and 
action,  which  alone  give  value  to  the  ethical  state :  in 
other  words,  we  aim  at  producing  a  certain  state  of 


204  Institutes  of  Education.  [LKCT.  i. 


being,   and  effective   virtue  as  sole  guarantee  of  the 
reality  of  that  state. 

Now  as  to  the  third  step,  it  has  to  be  noted  gen- 
erally that  no  one  can  get  a  knowledge  of  moral  or 
spiritual  ideas  by  merely  acquiescing  in  propositions 
regarding  them.  All  moral  ideas  which  can-constitute 
motives  of  action  arise  primarily  out  of  feelings  — 
"inner  sense,"  and,  consequently,  we  get  possession 
of  them  only  by  feeling  them  —  feeling,  and  so  seeing, 
their  truth,  and  the  law  that  is  inherent  in  them.  In 
the  same  way  we  do-  not  get  a  knowledge  of  anything 
of  external  sense  by  reading  statements  about  it,  but 
only  by  feeling  it,  that  is  to  say,  having  it  present  to 
the  senses.  There  is  this  difference,  however,  between 
the  intellectual  and  the  ethical,  that  knowledge  of  sub- 
jects completes  itself  simply  as  knowledge  (although 
until  we  can  tt.se  it,  it  is  not  wholly  ours),  whereas 
ethical  ideas  do  not  truly  live  at  all,  save  in  action. 
We  never,  consequently,  can  be  said  even  to  know 
them  (feel  them),  until  we  have  carried  them  into 
action ;  or,  at  least,  realised  them  imaginatively,  if  not 
in  our  own  activity,  then  in  the  activity  of  another. 


LECTURE   II. 

BRIEF  ANALYSIS  OF  MIND  AS  AN  ETHICAL  ACTIVITY. 

WHEN  dealing  with  the  philosophy  of  mind  as  an 
intellectual  or  reason-activity,  we  first  exhibited  the 
characteristics  of  the  sensational  intelligence  of  the 
animal ;  and  we  thus  gained  a  clearer  comprehension 
of  the  distinctive  characteristics  of  the  intelligence  of 
man,  who  alone  is  a  reason.  The  same  mode  of  pro- 
cedure will  be  followed  now  in  the  ethical  sphere. 

Animal  and  Infant  Ethics. 

The  result  of  our  analysis  (p.  73)  was  that  the 
simple  feelings  which  are  inherent  in  a  fully  developed 
animal  organism  are  the  following :  — 

1.  The  Feeling  of  Life-activity. 

2.  The  natural  appetites  (impulses,  instincts)  work- 

ing from  within. 

3.  Sympathy  of  being  and  of  natural  feelings  in 

living  creatures. 

4.  The  feeling  of  kindness  to  other  living  creatures, 

especially  among  those  of  a  like  kind  (good- 
will). 

5.  The  feeling  of  pleasure  in  kindness  received  from 

others  (love  of  approbation). 

205 


206  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

6.  The  feeling  of  a  superior  power  (with  the  con- 

sequent feeling  of  dependence). 

7.  The  feeling  of  resistance  to  anything  which  may 

hurt  (animal  courage). 

8.  The  feeling  of  fear,  or  of  evasion,  of  anything 

which  may  hurt  (animal  cowardice). 

9.  The  feeling  of  rivalry. 

All  these  insist  on  manifesting  themselves  as  occa- 
sion arises. 

Man  shares  all  these  feelings,  as  instincts,  desires, 
impulses,  with  animals;  and  they  form  the  basis  of 
his  ethical  nature.  As  basis  of  his  nature,  they  are 
in  evidence  from  the  first;  indeed  they  constitute  the 
whole  ethical  apparatus  of  the  infant.  There  is  no 
harm  in  them;  but,  on  the  contrary,  good:  and  the 
young  must  be  allowed  to  pursue  their  desires  and 
exercise  their  activities  in  every  direction.  We  grad- 
ually mould  these  to  law,  but  we  must  not  be  in  too 
great  haste. 

In  man,  reason  (as  Will)  enters  for  the  purpose  of 
rationalising  all  these  impulses  and  directing  them  to 
ends,  which  ends  are,  in  their  ultimate  form,  ethical 
ideas ;  and  these,  taken  together,  constitute  the  ideal 
of  conduct  for  each  man. 

The  business  of  the  teacher  and  parent  is  to 
train  and  discipline  this  Will  and  to  build  up  this 
Ideal. 

The  animal  is  a  mere  victim  of  the  dynamic  of  feel- 
ing. It  yields  to  that  which  is  strongest  or  upper- 
most at  the  moment.  Man,  on  the  contrary,  directs 
feeling  and  emotion  in  certain  special  lines  of  activ- 


ii.]    Analysis  of  Mind  as  an  Ethical  Activity.     207 

ity,  i.e.  towards  certain  specific  ends,  by  virtue  of  the 
reason  in  him.  These  ends  are,  as  I  have  said,  ethical 
ideas,  and  they  constitute  motives  of  action  as  gen- 
eralised. 

Further,  when  this  Will-reason  enters  into  the 
sphere  of  feeling,  it  brings  with  it  new  material  to 
Consciousness  —  (1)  A  consciousness  of  Will  as  a 
determining  power,  energy,  or  force.  (2)  A  con- 
sciousness of  personality  or  self.  (3)  A  conscious- 
ness of  duty  to  moral  law  as  inherent  in  the  ideas  and 
the  ideal  constituted  by  Will-reason. 

With  education  these  rational  elements  of  man's 
distinctive  ethical  nature  grow  in  strength. 

The  sum  of  the  ethical  ideas  of  conduct  in  a  man, 
taken  along  with  the  perception  of  law  in  these  ideas, 
and  of  consequent  duty  to  that  law  as  supreme,  con- 
stitute, taken  together,  what  we  call  Conscience.  The 
function  of  the  educator,  accordingly,  may  be  said  to 
be  to  build  up  Conscience  in  the  young:  and  Con- 
science, I  repeat,  may  be  succinctly  denned  as  the 
ideal  system  of  motives,  along  with  the  sentiment  of 
law  and  duty  to  law  as  inherent  in  that  ideal  system. 

As  to  these  Ideas  themselves :  they  are  ascertained 
thus :  Reason  dealing  with  the  feelings  and  emotions 
which  we  have  in  common  with  animals  (though  in 
more  ample  measure)  determines  the  relations  of  a 
person  to  himself  and  to  other  persons,  and  so  consti- 
tutes the  moral  ideas  (ends  and  motives) .  These  ideas 
are  all  complex. 


208  Institutes  of  Education.  [LKCT. 


The  most  common  of  them  are  — 

Humanity  (which  is  good-  Courage. 

will  to  others,  and  love  Integrity. 

of  goodwill  of  others).  Resoluteness    and    Perse- 
Justice,  verance. 
Truthfulness.  Purity. 
Honesty.  Reverence  (for  that  which 
Honour.  is    greater     than    our- 
Fidelity.  selves). 

Self-control  and  Self-respect  or  self- worth. 

The  analysis  of  these  complex  ideas  into  their  ele- 
ments of  emotion  and  reason  must  throw  light  on  the 
method  of  educating  the  young,  so  that  the  ideas  sluill 
be  to  them  a  permanent  possession  as  knowledge. 

I  do  not  attempt  this  analysis  here,  but  content 
myself  with  saying  that  the  teacher  should  ahv;iys 
have  present  to  himself,  as  dominating  aim,  the  cul- 
tivation in  the  pupil  of  self-control  and  self-respect, 
and  of  those  more  generic  and  supreme  ethical  ideas 
which  comprehend  others,  viz.  the  idea  of  HUMANITY, 
which  expands  and  enriches  the  soul,  while  at  the 
same  time  determining  conduct,  and  the  spiritual  idea 
of  GOD  as  universal  Father,  which  at  once  humbles 
and  exalts  the  personality,  and  Whose  best  service  is 
the  service  of  mankind.  The  pupil  should  early  know 
that  a  continuous  struggle  is  appointed  for  man,  not 
only  with  his  animal  nature  and  material  interests, 
but  with  the  very  self-conscious  ego,  which,  just 
because  it  lifts  him  above  nature,  is  too  apt  to  rest 
content  with  self-worship. 


ii.]     Analysis  of  Mind  as  an  Ethical  Activity.     209 

I  have  spoken  elsewhere,  in  detail,  of  specific  Relig- 
ious teaching.1  Accordingly,  I  would  confine  myself 
here  to  saying  that  where  there  is  a  breach  between 
ethical  and  religious  teaching,  we  have  neither  the 
one  nor  the  other  in  its  fulness  of  significance.  With- 
out religious  teaching,  the  education  of  a  human  being 
is  (on  purely  psychological  grounds)  demonstrably 
incomplete. 

Law  and  Duty.  —  I  have  referred  to  Law  and  Duty 
as  residing  in  the  ideas.  We  may  put  it  otherwise 
thus :  the  abstract  sentiment  of  law  and  duty  inherent 
in  the  reason  of  man  is  a  mere  empty  Form,  and  has 
to  be  filled  with  the  substance  of  real  or  ethical  ideas 
which  are  to  regulate  life  and  conduct.  This  senti- 
ment of  law,  implying  reverence  for,  and  duty  to,  law, 
accompanies  all  our  training  and  instruction,  and  is 
taken  for  granted  as  an  ever-present  inner  fact  dis- 
tinguishing the  man-child  from  the  animal.  Through 
this  sentiment  of  law  and  duty,  in  truth,  we  must 
mainly  work,  although  we  do  not  always  make  our 
procedure  apparent  to  the  child. 

The  educator  may  be  assured  that  the  child  is  ever 
in  search  of  law.  Were  there  no  ideal  and  law  for 
man  there  could  be  no  morality;  one  act  would  be  as 
good  as  another. 

The  discipline  of  duty  to  law  is  essentially  a  calling 
forth  of  effort  to  will  the  good  and  right  in  the  face  of 
difficulties. 

1  Occasional  Addresses  and  Teachers'  Guild  Addresses. 


210  Institutes  of  .Education.  [LECT.  n. 

In  this  connection,  again,  the  recognition  of  God  as 
source  of  law,  and  of  the  world  as  a  moral  order,  is  to 
be  continually  fostered  (by  being  assumed  rather  than 
inculcated),  until  it  reaches  that  clearness  of  vision, 
possible  only  to  the  maturing  or  matured  mind,  which 
contemplates  God  as  not  only  the  true  and  ever- 
abiding  life  of  the  spirit  of  man,  but  the  ever-during 
law  of  that  spirit. 


LECTURE   III. 

UNITY  OF  THE  INTELLECTUAL  AND  ETHICAL  IN 
EDUCATION. 

Nutrition  and  Discipline :   Real  and  Formal. 

WILL  in  so  far  as,  in  its  reason-process,  it  affirms 
or  posits  real  ethical  ends  or  ideas  as  also  abstract  law, 
is,  as  we  now  may  see,  the  Formal  element  in  ethics. 
In  other  words,  Will,  engaging  itself  with  abstract 
duty  to  law,  and  acting  for  the  sake  of  duty  to  law  as 
such,  is  Formal.  The  ethical  ideal,  on  the  other  hand, 
which  is  "  constituted  law  "  for  us,  is  the  substance  or 
matter,  in  other  words,  the  Real  in  the  ethical  act. 

We  have  spoken  in  past  pages x  of  the  unity  of 
reason ;  but  we  now  farther  see  that  the  human  mind 
as  a  whole  is  a  rational  unity.  There  is  no  true 
separation  of  the  intellectual  and  the  ethical.  The 
ethical  is  within  the  sphere  of  the  rational,  not  outside 
it  or  somehow  added  on  to .  it.  The  rational  affirma- 
tion of  end  in  the  sphere  of  inner  feeling  and  emotion, 
which  affirmation  determines  conduct,  is  identical  in 
its  nature  with  rational  affirmation  regarding  anything 
whatsoever. 

1  Vide  also  Appendix  D. 

211 


212  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


Note.  —  Within  the  limits  of  mere  knowledge,  the  affirma- 
tion has  its  final  issue  in  knowledge  simply ;  the  moment  it 
goes  beyond  this,  and  involves  the  effecting  of  a  particular 
knowledge  in  the  world  of  action  or  conduct,  the  knowledge, 
it  will  be  found,  is,  ipso  facto,  instinct  with  some  feeling  or 
emotion,  and  becomes  ethical.  The  abstract  love  of  pure 
knowledge  itself,  for  its  own  sake,  is,  however,  ethical, 
because  it  is  the  pursuit  of  an  idea  and  an  ideal.  This 
involves  emotion. 

In  the  purely  intellectual  sphere  we  distinguished 
between  the  Real  and  the  Formal  or  Abstract  in 
instruction.  So,  in  the  distinctively  Ethical  sphere 
—  the  ethical  side  of  reason  —  there  is  a  Real  and  a 
Formal  or  Abstract. 

Accordingly,  just  as  we  found  Will  in  the  conscious 
subject  to  be  root  and  nerve  of  reason  in  man,  we  now 
find  the  same  Will  to  be  root  and  nerve  of  all  ethical 
life  and  activity.  The  ethical  end, —  always  an  idea 
of  reason, —  which  is  affirmed  as  right  and  law,  is  car- 
ried, by  the  sustained  energy  of  the  same  Will  that 
affirmed  it,  into  action;  and  thus  we  become  ethical 
beings,  and  not  knowing  beings  only. 

It  will  be  at  once  seen  that  this  analysis  of  the 
essential  nature  of  mind  not  only  gives  to  us,  as  stu- 
dents of  philosophy,  a  unity  of  view,  but  as  students 
of  education  a  unity  of  theory  and  system.  For  in 
the  education  of  both  the  rational  and  ethical  nature, 
Will  is  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  man  — 
that  whereby  he  is  man;  and  it  is  this,  conse- 
quently, that  we  have  specially  to  train,  and  disci- 
pline, viz.  Will  as  at  once  a  rational  and  an  ethical 
energy. 


in.]       Unity  of  the  Intellectual  and  Ethical.      213 


But,  inasmuch  as  rational  mind,  as  pure  Will  and 
its  Reason-process  (or,  as  I  prefer  to  call  it,  Will- 
reason),  is  merely  formal,  we  have  to  provide  food, 
reality,  nutrition  for  the  moral,  just  as  we  do  for  the 
intellectual,  nature.  This  material  is,  we  now  know, 
ethical  ideas.  We  must  never,  however,  lose  sight  of 
the  fact  that  it  is  the  command  which  Will  has  over 
its  materials,  and  the  ends  for  which  it  uses  them, 
that  are  alone  of  value  in  life.  A  purpose  of  Duty 
is  demanded  of  us.  This,  indeed,  is  what  we  mean 
when  we  say  that  the  end  of  education,  as  of  life,  is 
ethical. 

Intellectual  discipline,  we  found,  involves  a  self- 
initiated  energy  of  Will  in  the  face  of  difficulties 
under  a  sense  of  Law  —  that  is  to  say,  the  fulfilment 
of  law  as  imposed  by  another  or  oneself  with  a  view 
to  the  fulfilment  of  a  purpose :  Ethical  discipline  also 
may  be  defined  in  the  same  terms.  Thus,  intellectual 
discipline  is,  in  truth,  a  moral  discipline. 

The  above  remarks  justify  the  traditionary  attitude 
of  the  classical  humanists  to  discipline  of  intellect  as 
of  supreme  importance;  but  it  also  shows  that  they 
have  erred  in  making  it  all-important.  The  intellect 
must  be  fed,  and  the  ethical  nature  must  be  fed.  So 
essential  is  this,  that  we  might  also  justify  the  real- 
istic attitude"  of  mind  to  education  as  of  supreme 
importance. 

The  true  conclusion  is  that  to  which  we  formerly 
came.  Will-reason  can  be  trained  and  disciplined  only 
in  and  through  the  Real :  and  the  Real  can  be  effec- 
tively taught  only  when  it  is  so  taught  as  to  be  a 


214  Institutes  of  Education.          [LECT.  in. 

training  and  discipline  of  the  Formal  in  mind.  How? 
To  this  scientific  methodology  is  the  answer;  and 
as  regards  intellect  we  have  nothing  more  to  say. 
But  methodology  is  equally  potent  in  the  ethical 
sphere. 


PART    VI. 

APPLIED  METHODOLOGY  AS  ART  OF 
ETHICAL  EDUCATION. 


LECTURE   I. 

THE  REAL  AND  THE  FORMAL. 
Instruction,  Training,  and  Discipline  generally. 

ETHICAL  Education,  I  have  just  said,  comprises  (like 
intellectual  education)  two  elements,  the  Real  and  the 
Formal  —  nutrition  and  training  with  discipline. 

I  pointed  out  (p.  41)  the  distinction  between  the 
"  training  "  and  "  discipline  "  of  the  intelligence.  Dis- 
cipline, we  found,  could  not  be  distinguished  from 
training  except  in  this,  that  it  was  dependent  on  spon- 
taneous, unaided,  and  self-directed  effort  on  the  part 
of  the  pupil,  with  a  view  to  the  effecting  of  a  self- 
conscious  purpose ;  while  training  was  the  carrying  of 
the  pupil  through  certain  intellectual  processes  by  a 
stronger  will  —  his  master's.  Hence  we  found  that 
formal  or  abstract  studies  were  in  themselves  more 
disciplinary,  if  rightly  taught,  than  realistic  studies, 
because  they  involved  greater  initial  energy  and  more 
sustained  application  of  that  Will  which,  as  a  power 
and  process,  is  the  distinguishing  differentia  of  man. 
The  same  distinction  is  apparent  in  ethical  education. 
In  the  case  of  very  young  children  we  train  to  right 
action,  i.e.  we  guide,  lead,  and  help  them  to  do  the 

217 


218  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT.  i. 

right,  in  obedience  to  their  teacher  as  a  moral  in- 
structor :  we  do  not  appeal  to  abstract  law,  or  lay  a 
burden  on  their  wills.  We  rely  on  imitation  and  on 
their  affection  for  us.  As  they  grow  older,  however, 
we  call  upon  them  to  do  the  right  of  themselves  in  the 
face  of  temptation,  in  obedience  to  the  moral  law  in 
them,  and  as  an  act  of  self -directing  will  in  the  service 
of  bare  duty :  this  is  formal  discipline. 

Thus  far,  the  method  of  intellectual  and  the  method 
of  moral  education  run  on  parallel  lines.  In  both 
alike  training  is  the  guidance  and  helping  of  the 
unformed  will  in  the  fulfilment  of  ends,  and  discipline 
is  the  spontaneous,  free  energising  of  that  will  in  the 
fulfilment  of  self-conscious  ends,  to  which,  as  law,  it 
owes  Duty. 


LECTURE   II. 

METHOD  OF  ETHICAL  EDUCATION   IN  THE  REAL  — 
INSTRUCTION. 

THE  ethical  differs  from  the  intellectual  as  regards 
the  method  of  instruction  only  in  so  far  as  we  are  now 
instructing  in  the  emotions  and  ideas  which  constitute 

the  inner  substance  or  matter  of  our  ethical  life.     The 

** 

difference  is  caused  by  this :  in  the  sphere  of  intellec- 
tual education  we  have  to  do  with  presentation  and 
acquisition,  whereas  in  the  sphere  of  ethical  education 
•we  have  directly  to  do  with  action  or  conduct;  for,  as 
we  pointed  out,  an  emotion  is  not  ours  till  it  is  felt, 
and  an  ethical  idea  is  not  truly  ours  till  it  is  used. 
An  ethical  emotion  or  idea  truly  lives  only  in  action, 
and,  accordingly,  can  be  realised  as  a  fact  of  conscious- 
ness by  the  child,  and  so  truly  Jcnoivn,  only  as  an  act. 

The  distinction  is,  fundamentally,  the  distinction 
between  outer  sense  and  inner  feeling  respectively  as 
yielding  materials  for  knowledge. 

Consequently,  we  instruct  in  the  real  of  ethics  chiefly 
by  training. 

That  is  to  say,  (a)  we  do  not  bring  the  ethical  before 
the  child's  mind  as  a  series  of  perceptive  facts  or 
reasoned  conclusions,  but  let  the  child  contemplate 
ethical  emotions  and  ideas  in  action  in  ourselves  or  in 

219 


220  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


others  (either  actually  or  in  narratives).  Perception 
is  here  perception  of  a,  feeling  in  activity,  (b)  Above 
all,  we  lead  him  to  imitate  and  do  the  good  instead  of 
the  bad  by  letting  him  feel  its  inherent  attractiveness, 
which  he  does  instinctively ;  and,  further,  by  associat- 
ing the  good  with  his  regard  for  us. 

Hence  it  is,  that  while  the  principle  of  method  — 
"  present  a  good  model "  —  is  of  general  application 
in  the  instruction  of  the  intelligence,  it  is  absolutely 
indispensable  in  ethical  instruction.  In  fact,  it  may 
be  said  that  abstract  instruction  in  emotions  or  in 
moral  ideas  or  precepts  is  to  the  young  nothing  but 
words  —  verba  sine  rebus.  The  res  in  this  sphere  are 
actions  resting  on  emotions  and  ideals.  The  process 
of  acquisition  is  the  imitative  adoption  of  what  the 
child  approves  in  others,  especially  his  Teacher.  Only 
then  does  he  truly  know  the  ethical  emotion.  So  with, 
himself;  he  must  do  that  he  may  know.  Logically,  it 
is  true,  the  virtuous  state  of  being  must  always  precede 
"  effective  virtue  " ;  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  two 
are  so  indissolubly  united  in  the  life  of  mind,  that  we 
would  seem  to  bring  about  the  virtuous  state  of  being 
by  first  securing  in  the  young  the  doing  of  the  right; 
and  so  we  work  backwards. 

These  remarks  apply  also  to  specifically  religious 
instruction.  I  build  up  the  reverential  frame  of  mind, 
for  example,  by  means  of  the  habitual  act  of  prayer 
and  the  exhibition  in  my  own  conduct  of  a  conscious- 
ness of  the  Divine  presence.  This  is  sympathetically 
adopted  by  the  child,  and  he  knows  it  in  the  moment 
of  doing  it  and  seeing  me  do  it. 


ii.]  Ethical  Education  in  the  Real.  221 


The  feelings,  again,  which  lie  at  the  root  of  minor 
morals  (which  Locke  calls  good  breeding)  are  all  taught 
by  imitation  and  a  training  in  acts.  Far  too  little 
importance,  I  would  here  point  out,  is  attached  by 
teachers  to  minor  morals  in  their  reactive  influence  on 
character  in  its  deeper  sense.  No  verbal  instruction 
is  here  of  much  avail.  Good  breeding,  acquired  after 
a  youth  is  grown  up,  is  always  alien  to  him.  His 
manners  and  "form  "  are  self-conscious.  He  is  wear- 
ing somebody  else's  clothes,  and  they  never  quite  fit. 

The  general  conclusion  is  that  ethical  instruction, 
is  through  training,  i.e.  by  evoking  in  the  child  the 
sympathetic  approval  and  imitation  of  good  acts. 
Coercion  would  defeat  our  purpose.  The  child  has  to 
adopt  our  point  of  view  through  imitation,  and  imita- 
tion rests,  as  we  have  seen,  psychologically  on  sym- 
pathy :  how  can  there  be  sympathy  with  that  which  a 
child  fears?  It  would  be  a  contradiction  in  terms. 

At  the  same  time,  I  do  not  admit  that  cold  precept 
is  always  out  of  place  with  the  young.  It  sums  up 
the  character  of  actions,  and  has  a  function  in  the 
sphere  of  the  emotions  similar  to  formulated  state- 
ments in  the  sphere  of  knowledge.  Still  less  is  it  to 
be  held  that  the  poetic  or  other  eloquent  expression  of 
moral  sentiment  is  ever  out  of  place.  On  the  contrary, 
so  long  as  a  poem  or  rhetorical  prose  expresses  ethical 
sentiments  or  ideas  which  are  fairly  well  understood, 
they  are  powerful  agents  in  building  up  the  ethical 
ideal  at  every  stage  of  education ;  especially  when,  as 
in  the  case  of  poetry,  the  words  are  allied  with  music 


222  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

in  the  school.  For,  all  that  has  to  do  with  the  expres- 
sion of  the  ideal,  in  words  or  in  beautiful  forms,  is 
moralising,  simply  because  it  is  ideal. 

Precepts  and  dogmas,  however,  are  generalisations, 
and  no  generalisation,  as  I  have  so  often  said,  has  any 
meaning  except  in  so  far  as  it  sums  up  particular 
experiences.  In  the  intellectual  sphere,  particular 
experiences  are  percepts  and  concepts  (individual)  of 
things;  in  the  ethical  sphere  they  are  the  acts  of  the 
learner  himself,  or  of  his  teacher  and  companions,  or 
the  imaginative  realising  of  the  acts  of  others  as 
narrated  in  prose  or  poetry. 

If  this  distinction  be  clearly  understood,  it  will  be 
found  that,  as  regards  all  else,  ethical  instruction  is 
subject  to  the  same  Principles  of  method  as  intellec- 
tual instruction,  and  we  do  not  require  to  start  in 
search  of  a  specific  ethical  methodology.  To  show  this 
in  detail  would  encumber  this  book,  but  the  mere  quot- 
ing of  a  few  of  the  Principles  will  show  what  I  mean. 

Present  to  Sense :  —  that  is  to  say,  evoke  the  moral 
feeling  or  emotion  so  that  it  shall  be  clearly  present 
to  consciousness.  No  preaching  will  do  this  any  more 
than  preaching  about  a  banana  will  convey  to  con- 
sciousness the  sense-concept  of  a  banana.  Emotions, 
etc.,  must  be  presented  to  inner  sense  as  acts. 

Present  a  good  model. 

Evoke  the  Will. 

Turn  to  Use :  i.e.  Help  the  child  in  his  daily  acts  to 
put  into  practice  what  he  has  seen  and  approved  in 
your  acts  and  the  acts  of  others.  Without  supervision, 
moral  training  is  impossible;  but  the  supervision 
should  be  sympathetic  and  easy. 


ii.]  Ethical  Education  in  the  Real.  223 

Let  the  instruction  be  analytico- synthetic :  that  is  to 
say,  in  historical  and  biographical  readings,  and  in 
poetical  reading,  the  complex  of  conduct  exhibited  has 
to  be  analysed,  and  its  elements,  moral  and  immoral, 
to  be  brought  into  light  with  a  view  to  a  correct  syn- 
thesis of  the  whole.  Only  so  is  the  lesson  of  any  use 
at  all.  But  do  not  overdo  this.  If  you  are  to  pro- 
duce a  flame  easily  with  Bryant  &  May's  matches, 
attend  to  the  direction  on  the  box,  ".Rub  lightly." 

Associate  ethical  teachings :  —  that  is  to  say,  not  only 
so  as  to  exhibit  their  unity  in  Will,  etc.,  but  associate 
them  also  with  pleasant  surroundings;  above  all,  a 
pleasant  countenance. 

The  other  principles  and  rules  of  Method  I  leave 
you  to  apply  for  yourselves. 

But  in  leaving  this  subject  I  cannot  forego  one 
remark  suggested  by  the  master  principle,  "  Evoke  the 
Will."  The  child  must  do  the  work  of  his  own  moral 
education  under  your  guidance  simply,  just  as  he  does 
the  work  of  instruction  under  your  guidance.  Do  not 
emphasise  and  drive  home  moral  teachings  too  much 
as  if  the  child  were  an  unwilling  recipient  of  them. 
Assume  that  the  young  mind  is  ready  for  them,  nay, 
eager  for  them;  and  while  you  handle  moral  and 
spiritual  things  gravely,  let  all  austerity  be  absent. 


LECTURE   III. 

METHOD  OF  ETHICAL  EDUCATION  IN  THE  FORMAL  — 
DISCIPLINE. 

BY  the  formal  or  abstract  in  ethics  we  mean  Law, 
and  Duty  to  Law  as  such;  and  here  the  principles 
"Evoke  the  Will"  and  "Turn  to  Use"  are  specially 
applicable. 

The  ethical  ideas  which  constitute  the  real  or  sub- 
stance of  morality  cannot  be  trusted  to  determine 
a  man's  conduct,  still  less  a  boy's,  save  in  ordinary 
cases.  Outside  the  ordinary  and  usual,  the  sense  of 
duty  to  abstract  Law,  and  that  as  Law  of  God,  is 
indispensable. 

It  is  the  Law  in  ethical  ideas,  consequently,  and 
obedience  to  that  Law,  which  we  must  constantly  keep 
before  the  young  if  we  are  to  educate  them  so  as  to 
give  them  power  over  their  own  actions  —  capacity  for 
free  self-regulation  as  they  grow  in  years.  This  evok- 
ing of  moral  energy  in  the  face  of  difficulties,  is  what 
is  meant  by  moral  discipline.  Our  aim  is  a  "  Habit 
of  good  action  under  a  sense  of  Duty." 

Will,  as  reason,  knows  and  realises  in  consciousness 
the  ethical  idea;  and  it  is  the  same  Will  which  real- 
ises the  knowledge  in  action.  The  continued  suprem- 
224 


LECT.  in.]     Ethical  Education  in  the  Formal.        225 

acy  of  tliis  Will,  as  serving  moral  Law,  is  the  Habit 
of  Virtue. 

But  the  child  knows  nothing  of  inner  Law,  and  the 
boy  knows  little.  It  is  abstract,  and  in  germ  only  as 
yet.  The  young  are  concrete  beings  of  sense  and  feel- 
ing. The  educator  (parent,  teacher,  the  state)  is  to 
them  Law  —  Law  in  its  concrete  and  visible  form. 
This  is  their  Conscience,  as  yet  external  to  them,  and 
preceding,  evoking,  and  guiding  the  natural  growth 
of  inner  Law  in  them. 

For  the  securing  of  the  habitual  recognition  of  Law 
as  Law,  and  as  an  end  in  itself  for  the  free  energy  of 
Will  (the  essential  characteristic  of  man  as  a  good 
citizen  and  as  a  person),  a  great  deal  depends  on  the 
behaviour  of  this  external  Conscience  —  viz.  Authority 
or  Law  as  embodied  in  the  parent,  the  state,  and  the 
teacher.  The  method  of  Moral  Discipline,  then,  is 
through  Authority. 

It  might  be  asked  at  this  point,  What  Right  has  a 
schoolmaster  thus  to  impose  himself,  as  Law,  on  the 
young  ?  The  answer  is,  The  right  of  the  mature  mind 
to  direct  the  immature  mind,  the  right  conferred  by  a 
man's  being  the  holder  of  the  tradition  of  Law  which 
is  accumulated  wisdom,  and  the  right  inherent  in  the 
parent  and  the  State, —  all  which  are  embodied  in  the 
Teacher  for  the  time  being. 

This  is  his  Eight.  Right  may  ultimately  have  to 
be  supported  by  Might.  But  Might,  in  so  far  as  it  is 
not  used  in  the  service  of  Right,  has  no  right,  and  is 


226  Institutes  of  Education.         [LECT.  m. 

immoral;  consequently,  ineffective  and  demoralising. 
Nay,  even  in  the  service  of  Eight,  it  is  ineffective  and 
demoralising  when  employed  without  absolute  neces- 
sity. For  Might  as  such  (mere  physical  force)  can 
never  moralise.  Through  sympathy  alone  the  child 
imitatively  adopts  the  Law  in  you  and  from  you. 
Doubtless,  Might  can  deter  from  certain  external  acts 
and  protect  law-abiding  citizens  from  their  internal 
enemies ;  and,  consequently,  in  a  State  it  is  indispen- 
sable as  a  protective  police.  In  the  school,  too,  Might 
can  deter;  but  inasmuch  as  the  purpose  of  the  school 
is  education,  it  is  an  ethical  purpose  —  the  attainment 
of  certain  positive  ethical  results  in  the  pupils  of  self- 
directing  wills  —  and  the  merely  deterrent,  conse- 
quently, cannot  educate.  In  truth,  we  might  almost 
go  so  far  as  to  say  that,  except  in  so  far  as  the  young 
acquiesce  in  the  law  of  their  elders,  the  effect  of  law 
is  demoralising.  You  cannot  form  character  outside 
the  will  of  the  child.  It  is  a  miserable  result  of  edu- 
cation, which  can  be  identified  with  the  merely  nega- 
tive result  of  a  State  police. 

We  conclude  that  the  Authority  which  demands  and 
commands  obedience  to  Law,  in  the  family  and  school, 
is  MORAL  AUTHORITY,  not  Coercive  Might.  The 
whole  subject  of  Discipline  to  Law  and  Duty,  then, 
centres  round  this  question  of  moral  authority. 


LECTURE   IV. 

MORAL  AUTHORITY  AND  ITS   CHARACTERISTICS. 

THE  immature  mind  is  not  capable  of  apprehending 
the  conception  of  abstract  Law  and  Duty,  as  I  have 
already  said.  This  conception  is  there  in  germ  and 
becomes  explicit  gradually  through  the  discipline  of 
young  minds,  which  by  nature  are  seeking  for  Law  and 
going  out  to  meet  it.  Discipline,  it  might  be  said,  is 
attained  when  we  have  formed  the  habit  of  obedience 
to  the  external  Law  —  the  Moral  Authority  of  the 
teacher.  Not  so :  the  habit  must  be  so  formed  as  to 
be  a  habit  of  free  obedience  to  inner  Law,  and  a  per- 
petual recognition  of  its  majesty.  It  is  a  slow  proc- 
ess, and  the  teacher  must  pursue  his  aim  deliberately, 
calmly,  and  persistently.  If  the  young  were  capable 
of  realising  the  abstract  conception  of  formal  law,  we 
should  content  ourselves  with  saying  that  sympathy 
with  the  teacher  and  imitation  of  him  and  of  other  good 
examples  would  suffice,  as  is  the  case  of  instruction. 
But  they  are  not  capable.  The  abstract  has  here,  as 
everywhere,  to  be  learned  through  the  concrete.  The 
teacher  is  the  concrete.  Now,  since  the  teacher 
embodies  moral  authority  for  the  purpose  of  regulat- 
ing the  acts  of  the  pupil  and  so  disciplining  him  in 

227 


228  Institutes  of  Education.          [LECT.  iv. 

duty  to  law,  he  himself  must  make  sure  that  he  is  a 
true  and  worthy  moral  authority.  So  far  as  he  is  this, 
he  will  succeed:  so  far  as  he  is  not  this,  he  will  fail. 
We  must  now,  therefore,  consider  those  character- 
istics and  elements  of  a  true  moral  authority  which 
must  be  found  in  the  teacher,  if  the  young  are  to  be 
so  disciplined  by  it  as  to  grow  up  willing  servants  of 
the  inner  Law,  and  ultimately  identify  it  with  their 
own  personalities  as  free  personalities: 


LECTURE   V. 

CHARACTERISTICS   OF  THE  EXERCISE  OF  MORAL 
AUTHORITY. 

THE  characteristics  of  a  true  Authority  make  them- 
selves known  in  the  exercise  of  authority  from  day  to 
day  and  hour  to  hour.  It  is  assumed  that  the  master 
always  maintains  the  aspect  and  bearing  of  authority. 
This  is  quite  compatible  with  kindliness  and  sym- 
pathy, and  is  always  self -controlled.1 

Summary  of  characteristics :  — 

1.  The  commands  of  the  master  are  always  in  accord- 
ance with  right  reason.     They  are  rational. 

This  does  not  mean  that  he  is  to  convince,  or  try  to 
convince,  his  pupils  that  his  commands  are  rational; 
but  only  that  in  quiet  moments  he  should  be  able  to 
justify  his  commands  to  himself,  or  to  other  adults, 
on  rational  grounds.  His  commands  must  thus  never 
be  arbitrary,  if  they  are  to  exhibit  true  authority.  In 
other  words,  they  must  never  be  an  utterance  of  his 
own  wilful  will,  but  have  a  rational  justification. 

2.  The  same  commands  are  given  in  all  similar  cir- 
cumstances.    They  are  sure,   steady,  and  consistent 

1  For  an  Essay  on  Authority  in  the  Schoolmaster,  see  my  book, 
The  Training  of  Teachers,  and  other  Educational  Papers. 

229 


230  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 

with  themselves.     The  pupil  always  knows  where  to 
find  the  master,  so  to  speak. 

The  master  must  not,  therefore,  allow  his  commands 
to  be  influenced  — 

(a)  By  regard  for  personal  ease,  or  by  indolence 

(selfishness). 
(6)  By  variations  of  moods  or  temper  (caprice). 

(c)  By  personal  likes  or  dislikes  (passion). 

(d)  By  indifference  or  frivolity  —  showing  that 

he  himself  does  not,  at  the  bottom  of  his 
heart,  much  respect  the  law. 

(e)  By  self-esteem  or  pride  —  showing  that  he 

places  himself  and  his  own  personality 
above  the  law  as  more  worthy  than  it. 
(/)  By  love  of  popularity. 

3.  The  master's  commands  are  always  instinct  with 
a  moral  purpose. 

This  means  that  they  would  be  found,  if  examined, 
to  have  a  moral  aim. 

4.  Great  liberty  of  thought  and  action  is  consistent 
with  the  observance  of  law;  and  all  things  are  right 
which  do  not  conflict  with  the  law. 

Therefore  — 

The  master's  commands  do  not  hover  round  every 
part  of  the  boy's  life;  they  do  not  harass  him;  they 
are  few  but  strong,  strong  but  few.  Liberty  of  action, 
freedom  of  thought  and  life,  are  carefully  protected 
within  certain  easily  understood  and  well-marked 
limits. 

5.  The  master's  commands  and  requirements  are 
clear  and  unmistakable. 


v.]  Exercise  of  Moral  Authority.  231 

6.  The   Moral    Law   does   not    require   of  us   the 
impossible.     The  master  who  is  a  true  moral  author- 
ity gives  no  commands  and  imposes  no  tasks  which 
cannot,  with  a  moderate  effort,  be  fulfilled. 

By  excessive  exactions  you  justify  disobedience. 
"Fathers,  provoke  not  your  children  to  wrath." 

7.  The   Moral  Law  is   not  equally  imperative  in 
respect  of  all  rules  of  conduct.     The  master,  there- 
fore, lets  it  appear  that  there  is  a  distinction,  and  a 
difference  of  degree,  in  his  commands ;  that  some  are 
truly  Laws  of  imperative  force,  others  mere  rules  or 
orders  of  expediency.     There  are  the  "bye-laws,"  so 
to  speak,  of  the  family  or  school. 

It  is  well  sometimes  even  to  suspend  (by  way  of 
reward)  rules  of  expediency,  when  they  restrict  the 
freedom  of  the  pupil.  The  very  suspension  enforces 
the  distinction  between  the  Good  and  the  merely  Ex- 
pedient ;  and  so  far  from  weakening  the  sense  of  Law 
in  the  boy  and  the  school,  tends  to  strengthen  it. 

8.  The  commands  and  demands  of  the  master  are 
just. 

The  young  are  exceedingly  sensitive  on  the  subject  of 
justice.  If  you  are  just,  you  strengthen  the  inner  Law 
by  the  outward  manifestation  of  its  own  all-pervading 
characteristics.  There  is  much  that  might  be  said  on 
this  question  of  Justice,  but  I  shall  make  only  three 
remarks  — 

(a)  The  teacher's  commands  must  apply  to  all 
equally.  This  does  not  preclude  relaxa- 
tions in  the  case  of  children  of  native 
weakness  or  sensitiveness,  provided  that 


232  Institutes  of  Education.  [LECT. 


the  other  pupils  recognise  the  existence  of 
the  reasons  for  exemption,  which  they  are 
sure  to  do. 

(6)  Make  very  sure  of  your  facts  before  you 
approve  or  disapprove.  If  there  be  any 
doubt,  always  give  the  pupil  the  benefit 
of  it. 

(c)  Never  remember  a  fault  against  a  boy  when 
it  has  been  atoned  for.  Start  afresh  every 
morning  with  a  clean  sheet.  A  new  day, 
a  new  life.  Let  each  day  be  a  day  of 
regeneration. 

9.  The  master  makes  use  of  the  feeling  of  awe  and 
reverence,  which  is  native  to  every  human  soul,  and 
which  finds  its  supreme  object  in  the  absolute  all- 
pervading  thought  of  God,  to  strengthen  the  authority 
of  moral  law;  but  only  in  grave  cases. 

If  the  teacher  consistently  exhibit  the  above  charac- 
teristics of  Moral  Authority,  his  own  personal  author- 
ity, as  the  external  conscience  of  the  pupil,  is  then 
justified  in  him:  and  it  will  be  found  that  the  pupil 
will  gain  such  trust  and  confidence  that,  should  the 
teacher  at  any  time  demand  or  command  the  ap- 
parently capricious  or  unreasonable,  the  pupil  will 
accept  the  command  without  question,  as  capable  of 
explanation  and  as  right,  simply  because  the  teacher 
requires  it. 

What  ground  have  we  for  selecting  these  charac- 
teristics of  the  external  moral  authority?  This,  that 
they  are  the  characteristics  of  the  internal  moral 
authority.  It  is  only  when  Moral  Law  thus  clothes 


v.]  Exercise  of  Moral  Authority.  233 

itself  that  it  wears  the  purple,  and  commands  the 
reverence  of  a  rational  being  as  over  all  supreme. 

As  the  boy  grows  in  years,  you  relax  the  pressure 
of  authority  as  an  external  agency.  You  take  him 
into  moral  partnership,  so  to  speak. 


LECTURE  VI. 

THE  MORAL  SANCTIONS  OF  AUTHORITY. 

THESE  may  be  summed  as  the  Approbation  and  Dis- 
approbation of  the  educator.  They  are  moral  in  their 
character  and  effect,  because  they  appeal  to  native 
emotions  of  a  moral,  and  not  of  a  material  and  conse- 
quential kind. 

There  is  so  much  to  be  said  here  on  Disapprobation 
that  I  prefer  to  say  nothing  save  to  repeat  the  words 
of  Herbart,  that  we  must  never  so  censure  as  to  cause 
a  boy  to  lose  all  self-respect.  It  is  clear  that  blame 
is  not  felt  at  all  unless  there  is  self-respect  to  lose. 
The  great  task  of  the  Church  with  the  hopelessly  fallen 
may  be  said  to  be  to  restore  their  self-respect.  Appro- 
bation, again,  is  to  be  frank  and  generous,  but  with  a 
certain  reserve.  You  should  not  approve  as  if  you 
were  agreeably  surprised  that  the  boy  should  do  right. 
234 


LECTURE  VII. 

THE  MATERIAL  SANCTIONS  OF  AUTHORITY,  OR  THE 
ENFORCEMENT  OF  AUTHORITY. 

THESE  sanctions  are  Rewards  which  emphasise  Ap- 
probation, and  Punishments  which  emphasise  Disap- 
probation. The  moment  we  carry  material  rewards 
and  punishments  farther  than  is  necessary  to  empha- 
sise the  moral  sanctions,  we  pass  into  the  sphere  of 
the  non-moral  —  the  purely  coercive.  School  disci- 
pline, in  its  vulgar  sense,  always  appeals  to  material 
or  bodily  considerations  alone,  and  as  deterrent  is 
non-moral,  if  not  also  demoralising. 

As  to  Rewards.  —  These  are  almost  wholly  unneces- 
sary. 

Punishments.  —  These  may  be  classified  thus :  — 

(1)  Positive  punishments:  (a)   bodily  castigation, 
(6)  impositions,  (c)  confinement,  (d)  expulsion. 

(2)  Negative  or  privative  punishments. 

A  question  to  be  considered  here  is  the  gradation  of 
punishments.  Never  punish  if  you  can  attain  your 
end  without  it.  When  you  do  punish,  let  the  punish- 
ment be  the  minimum  which  will  attain  your  end. 
The  precise  psychological  effect  of  material  punish- 
ments, such  as  flogging,  confinement,  etc.,  is  an  inter- 
esting question  for  the  Analyst. 

235 


LECTURE   VIII. 

NATURAL  AUXILIARIES  OF  AUTHORITY. 

THE  skilled  teacher  gets  these  on  his  side.  Woe  to 
the  Headmaster  who  finds  them  against  him. 

They  are  so  potent  that  the  teacher  is  generally  to 
blame  when  he  has  to  resort  to  physical  castigation. 
The  natural  auxiliaries  may  be  summed  under  the 
following  heads  —  (1)  Sympathy  of  members  of  the 
school  with  each  other ;  (2)  Esprit  de  coiys;  (3)  Emu- 
lation. But  the  chief  auxiliary,  without  which  all  the 
ethical  work  of  the  teacher  would  be  wholly  vain,  is 
this,  that  reason  is  always  in  search  of  law,  and  rejoices 
in  it.  Attention  to  the  ordinary  fixed  rules  of  the 
family  and  the  school,  though  trivial  in  themselves, 
yet  promote  the  general  habit  of  recognising  Law. 


The  result  of  instruction  in  ends  or  ideas,  and  of 
discipline  of  Will,  is,  that  at  the  end  of  the  secondary 
school-period  the  youth  is  (speaking  generally)  a  Will 
which  has  been  fashioned  by  those  set  over  him,  and 
with  tendencies  in  a  definite  and  traditional  direction. 
He  cannot,  however,  be  as  yet  said  to  act  under  a 
system  of  self -constituted  ideals,  i.e.  a  conscience  of 
his  own  making.  But  he  has  been  so  wisely  trained 
236 


LECT.  vm.]     Natural  Auxiliaries  of  Authority.     237 

that  he  has  acquiesced  willingly  in  ethical  ideas,  in 
the  reasonableness  of  law  and  the  obligation  of  duty, 
and  has  acquired  certain  moral  and  religious  convic- 
tions. Inasmuch  as  there  has  been  intelligent  acquies- 
cence, his  conscience  cannot  be  said  to  be  imposed  from 
without,  but  to  be  free.  The  effort,  now  weak,  now 
strong,  after  conduct  in  harmony  with  his  acquired 
ideal,  continues  for  life. 

In  the  case  of  the  thinking  few,  however,  all  moral 
convictions  and  ends  are,  during  the  period  of  adoles- 
cence, subjected  to  a  new  and  self-initiated  analysis. 
This  stage  of  mental  growth  corresponds  to  the  uni- 
versity period  of  a  man's  education.  Beginning  with 
doubts  and  negation,  it  is  resolved,  ere  long,  into  a 
self-convinced  and  self-directed  affirmation  of  ethical 
truth,  which,  though  it  may  not  wholly  harmonise 
with  the  tradition  in  which  the  youth  has  been  edu- 
cated, will  not  very  far  depart  from  it.  The  best  work 
a  university  can  do  is  to  afford  guidance  to  this  philo- 
sophic movement  of  mind. 

It  may  be  said  that  those  youths,  who  do  not  think, 
often  go  astray  at  this  period  of  their  lives,  however 
well  educated  they  may  have  been.  But  this  straying 
from  the  right  path  is  merely  a  lapse  in  conduct  owing 
to  the  powerful  impulses  of  nature  which  emerge  into 
a  feverish  activity  during  adolescence,  and  not  to  any 
weakening  of  personal  conviction  as  to  law  and  duty. 
Allowing  for  certain  exceptions,  their  recovery  and 
restoration  may  be  safely  calculated  on.  There  is 
much  truth  in  the  old  Calvinistic  doctrine  of  the 
"perseverance  of  the  saints." 


238  Institutes  of  Education.         [LECT.  vm. 

In  conclusion,  let  me  say  that  the  sum  of  the  matter 
is  this:  As  the  aim  of  intellectual  instruction  and 
discipline  is  to  form  a  free  rational  self -activity  which 
seeks  Knowledge  as  Truth;  so,  the  aim  of  ethical 
instruction  and  discipline  is  to  form  a  free  rational 
self-directing  activity  which  seeks  the  Good  as  Law. 
These  two  together  (and  they  cannot  be  separated) 
constitute  the  aim  of  Education;  and  if  they  are 
accompanied  and  sustained  by  a  comprehension  of  the 
spiritual  significance  of  the  Truth  and  the  Law,  the 
Ethical  End  is  achieved. 


PART  VII. 

SCHOOL-MANA  GEMENT. 


SCHOOL-MANAGEMENT. 

Questions  for  Consideration  and  Discussion. 

WE  have  throughout  assumed,  in  the  preceding 
Course,  that  we  have  been  speaking  of  the  education 
of  the  human  mind  in  general.  But  the  advantages 
and  disadvantages  of  congregating  boys  and  girls 
for  purposes  of  instruction  and  education  demand 
special  consideration.  The  questions  to  be  considered 
are  — 

1.  To    what    extent    are    the    ends,    subjects,   and 
methods  of  education  modified  when  there  are  large 
numbers  to  deal  with? 

2.  What  is  the  maximum  number  which  should  be 
placed  under  one  Headmaster? 

3.  How    many    can    be    taught    together    in    one 
class? 

4.  How  is   the  difficulty  of  large  numbers  to  be 
overcome  when  the  pupils  are  of  different  ages  and 
various  stages  of  progress  ?     The  general  answer,  of 
course,  is  —  By  Organisation.     What  do  we  mean  by 
this?     We  mean  — 

(1.)  The  Organisation  of  the  Instruction.  The  In~ 
struction-scheme  is  presumed  to  have  fixed  regard  to 
the  educational  aim  of  the  School.  It  must  be  devised 

241 


242  Institutes  of  Education. 

with  a  view  to  the  work,  not  only  of  successive  years, 
but  of  successive  terms,  and  even  of  successive  weeks. 
Length  and  difficulty  of  daily  lessons  have  to  receive 
careful  attention ;  they  must  be  adapted  to  the  average 
pupil. 

The  curriculum  of  instruction  to  be  laid  down  for 
different  kinds  of  schools  has  to  be  discussed  with 
reference  to  the  general  scope  and  purpose  of  all 
education. 

It  may  appear  impossible  to  give  such  instruction 
in  all  the  subjects  enumerated  under  the  head  of  Mate- 
rials (p.  35)  as  to  give  an  exact  basis  for  further 
progress  and,  above  all,  intellectual  interest  in  making 
further  progress.  But  it  is  quite  possible  to  do  so,  if 
we  begin  betimes  and  build  up  gradually  from  the 
foundation,  falling  back  at  every  stage  on  previous 
stages  and  connecting  the  earlier  with  the  later.  We 
have  always  to  think  of  quality  rather  than  quantity. 
The  actual  amount  to  be  acquired  is,  in  truth,  not 
great. 

The  difficulty  which  meets  us  in  carrying  out  an 
ideal  Instruction-plan  is  the  Time-table. 

The  Instruction-plan  compels  us  to  consider  the 
respective  claims  of  the  Real-naturalistic  and  Real- 
humanistic  in  a  school  curriculum.  The  latter  is  the 
centre  round  which  all  education  must  revolve. 

This  does  not  to  any  extent  affect  the  position  taken 
up  in  dealing  with  the  materials  of  education  1  —  viz. 
that  the  Real-naturalistic  should  run  through  the 


1  In  the  Class  Lectures. 


School-Management.  243 

whole  curriculum  of  instruction  from  infancy  to  man- 
hood, being  especially  prominent  up  to  the  fifteenth 
year. 

Encyclopsedism  —  its  advantages  and  disadvantages. 
Education  is  an  extensive  as  well  as  intensive  process. 
Breadth  of  basis.  Specialisation  in  Schools :  is  this 
permissible?  or,  is  it  a  characteristic  of  the  Univer- 
sity alone? 

As  a  guide  in  the  arrangement  of  the  succession  of 
lessons  daily,  Bacon's  words  may  be  adapted  to  the 
school,  viz. :  "  Interchange  of  contraries  with  a  ten- 
dency to  the  more  benign  extreme."  Formal  and  Real 
subjects  should  be  interchanged  with  a  tendency 
towards  the  "  more  benign  "  Eeal. 

(2.)  The  Organisation  of  the  Pupils,  i.e.  the  fitting 
them  into  the  Instruction-scheme;  in  other  words, 
Classification.  In  connection  with  Organisation  of 
pupils,  Examinations,  written  and  oral,  Removes, 
Leaving  Certificates,  etc.  etc.,  have  to  be  discussed. 

In  this  connection,  too,  Class  Manipulation,  Place- 
taking,  Prizes,  Expedients  and  Devices  in  Teaching,  as 
distinguished  from  Methods,  demand  consideration. 

Thereafter,  School-Eooms,  School  Furniture,  Light 
and  Ventilation,  Apparatus  for  teaching,  Text-Books, 
Manual  Work  in  Schools. 

In  every  question  the  Ethical  End  must  always  be 
present  to  us,  as  governing  all  practical  questions  of 
detail. 


244  Institutes  of  Education. 

ORGANISATION  OF  A  STATE  SCHOOL  SYSTEM. 
Relation  of  the  State  to  the  School. 

The  different  grades  of  Schools  are  to  be  determined 
by  the  periods  of  Mental  Development.  They  are  — 

From  3rd  till  6th  year,  KINDERGARTEN  SCHOOLS,  or  Infant 

Asylums. 

"      6th   "   8th     "     INFANT  SCHOOLS. 
"      8th   "   15th   "     PRIMARY  SCHOOLS  (Lower-Primary 
to  12th,  Upper-Primary  to  16th 
year1). 

From  15th  till  18th  year,  SECONDARY  OR  HIGH  SCHOOLS. 
Above  18th  year,  UNIVERSITIES. 

NOTE.  —  These  might  be  all  under  one  roof;  but  in  that  case 
the  line  of  demarcation  between  each  would  have  to  be  strongly 
drawn,  because  each  has  its  own  idea  by  which  its  work  must  be 
governed. 

TECHNICAL  SCHOOLS  are  schools  intended  to  prepare 
for  some  specific  industrial  function,  as  opposed  to 
schools  whose  end  is  purely  the  education  of  the  man. 
The  place  of  Technical  Schools  in  an  industrial  nation. 
To  what  extent  they  can  be  so  moulded  as  to  give 
education  as  well  as  instruction. 

GIRLS'  SCHOOLS.  — The  question,  "To  what  extent 
difference  of  sex  affects  the  education  of  Girls,"  has 
to  be  discussed.  Mixed  Schools.  Teaching  by  Women, 
etc. 

1  The  Upper-Primary  may  belong  to  the  Secondary  Schools,  and 
usually  does. 


School-Management.  245 


CONTINUATION  AND  EVENING  SCHOOLS. 


THE  TEACHER. 

Is  he  an  Educator  or  a  mere  retailer  of  so  much 
knowledge  for  so  much  money?  His  true  vocation, 
and  its  precise  social  significance  as  an  ethical  func- 
tion. Intellectual  and  moral  qualifications. 

Professional  training.  The  general  education  of  the 
Teacher  should,  like  that  of  other  Professions,  be  in 
the  line  of  the  higher  education  of  the  country,  but 
demands  more  breadth.  His  professional  training  is 
a  matter  to  be  determined  in  its  details  by  time,  place, 
and  circumstance.  (Training  Colleges  and  Normal 
Schools.  The  Universities  as  Schools  of  Education.) 

The  Headmaster's  relation  to  his  Assistants,  Powers 
and  position  of  Assistants,  etc.  etc.  Relation  of  Head- 
masters to  Governing  Bodies. 


HISTORY  OF  EDUCATION. 

THE  History  of  education  in  various  countries  is 
part  of  the  philosophy  of  History ;  for,  to  understand 
the  education  of  a  country,  we  must  first  understand 
its  characteristics,  its  social  system,  and  its  ideal  of 
human  life.  We  thereby  ascertain  the  standard  of 
attainment  which  it  places  before  itself,  and  are  only 
then  prepared  intelligently  to  contemplate  its  educa- 
tional machinery  and  methods.  The  History  of  edu- 
cation, adequately  treated,  thus  contains  much  of  those 
materials  of  culture  which  belong  to  the  philosophic 
study  of  history.  A  day  spent  in  an  Athenian  school 
would  give  us  more  archaeological  light  than  all  the 
tombs. 

As  regards  education,  in  its  narrower  sense  as  the 
education  of  the  school,  the  History  of  education  is 
rather  to  be  called  Comparative  Education,  and  is  very 
instructive.  To  go  over  the  whole  of  so  rich  a  field 
in  one  university  course  is  impossible.  Those  por- 
tions are  to  be  specially  selected  which  best  exhibit 
the  progress  of  educational  ideas,  and  national  ideals, 
and  also  those  which  extend  our  practical  acquaintance 
with  methods  of  instruction  and  school-keeping,  e.g. 
Chinese  Education,  Hellenic  Education,  Roman  Edu- 
246 


History  of  Education.  247 

cation,  Church  Education,  and  among  Writers,  Quin- 
tilian,  Ascham,  Comenius,  Milton,  Locke,  Rousseau, 
Pestalozzi. 

The  Contents  of  a  Course. 

I.  EDUCATION  IN  CHINA:  —  The  home  of  the 
Chinese  and  its  physical  characteristics. 
The  characteristics  of  their  social  system. 
Their  inner  life  as  that  may  be  ascertained 
from  their  philosophy,  sacred  books,  and 
other  literature.  Their  educational  aims 
and  machinery.  Their  methods.  The  re- 
sults of  their  system,  morally  and  intellec- 
tually. Criticism  of  the  Chinese  educational 
ideas  and  methods.,  and  lessons  to  be  drawn 
for  ourselves. 

II.  Following  the  same  method  we  proceed  to 
consider  briefly  the  EDUCATION  OF  THE 
ANCIENT  EGYPTIANS. 

III.  THE  EDUCATION  OF  THE  HINDUS. 

IV.  THE  EDUCATION  OF  THE  ANCIENT  PERSIANS 

—  its  general  aim  and  methods  in  connec- 
tion with  their  life  and  character  in  so  far 
as  we  have  records. 

V.  History  of  Education  among  the  Semitic  Races 
of  the  Mesopotamia  Basin. 


248  Institutes  of  Education. 

VI.  EDUCATION  AMONG  THE  HELLENIC  RACES  :  — 
This  is  to  be  treated  in  full  detail.  The 
educational  views  of  Plato,  Xenophon,  Aris- 
totle, and  Plutarch  in  this  connection. 

VII.  EDUCATION  AMONG  THE  ROMANS.     Hellenic 
influence ;  Cato ;  Cicero  de  Oratore. 

VIII.  Detailed  analysis  and  exposition  of  the  Insti- 
tutions of  Quintilian. 

IX.  Survey  of  the  History  of  Education  from 
Quintilian  to  the  time  of  the  Keformation. 
Monastery  and  Cathedral  Schools.  Rise  of 
Universities. 

X.  The  Renaissance  and  Humanism,  as  repre- 
sented by  the  literary  and  theological  re- 
vival. Erasmus  and  Colet,  Luther  and 
Melanchthon.  Rabelais  and  Montaigne. 
Roger  Ascham,  and  John  Sturm  of  Stras- 
burg.  Mulcaster. 

[Jesuit  Education.] 

XI.  Bacon  and  the  Inductive  study  of  Nature :  — 
The  rise  of  Realism  and  Utilitarianism  in 
Education  as  opposed  to  Humanism  and 
Culture.  In  connection  with  this,  the  advo- 
cacy of  "  natural "  methods. 

XII.  Analysis  and  exposition  of  the  Baconians, 
Ratichius  and  Comenius. 


History  of  Education.  249 

XIII.  Milton's  Educational  views. 

XIV.  Exposition  of  John  Locke's    "Thoughts  on 

Education,"  and  the  relevant  parts  of  the 
"Essay  on  the  Conduct  of  the  Under- 
standing." 

XV.  Rousseau,  Basedow,  and  Campe. 
XVI.  Exposition  of  Pestalozzi  and  his  school. 
XVII.  Jacotot. 

XVIII.  Dr.  Andrew  Bell  and  Joseph  Lancaster. 
XIX.  Jean  Paul  Kichter. 

XX.  More  recent  opinion,  as  represented  by  Frobel, 
Diesterweg,  Dr.  Arnold,  Herbert  Spencer, 
and  Professor  Bain  (contemporary  Realism, 
so  called). 


APPENDIX 

ON 

CERTAIN   PHILOSOPHICAL   QUESTIONS   SUG- 
GESTED BY  THE  PRECEDING  PAGES. 

A.  —  PSYCHOLOGICAL  BASIS. 

B.  —  DUALISM,  MATERIALISM  (CEREBRATION,  ETC.). 

C.  —  BRIEF  SYNTHETIC  STATEMENT. 

D.  —  UNITY  OF  REASON. 


May  be  omitted  by  the  Student  of  Education. 

251 


A.  —  PSYCHOLOGICAL   BASIS. 

WHEN  I  say  in  the  text  that  the  human  mind  is  a  one 
self-conscious  entity,  I  am  far  from  meaning  that  it  is  a 
mere  x  of  departure  for  a  series  of  phenomena.  I  mean  that 
in  man,  as  in  all  else,  Being-universal  individuates  itself. 
This  is  effected  in  man,  not  only  as  a  specific  form  of  or- 
ganic Life,  but,  further,  of  a  living  consciousness  (or  potency 
of  consciousness)  of  existences  which  are  not  itself;  and 
this  consciousness,  as  a  self-consciousness,  contains  in  it  cer- 
tain activities  and  ends  for  its  own  fulfilment  as  a  being  or 
entity. 

This  individuated  being  or  conscious  entity  is,  I  say, 
"  one : "  it  is  not  made  up  of  parts  any  more  than  "  life " 
in  the  plant  or  animal  is  made  up  of  parts. 

Though  the  peculiar  sensibility  and  activity  which  we 
call  consciousness  is  specially  allied  with  a  specific  part  of 
body  as  its  instrument,  viz.  the  brain,  it  itself  is  not  to  be 
confounded  with  the  physical  conditions  of  its  manifesta- 
tion, any  more  than  life  in  a  plant  is  to  be  confounded  with 
certain  molecular  movements  in  the  matter  of  the  plant. 

Mind  and  matter  act  and  react  on  each  other :  they  are 
mutually  involved.  But  matter  is  not  mind,  and  mind  is 
not  matter.  I  stand  by  this  dualism.  To  attempt  to  local- 
ise mind  is  to  materialise  it.  It  is  a  diffused  and  interfused 
"  somewhat,"  whose  characteristics  we  may  feel  and  know ; 
it  is,  as  the  schoolmen  said,  "all  in  the  whole  and  all  in 
every  part." 

Through  se(/"-consciousness  I  become  more  intimately 
aware  of  the  mind-entity  than  I  can  ever  be  of  matter. 

253 


254     Appendix  on  Philosophical  Questions. 

Matter  presents  itself  to  consciousness  as  ultimately  reduci- 
ble into  Space  plus  Motion.  The  ultimate  affirmation  of  the 
monistic  materialist  is  that  Space  plus  motion  in  certain 
complexities  of  relation  is  mind.  This  is  manifestly  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms,  unless  we  first  insinuate  into  matter 
what,  by  our  own  showing,  is  not  in  its  concept  or  notion. 
[What  has  been  called  Mind-stuff  is  matter,  so  far  as  I  can 
see.] 

Men  become  too  much  enamoured  of  inquiries  into  what 
they  can  see  and  weigh  and  measure.  There  is  a  kind  of 
stability  and  certitude  about  such  investigations.  True, 
they  find  in  many  of  the  objects  which  yield  their  secrets 
(so  far)  to  physical  inquiries,  an  alien  and  disturbing  factor. 
Life,  feeling,  consciousness,  rational  activity,  purpose,  voli- 
tion, are  all  admittedly  there  before  them,  as  certainly  as 
the  sun  and  moon  (to  say  the  least).  Can  these  facts  of 
consciousness,  as  sensory  and  active,  not  be  reduced  to  sim- 
ple matter-terms  ?  If  it  were  possible  (which  it  is  not  until 
we  alter  our  concept  of  matter),  we  should  still  feel  and 
think  and  will,  but  we,  i.e.  that  which  feels  and  thinks  and 
wills,  and  the  feelings  and  thinkings  and  willings,  would  all 
alike  be  matter  and  its  motions ;  and,  thus,  the  morbid 
desire  for  a  monistic  view  of  experience  would  be  gratified. 
If  such  phenomena  were  only  matter  and  its  motions,  it  is 
manifest  that  they  would  then  be  subject  to  the  laws,  and 
characterised  by  the  behaviour,  of  matter.  These  laws  are 
(speaking  generally)  dynamical :  stone  and  iron  are  knocked 
about  by  them,  so  to  speak,  without  knowing  why  or 
whither;  and  "minds"  would  be  in  the  same  predicament, 
with  this  difference,  that,  to  begin  with,  they,  at  first,  think 
that  they  are  not  knocked  about ;  but  after  being  "  scientifi- 
cally" instructed,  they  know  that  they  are  verily  knocked 
about.  Matter,  it  would  appear,  has  taken,  at  a  certain 
stage  of  evolution,  the  disease  of  questioning  itself  and 
affirming  that  it  is  not  matter,  and  even  inventing  the  word 
"  mind."  It  thinks  it  thinks ;  it  suffers  in  its  most  perfect 
evolution  from  illusions  as  to  its  own  being  :  it  even  fancies 


Psychological  Basis.  255 

it  is  an  Ego  that  wills.  I  hope  I  do  not  state  the  case  too 
crudely. 

It  is  admitted  that  the  "  mind  "  phenomena,  even  as  simple 
states  of  consciousness,  are  different  from  the  other  known 
phenomena  called  matter.  But  this  seems  to  present  no 
difficulty  to  the  "  scientific  "  mind  (I  should  say,  complex  of 
matter).  Quantity  plus  quality  plus  motion,  feel  and  think 
themselves .'  The  atom,  as  the  ultimate  of  the  physical,  feels 
and  thinks,  or,  at  least,  it  can,  after  a  certain  evolution,  feel 
and  think;  and,  consequently,  feeling  and  thinking  must 
always  be  implicitly  in  the  atom  itself.  But  it  is  always 
only  matter :  that  is  to  say,  it  is  always  quantity  plus  motion, 
or,  let  us  say,  energy.  We  should  then  (accepting  this  view) 
have  to  say  that  man's  mind  is  a  combination  of  matter  and 
motion,  such  that  it  feels  and  thinks  all  less  complex  com- 
binations, and  also  itself.  Such  a  combination  must,  of 
course,  have  locality  (for  it  must  have  all  the  conditions  of 
matter),  arid  thus  we  should  have  mind  defined  as  a  separate 
or  individualised  one  material  organic  complex,  with  a  certain 
relation  of  feeling  and  knowing  to  other  atomic  and  organic 
combinations,  which  are  like  itself  in  all  respects  save  in  the 
manner  of  their  combination.  Can  it  be  said  that  our 
presupposition,  that  mind  is  a  "  one  feeling  entity "  (not- 
matter),  demands  more  from  the  "scientific"  mind  than 
such  a  conclusion  does  ? 

Accordingly,  I  feel  that  I  have  a  good  title  to  say  that 
there  is,  within  certain  organic  beings,  a  one,  self-identical 
potency  of  consciousness  with  inner  determinations,  and  a 
specific  activity —  an  entity  not  matter  nor  caused  by  matter. 
Note,  I  say  there  is.  It  is  or  be's;  consequently,  it  is  a 
being,  i.e.,  entity.  When  I  say  "  you  are  a  conscious  entity," 
I  merely  say  "  you  are  a  conscious  being  : "  do  you  doubt  it  V 
Why  so  coy?  When  I  say  you  are  "one,"  do  you  really 
think  you  are  two  or  twenty  ?  Any  difficulty  in  the  appre- 
hension of  a  one  conscious  entity  arises  from  the  illegitimate 
extension  of  the  concept  of  matter  into  being  and  mind, 
even  to  the  extent  of  asking,  WHERE  is  mind  localised  ? 


256     Appendix  on  Philosophical  Questions. 

All  such  questions  can  be  met  by  another,  Where  is  the 
"  life  "  of  a  plant  localised  —  the  principium  vita;,  as  it  used 
to  be  called?  Did  you  ever  see  it?  There  is,  assuredly, 
such  a  phenomenal  difference  between  a  stone  and  a  tree, 
that  you  find  yourself  in  presence  of  a  new  fact  —  life. 
You  can  trace  the  material  conditions  of  life ;  but  what 
about  life  itself  ?  So  also  a  new  fact  is  presented  to  you  in 
the  phenomenon,  a  conscious  subject,  which  fact  we  call 
mind.  Where  is  this  metaphysical  fiction  (as  some  would 
call  it)  ?  Precisely  where  the  life-fiction  is.  Again,  the 
most  intimate  of  all  consciousnesses  is  Being.  Can  you 
make  an  image  of  it?  And  yet,  Does  Being  not  be?  If 
not,  then  what  be's?  The  prime  condition  of  philosophical 
capacity  is,  it  seems  to  me,  annihilation  of  the  material 
imagination,  except  for  illustrative  purposes. 

Further,  the  conscious  one  entity  we  call  the  human 
mind  is  not  only  a  self-identity,  but  a  permanent  self-identity 
or  self-sameness  —  two  questions  constantly  confounded. 
Were  there  only  a  single  flash  of  consciousness,  and  then 
darkness  and  the  inane,  the  moment  of  that  flash  would 
be  a  moment  of  self-identity.  This  self-sameness  remains 
through  all  the  experiences  of  a  mind.  I  do  not  understand 
that  this  consciousness  of  the  permanent  sameness  of  the 
Subject  (whatever  the  subject  may  be  or  not  be)  is  ques- 
tioned in  these  days.  Fresh  attempts  are,  doubtless,  made 
to  explain  it  —  attempts  which,  I  believe,  will  be  for  ever 
hopeless.  The  mind  of  a  man  is  "  for-itself,"  not  by  any 
sudden  freak  or  saltus  of  nature,  but  just  as  every  atom  and 
every  organic  thing  is  "for-itself."  Its  peculiarity  is  that 
it  is  mind,  that  is  to  say,  a  potency  of  receiving  and  reflecting 
the  rest  of  the  world,  first  as  a  feeling-syn thesis  or  collocation 
(synopsis),  and,  thereafter,  as  a  rational  or  self-regulated 
synthesis, — containing  certain  determinations  within  itself 
which  constitute  it  as  a  complex  one. 

The  most  recent  attempt  to  explain  the  permanent  iden- 
tity of  the  conscious  entity  is  that  of  Professor  James. 
Unfortunately  his  argument  is  involved  in  some  confusion, 


Psychological  Basis.  257 

because  of  his  confining  himself  to  se(/"-consciousness,  so  that 
the  term  used  by  him  for  manifestation  of  mind  is  "thought." 
This  complicates  things.  Hume,  in  using  "  ideas,"  used  a 
better,  because  more  generic,  word.  Professor  James  regards 
the  life  of  consciousness  under  the  metaphor  of  a  "stream." 
The  mind  is  composed  of  a,  6,  c,  d,  etc.,  in  succession,  or 
collected.  If  this  were  all  there  could  be  no  identity,  much 
less  permanent  identity,  as  Professor  James  sees  clearly 
enough.  But  he  says :  when  there  is  a  consciousness  of 
the  presentation  a,  there  is  with  it  a  consciousness  of  the 
Ego  (which  I  would  prefer  to  call  in  this  connection  the 
"conscious  subject").  Consequently,  he  does  not  redargue 
Hume,  but  simply  affirms  self-identity  in  this  form.  No 
one,  I  imagine,  will  care  to  question  Professor  James's  way 
of  putting  the  bare  fact  of  self-identity  in  each  successive 
consciousness.  But  this  conscious  subject  has  next  to  be 
carried  on  from  one  consciousness  to  another,  as  always  a 
permanent  same  subject  in  the  midst  of  incessant  change, 
and  it  is  here  that  Professor  James  contributes  a  view  of 
his  own. 

The  successive  consciousnesses  b,  c,  d,  etc.,  also  contain  ego 
or  conscious  subject  just  as  a  did,  and  we  are  aware  of  ego 
in  b,  c,  d  as  the  same  subject  which  appeared  in  a,  because 
a  passes  on  itself  with  its  implicit  conscious  subject  to  b,  and 
c,  and  d,  which,  one  after  the  other,  inherit  a  as  well  as  its 
other  predecessors ;  and  so  make  up  a  stream  which  is  a 
continuous  stream.  There  are  two  things  to  be  considered 
here :  there  is  a,  the  "  state  "  of  consciousness,  and  there  is 
the  "  conscious  subject."  Let  us  separate  them.  The  state 
b  inherits  and  appropriates  the  state  a,  and  consequently  has 
memory  of  it.  How  is  this  possible?  As  a  graphic  way  of 
talking,  there  can  be  no  objection  to  this  inheritance  and 
appropriation ;  but  it  affords  no  explanation.  The  state  6, 
as  such,  can  have  no  possible  connection  with  the  state 
a  other  than  that  of  atomistic  succession.  I  cannot  pass 
on  a  to  b  in  such  a  way  as  to  constitute  ab  by  simply  draw- 
ing up  a  will  in  b's  favour.  There  is  no  bridging  of  the 


258      Appendix  on  Philosophical  Questions. 

bottomless  gulf,  the  infinite  inane,  between  a  and  b  which 
would  make  the  memory  of  a  possible.  The  "common 
sense"  position  that  the  same  one  subject  receives,  holds, 
and  synthesises  the  experiences  a,  6,  c,  d,  etc.,  is  certainly 
an  explanation ;  James's  inheritance  and  appropriation  of 
a  by  b,  etc.,  is  simply  a  figurative  way  of  talking. 

This  is  not  all,  however;  for  in  b  there  is  "conscious 
subject "  just  as  there  was  in  a,  according  to  James.  How, 
now,  do  I  feel  it  to  be  the  same  conscious  subject  as  was  in 
a  f  Thus :  a  has  executed  a  will,  so  to  speak,  in  favour  of 
b,  and  made  b  sole  legatee  of  all  his  worldly  goods,  including, 
consequently,  the  "  conscious  subject "  in  a  which  conscious 
subject  possesses  these  goods.  Where,  I  would  ask,  does  the 
consciousness  of  continuity  come  in  —  the  continuity  of  sub- 
ject in  a  with  subject  in  b,  c,  d,  etc.  ?  It  is  not  in  a,  and  it 
is  not  in  b  as  such,  as  I  have  shown :  does  it  lie  between  a 
and  b  then  ?  It  passes  on,  says  James,  from  a  to  b.  Is  this 
not  simply  another  way  of  saying  that  what  was  in  a  con- 
tinues in  b  —  the  common  doctrine  ?  Why,  then,  all  this 
pother  ?  Must  we  be  "  scientific  "  at  all  hazards  ?  If  there 
is  any  true  interval  between  a  and  b,  it  certainly  is  a  chasm 
deep  enough  to  engulf  all  knowledge,  and  the  doubt  would 
for  ever  remain,  whether  the  process  whereby  the  dying  a 
bequeathed  his  possessions  to  b  (including  in  these  posses- 
sions the  ego  which  possessed  a  /)  would  hold  good  in  the 
courts,  and  be  held  to  be  an  effective  transference.  The 
ego  in  b  might,  after  all,  be  an  illegitimate  descendant  of 
the  ego  in  a.  The  father  of  the  bastard  might  be  —  who  or 
what  ?  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  ego  or  subject  in  a  hands 
itself  on  without  break;  what  is  this  but  the  perduring  con- 
tinuity of  ego  or  subject,  as  "  common  sense "  holds  it  ? 
This  "stream"  of  consciousness  should  rather  be  called  a 
corduroy  road. 

James  either  grants  the  continuum,  and  his  argument  is 
mere  ingenious  metaphor ;  superfluous  as  it  is  unsound  even 
as  a  metaphor,  for  it  may  mislead  the  unwary.  It  seems  to 
induce  him  even  to  dispense  with  a  "  thinker  "  in  the  inter- 


Psychological  Basis.  259 

ests  of  "thought,"  just  as  America  might  be  said  to  have 
been  discovered  without  a  discoverer.  Under  the  influence 
of  this  point  of  view,  he  seems  to  regard  the  "  state  "  a  as 
playing  the  chief  role,  and  as  handing  on  the  subject  or  ego 
as  in  it.  Why  should  it  not  be  the  other  way  round  if  there 
is  to  be  handing  on  at  all  ?  Why  should  not  the  subject  or 
ego  in  a  hand  on  iteelf  with  a  on  its  shoulders.  Or  is  it  a 
that  generates  the  ego  ?  I  presume  Professor  James  prefers 
a  as  the  chief  actor  in  the  drama,  because  he  wishes  to 
escape  from  that  fearful  thing  a  metaphysical  entity.  Is  he 
not  here  making  friends  with  the  mammon  of  unrighteous- 
ness—  the  physical  investigator  who  cannot  apprehend  an 
entity  which  has  not  a  shape  at  least  as  solid  as  a  vortex 
ring?  Certainly  a  metaphysical  entity  is  a  ghost.  But  why 
this  superstitious  dread  of  ghosts  in  so  illuminated  an  age  — 
the  age  of  spooks?  And  does  he  not  see  that  all  that  meta- 
physicians mean  by  entity  is  conceded  whe'n  he  admits 
"  I  "  ?  Hume  knew  better  what  he  was  about  than  to  admit 
so  much. 

I  shall  conclude  by  quoting,  from  the  sober  philosopher  of 
Common  Sense,  a  sentence  which  expresses  a  "scientific" 
phenomenal  truth  of  more  certitude  than  the  existence  of 
the  sun  as  an  objective  reality :  "  I  am  not  thought,  I  am 
not  action,  I  am  not  feeling  ;  I  am  something  '  that  thinks 
and  acts  and  feels.'  The  self  or  I  is  permanent,  and  has 
the  same  relation  to  all  the  succeeding  thoughts,  acts,  and 
feelings  which  I  call  mine."  * 

In  fine,  there  is  an  interplay  between  the  physical  and 
metaphysical  in  man  and  his  brain.  Consciousness  affects 
and  effects  physical  conditions,  and  vice  versa.  But  if  con- 
sciousness be  not  the  physical,  nor  a  product  of  the  physical, 
then  mind  may  correctly  be  called  an  entity  and  identity  in 
whatever  way  it  may  be  implicated  in  the  physical,  whether 
by  pre-established  parallelism  (concomitance)  or  by  a  double 
action  and  reaction.  In  short,  my  Ego  is  not  my  body, 

1  Reid's  Intel!.  Powers,  iv. 


260     Appendix  on  Philosophical  Questions. 


though  Ego  and  body  are  mutually  conditioned  and  condi- 
tioning. 

Let  me  add : 

I  hold  it  for  true,  that  if  man  be  not  a  one  self-identical 
conscious  entity,  having  within  it  certain  capacities,  desires, 
emotions,  and  faculties  (which  it  is  the  business  of  psychol- 
ogy to  explain),  in  the  fulfilment  and  harmonious  regulation 
of  which  the  Ego  finds  the  purpose  of  its  existence,  there  is 
not  even  "  matter"  for  Ethics,  much  less  Ethics.  The  only 
alternative  seems  to  me  to  be  that  man  is  simply  a  cunningly 
devised  material  organism  of  a  peculiarly  sagacious  kind, 
living  for  the  conservation  of  itself  and  the  species  to  which 
it  belongs:  Appetite,  more  or  less  disguised,  sums  him  up; 
and  spiritual  ideas  and  ideals  are  only  painted  fictions  which 
colour,  while  they  conceal,  gross  material  aims. 


B.  —  DUALISM,   THE  UNCONSCIOUS,   AND 
CEREBRATION. 

GRANT  the  dualism  of  Mind  and  Matter,  with  their 
mutual  implications,  it  follows,  from  what  we  know  of  the 
former  by  personal  experience,  that  we  must  posit  mind  as 
the  prius,  and  matter  as  its  vehicle  or  expression. 

The  two  being  in  combination,  must  act  and  react  on 
each  other :  if  a  molecular  change  is  produced  in  the  cere- 
brum, it  must  affect  mind ;  and  if  mind,  when  it  has  once 
emerged,  works  out  its  own  activities  by  means  of  nerve, 
these  mind-originated  activities,  again,  must  make  their 
record  in  the  cerebrum.  This  being  so.  we  should  not  be 
surprised  to  learn  that  a  change  might  be  made  in  the 
cerebrum  by  an  outer  or  inner  stimulus  which  did  not  then 
and  there  emerge  as  a  consciousness,  because  consciousness 
as  a  one  whole  was  too  busy  with  some  other  occupation  to 
admit  of  the  nerve-stimulus  fulfilling  itself  in  mind.  But  if 
the  scar  (so  to  call  it)  in  the  nerve- tissue  remains,  there  is 
no  reason  why  it  should  not  take  other  opportunities  of 
forcing  itself  to  the  front  when  the  original  stimulus  had 
spent  itself  and  was  withdrawn.  If  it  be,  as  we  opine,  then 
we  should  have  mere  dynamical  cerebration,  which  can  be 
arrested  at  the  threshold  of  consciousness  and  stand  there 
waiting  for  an  open  door.  This  would  be  "  unconscious 
cerebration,"  and  can  be  conceived  as  going  on  ceaselessly 
in  our  brains  as  a  merely  dynamical  process.  But  if  any 
one  asks  us  to  believe  in  "unconscious  consciousness"  we 
decline,  just  as  as  we  should  decline  believing  in  "  Yes-No." 

Accept,  however,  two  planes  of  mind  —  the  conscious 
(animal)  and  the  self-conscious  (man),  and  we  can  readily 

261 


262      Appendix  on  Philosophical  Questions. 

admit  that  much  may  be  in  a  man's  consciousness  of  which 
he  is  not  at  all  se//"-conscious  ;  that  is  to  say,  self-consciousness 
(which  also  has  its  degrees  like  everything  else)  is  at  so  low 
a  potency  (e.g.  in  reverie)  that  we  may  call  such  experiences 
unself-conscious  consciousness,  or  rather  sub-self-conscious- 
ness. In  fact,  is  not  the  greater  part  of  each  man's  mental 
life  of  this  sub-self-conscious  kind  ?  Is  it  desirable  that  we 
should  be  for  ever  sifting  out  and  binding  down  our  vague 
experiences  and  interrupting  the  beneficent  inflow  of  gracious 
nature?  Knowledge  may  be  too  much  with  us.  "  The  time 
of  life  is  short ; "  better  to  live  at  once,  then,  than  to  spend 
all  our  time  in  learning  what  life  may  be,  and  how  to  live. 

In  the  conscious  or  attuitional  stage  the  nerve-dynamical 
(cerebration)  and  the  mind-dynamical  would  seem  to  be  in 
counterpoise ;  in  the  self-conscious  stage  the  tables  are 
turned  by  the  emergence  of  Will ;  and  while  the  nerve- 
dynamical  and  the  mind-dynamical  still,  of  course,  remain 
inter-active,  they  are  now  overpowered  and  regulated  by  the 
Ego  as  self-conscious  subject,  which  Ego  has  itself  been 
effected  by  the  free  functioning  of  the  new  phenomenon  — 
Will  —  determining  all  to  ends  and  to  law. 

It  does  not  follow  from  this  that  mind  ever  operates,  even 
in  its  highest  self-conscious  activities,  independently  of  a 
physical  vehicle,  and,  therefore,  of  physical  conditions.  The 
world  seems  to  be  constructed  on  this  plan  —  Mind  using 
matter  and  at  the  same  time  being  restricted  by  matter. 
This  is  Dualism. 

When,  however,  we  accept  the  involvement  of  every  state 
of  consciousness  with  brain  (as  of  all  mind  with  all  matter 
in  the  universe),  we  are  not  therefore  committed  to  a  theory 
that  every  state  of  consciousness  even  in  an  animal,  is  pro- 
duced by  an  antecedent  molecular  movement  of  matter. 
That  such  molecular  movement  gives  rise  to  states  of  con- 
sciousness is  patent  enough  ;  but,  vice  versa,  we  may  hold 
that  states  of  consciousness  are  the  antecedent  causes  of 
certain  molecular  movements  of  brain.  When  a  fox  sees  or 


Dualism,  the  Unconscious,  and  Cerebration.     263 

smells  a  hound,  a  consciousness  of  a  certain  specific  kind  is 
set  up  in  him  by  means  of  certain  physical  processes,  and 
the  running  to  cover  for  concealment  is  also  effected  through 
certain  physical  processes ;  but  the  latter  were  set  in  operation 
by  the  consciousness  of  fear.  When  we  come  to  Man  giving 
external  effect  after  deliberation  to  a  formed  purpose  under 
the  domination  of  an  idea,  we  have  a  series  of  movements  or 
processes  each  one  of  which  may  be  admitted  to  involve 
physical  or  molecular  nerve-movement  or  disturbance ;  but 
the  successive  units  of  the  process,  viz.  consciousness,  and 
purpose,  and  will  are  not  caused  by  these  molecular  move- 
ments. It  is  not  denied  that  when  any  particular  conscious- 
ness arises,  it  involves  the  nerve-tissue ;  and  it  may  further 
be  admitted,  I  think,  that  the  molecular  movements  in  the 
cells  have  a  purely  material  relation  to  past  activities  in  other 
cells  and  revive  these  activities,  thus  forcing  a  fresh  con- 
sciousness on  us  to  which  we  assign  its  proper  place  in  the 
complex  which  constitutes  mental  life  and  action.  But,  I 
repeat,  it  does  not  at  all  follow  that  a  consciousness  as  stick 
does  not  also  antecede  a  molecular  movement  and  set  it 
up,  and  also  give  rise  by  association  or  otherwise  to  other 
consciousnesses  as  such. 

If  the  Dualistic  conception  is  incorrect,  monistic  material- 
ism holds  the  field,  then  Mind  is  nothing  real ;  it  is  at  best 
a  mere  glow  on  the  surface  of  the  material  organism  suffering 
a  series  of  necessary  mechanical  movements  :  these  mechani- 
cal movements  constitute  the  sole  reality.  This  position 
seems  to  me  to  be  so  unscientific  in  the  face  of  the  actual 
phenomena,  as  to  be  scarcely  worth  arguing  against.  If  it 
were  true,  every  conscious  thing  would  find  its  apotheosis 
in  being  a  stone  in  order  that  the  purely  mechanical,  being 
in  that  event  undisturbed  by  the  intrusion  of  consciousness, 
the  conscious  thing  might  be  safely  and  finally  put  to  sleep, 
and  rid  of  all  illusions. 

The  whole  question  lies  deeper  down,  and  the  mind  of 
man  is  only  a  single  "case."  Does  matter  (which  is  only 
space  plus  motion)  think  itself,  and  produce  the  illusion  of 


264     Appendix  on  Philosophical   Questions. 

its  antithesis,  mind  ?  In  the  cosmic  whole  is  Mind,  Thought, 
Reason,  first  or  second?  I  do  not  mean  first  or  second  in 
time  ;  for  we  have  present  to  us  matter  and  mind  in  a  syn- 
thesis from  the  first,  and  always.  But,  given  the  dualism  of 
the  synthesis,  is  Mind  logically  and  necessarily  the  prius  of 
Space  plus  motion,  or  is  it  the  other  way  about  ?  If  matter 
be  first  in  the  scheme  of  things,  then  not  only  is  it  first  in 
what  is  called  the  human  mind,  but  mind  itself  is  non-exist- 
ent, save  as  a  series  of  matter-negating  phenomena  following 
in  the  wake  of  the  fatalistic  series  of  matter-phenomena. 
From  beginning  to  end  all  things  and  minds  are  merely 
dynamical  and  automatic;  and  the  term  " mind "  demands 
a  new  definition. 

P.S.  —  "Impressions."  —  There  are  some  who  object  to 
the  use  of  the  words  "  impressions  "  and  "  reflexive  "  in  con- 
nection with  the  conscious  subject  as  such ;  but  these  words, 
like  all  words  used  to  denote  spiritual  facts,  are  figurative. 
We  are  told  also  that  a  reflexive  activity  in  response  to 
impressions  must  impart  to  these  impressions  or  recepts  the 
"  nature "  of  the  reacting  subject,  and  that  even  to  this 
extent  that  they  ai-e  constituted  by  the  reacting  subject. 
Which  amounts  ultimately  to  this,  that  certain  pin-pricks, 
coming  from  Heaven  alone  knows  where,  give  to  the  subject 
an  impulse  reflexively  to  create  the  object.  At  the  same 
time  it  would  not  be  denied  that  these  pin-pricks  give 
the  cue  to  the  subject,  and  so  tell  it  when  it  is  to  constitute 
a  cabbage  and  when  a  dog.  This  ultra-Kantism  is  to  be 
justified,  it  would  seem,  by  the  fact  that  all  our  knowledge 
of  the  external  of  sense  goes  on  "within  the  skull"!  It 
does  not  seem  to  occur  to  these  writers  that  the  conscious- 
ness of  hunger  and  thirst,  of  love  and  hate,  of  the  beautiful, 
and  of  the  right  and  the  wrong,  also  all  go  on  "within  the 
skull";  and  consequently  all  things  we  feel  and  desire  and 
think  and  know  must  be  constituted  by  the  nature  of  the 
reacting  subject.  The  argument,  with  many  at  least,  rests 
on  the  vast  number  of  physical  processes  that  go  on  in  the 


Dualism,  the  Unconscious,  and  Cerebration.     265 

brain  before  we  can  be  conscious  of  anything,  as  if  the 
external  "  somewhat "  could  not  tell  its  true  tale  to  the  sub- 
ject because  of  this  intervention  !  It  would  then  follow  that 
the  reader  of  this  sentence  could  not  by  possibility  receive 
what  it  truly  contained  as  it  left  me.  Before  it  reaches  the 
page  there  is  an  infinite  series  of  physical  processes ;  it  has 
then  to  be  printed  and  be  locked  in  the  arms  of  a  further 
series  of  physical  laws  and  processes  before  the  reader  begins 
to  be  the  theatre  of  another  infinite  series  which  result  in  — 
What?  —  constituting  a  meaning  for  himself  which  is  not 
my  meaning. 

Perhaps  it  is  unnecessary  to  continue  the  consideration  of 
this  subject ;  but  I  would  put  this  question  to  these  writers, 
Does  it  not  occur  to  you  that  these  physical  and  physiological 
processes  (brain  and  all)  must  themselves,  when  you  come 
to  be  aware  of  them,  also  be,  on  your  own  showing,  consti- 
tuted by  the  reacting  subject?  If  so,  is  it  not  just  possible 
that  the  resultant  consciousness  is  a  true  reflex  of  the  pin- 
pricks (for  you  begin  with  a  pin-pricking  outer),  inasmuch 
as  the  subject  constitutes  for  itself  all  the  processes  as  well  as 
their  resultant,  and  so  probably  knows  what  it  is  about? 
The  universe  after  all  may  be  found  not  to  be  an  infinite 
chaos  of  potential  pin-pricks,  or,  to  put  it  otherwise,  a  con- 
fused jelly  poured  into  tin  moulds  called  minds. 


C.— BRIEF  SYNTHETIC   STATEMENT. 

MIND-UNIVERSAL  externalises  itself  as  matter  —  the  (to 
us)  phenomena  of  recipience  generally.  This,  however,  would, 
if  it  went  no  farther,  be  an  inadequate  expression  of  Mind- 
universal.  For  Mind  would  have  still  to  externalise  itself 
as  life  and  finally  as  finite  minds;  always,  however,  under 
conditions  of  externalisation,  and,  therefore,  necessarily  ma- 
terialised, i.e.  in  Space,  Motion,  and  Time,  which  are  the 
fundamental  forms  of  all  externalisation  —  which,  in  short, 
is  what  externalisation  means. 

All  is  by  infinitely  small  degrees ;  and,  accordingly,  to  fix 
definitely  the  point  at  which  any  manifestation  of  the  Uni- 
versal differentiates  itself  into  another  is  for  ever  impossible; 
and  this  by  the  very  nature  of  sense  and  of  the  act  of  finite 
reason,  as  I  have  shown  elsewhere.  None  the  less  is  each 
thing  (or  movement,  if  you  please  so  to  call  it)  different 
from  another  —  that  which  precedes  from  that  which  follows. 
It  is  only  at  a  certain  stage,  that  is  to  say,  after  a  certain 
accumulation  of  subtle  and  silent  differences,  that  finite 
mind,  under  conditions  of  space  and  time,  can  become  aware 
of  distinct  and  differentiated  presentations.  These  are  then 
and  there  received  as  complex  totals  in  their  complex  totality, 
as  "things."  An  egg  is  an  egg  and  a  chicken  is  a  chicken, 
but  at  every  stage  of  the  process  from  egg  to  chicken  there 
is  a  "thing"  self-identical  —  a  total  complex  in  the  universe 
of  things. 

It  will  be  said  that  if  all  is  mind-universal  externalising 

itself,  the  very  primordial  atom  contains  mind,  —  fa  mind. 

And  it  is  so.     It  is  monad,  not  atom.     By  which  I  do  not 

mean  that  mind  is  attached  to  atom,  but  that  the  being  and 

266 


Brief  Synthetic  Statement.  267 

the  determination  of  the  material  externalisation  is  mind 
dwelling  in  and  with  the  atom,  as  it  dwells  in  and  with  the 
universe.  The  dynamical,  however,  at  this  stage  of  the 
cosmic  synthesis,  and  for  long,  seems  to  play  the  leading 
role  (how  we  know  not)  until  we  reach  the  thing  called 
conscious  entity,  where  there  is  an  equal  reciprocation ;  and 
this  reciprocity  becomes,  at  the  moment  of  the  emergence 
of  Will  and  self-consciousness,  supremacy  over  the  matter- 
form. 

Difficult  as  it  is  to  affirm  the  point  of  differentiation,  we 
may  yet  venture  to  say  that  the  moment  at  which  a  mate- 
rialised thing  feels  is  also  the  moment  of  primordial  mind  as 
a  specific  mind  entity. 

From  mere  vague  feeling,  which  is  a  state  of  indifference 
in  which  subject  and  object  are  lost  in  each  other,  the  indi- 
vidual mind  rises  to  sensation  in  which  subject  and  object, 
i.e.  the  feeling-thing  and  that  which  stimulates  feeling  in 
the  thing,  are  separated,  and  the  object  reflexly  placed  out- 
side. There  is  now  repeated  in  the  individual  as  a  conscious- 
ness the  duality  which  already  constitutes  the  universe. 
What  follows  in  the  evolution  of  finite  mind  is  sufficiently 
indicated  in  the  preceding  book. 

Just  as  Sense  finds  the  a  posteriori  categories  in  mere 
reflex  sensation,  so  Reason  finds  all  a  priori  categories  in 
and  through  its  own  pure  activity  :  the  two  together  consti- 
tute the  universe  for  the  subject-self. 

Matter  can  have  no  reality  by  itself :  its  reality  is  Mind, 
the  sole  Substance.  And  yet  it  is  externality.  If  we  part 
from  this  Dualism,  we  are  driven  into  the  arms  of  Monism 
—  materialistic  or  spiritualistic.  The  rose  of  Monism  smells 
sweeter  under  the  latter  name ;  but  that  is  all.  If  All  is 
Mind,  then  the  dynamics  of  what  we  call  "  matter  "  and  the 
dynamics  of  cerebration  are  the  dynamics  of  Mind,  and  not 
merely  of  the  externalised  expression  or  vehicle  of  Mind ; 


268      Appendix  on  Philosophical  Questions. 

for  there  is  no  externalised  expression  —  no  matter.  If 
matter,  again,  is  Mind,  and  all  is  Matter,  then  this  is  simply 
to  say  that  Mind  is  matter.  There  is  nothing  to  choose 
between  the  two  positions. 

In  reply  to  the  dualistic  position  that  the  universal  object 
exists  so,  that  is  to  say,  as  beent  and  inreasoned  matter, 
because  we  necessarily  take  it  up  so  in  sense  and  reason,  it 
may  be  said  that  it  may  not  after  all  be  so.  To  which  the 
rejoinder  is,  How  else,  since  that  is  how  we  know  it?  We 
cannot  know  it  otherwise.  It  is  as  futile  to  suggest  that  it 
is  not  so  as  to  raise  the  question  whether  the  thing  I  call  a 
poker  be  not  truly  after  all  a  cat.  To  use  knowledge  as  a 
knife  to  cut  the  throat  of  knowledge  is  a  kind  of  suicide  by 
anticipation,  a  self-contradiction,  which  cannot  effect  itself. 
To  say  that  we  do  not  and  cannot  know  save  in  part,  is,  on 
the  other  hand,  tenable  and  true ;  but  this  does  not  affect 
the  validity  of  what  we  do  know.  But  we  must  make  sure 
that  this  last  is  in  very  truth  knowledge. 


D.  —  UNITY  OF  REASON. 

WHEN  the  conscious  subject  functions  Will  for  purposes 
of  knowledge  and  consequent  conduct,  it  asks  of  the  thing 
before  it,  and  of  all  things  in  their  relations,  what  they  pre- 
cisely are.  The  answer  must  ultimately  be  the  purified 
record  of  the  sensate  plus  the  satisfaction  of  the  dialectic 
form  of  the  reason-movement  in  its  specific  reference  to  that 
sensate.  It  is  this  end  towards  which  Will-reason  is  always 
striving;  and  to  accomplish  it,  it  has  to  take  successive 
steps.  It  stands  face  to  face  with  a  synthesis  given,  and  it 
has  to  understand  that  synthesis,  to  categorise  it :  and  then 
only  does  it  fulfil  its  purpose,  which  is  knowledge.  The 
rudimentary  act  of  Percipience  contains  in  itself  the  mode 
of  procedure,  for  it  is  a  separating  of  a  one  complex  from 
other  complexes,  and  synthesising  it  with  the  conscious 
subject.  This  process  of  taking  things,  and  then  the  ele- 
ments of  things,  apart,  and  then  synthesising  them,  thus 
converting  sense-synthesis  or  synopsis  into  rational  synthesis, 
is  always  going  on.  We  can  imagine  a  rational  being  so 
endowed  as  to  analyse  and  synthesise  in  a  single  flash  of 
intuition ;  but  if  it  did  so,  it  would  still  have  to  go  through 
the  necessary  steps  (with  whatever  celerity)  whereby  the 
rational  synthesis  was  attained.  These  steps  are  all  con- 
tained in  the  final  complex  act,  which  alone  is  true  knowing ; 
but  when  we  separate  this  final  complex  act  into  its  con- 
stituents, the  logical  order  of  these  steps  becomes  also  a 
time-order;  because  all  is  in  Time.  As  separated  we  call 
them  Attuition,  Discrimination,  Perception,  Comparison, 
Conception  of  the  individual,  General  Conception,  Reasoned 
or  Causal  ground;  and  these  movements,  with  their  auxiliary 

269 


270      Appendix  on  Philosophical   Questions. 

conditions  in  sense,  e.g.  Imagination,  Memory,  and  Associa- 
tion, constitute  the  substance  of  Rational  Psychology.  But 
the  various  steps  are  all  elements  in  or  moments  of  the  final 
complex  act  of  Reason  in  knowing :  Reason  or  the  rational 
act  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  One  in  many  moments. 

Xot  only  is  the  unity  of  Reason,  as  a  one  Will-movement 
in  many  moments  towards  an  end,  thus  vindicated,  but  it  is 
seen  that  the  idea  and  the  ideal  themselves  emerge  out  of 
reason  as  so  conceived.  What  we  have  to  render  an  account 
of  are  complexes,  and  finally  the  one  total  complex,  the  uni- 
verse of  things.  Will  being,  by  virtue  of  its  essential  nature 
a  free  activity,  is  for  ever  restless  and  for  ever  pushing  on, 
even  to  the  transcending  of  the  limits  of  Time  and  Space. 
It  is  the  total  individual  thing  which  it  has  to  explain  in  its 
whole  notion,  and  also  in  the  idea  within  the  notion,  this 
idea  being  the  true  differentiation  of  the  thing  —  at  once  its 
essence,  cause,  and  reA.os  relatively  to  itself.  It  thus  insists 
on  pushing  on  till  it  grasps  this  true  isness  of  the  thing,  to 
which,  however,  it  can  never  attain  even  in  a  physical  sense ; 
and  which,  if  attained,  would  still  leave  for  our  solution  the 
true  "  isness  "  of  that  ultimate  physical  "  isness."  This  true 
"isness  "  is  the  idea  and  the  "one  "  which  explains  the  parts. 
The  ideal,  again,  as  distinguished  from  the  idea,  is  of  the 
complex ;  it  is  the  perfected  complex :  and  it  is  Will,  as  a 
necessary  pursuer  of  ends,  which  makes  the  ideal  (no  less 
than  the  idea)  a  possible  fact  of  consciousness,  both  in  the 
sphere  of  knowledge,  of  ethics,  of  aesthetics,  and  of  educa- 
tion. 

It  would  be  out  of  place  to  prosecute  this  subject  further 
here.  All  I  wish  to  do  is  to  emphasise  the  unity  of  Reason 
and  the  Reason-movement  as  that  is  brought  to  light  by 
regarding  Will  as  root  of  reason  and  nerve  of  reason  from 
first  to  last ;  the  various  steps  in  the  process  which  psychology 
lays  bare  being  only  the  logical  moments  of  a  one  act,  though 
presenting  themselves  to  us  in  a  time-order,  because  we 
exist  in  Time. 

Further,  the  reason  act  is  not  only  a  one  act  in  several 


Unity  of  Reason.  271 

moments  according  to  a  certain  logical  order,  but  in  each 
separate  moment  the  whole  reason-/orm  is  present,  and  is 
repeating  itself.  In  Percipience  I  discriminate  and  isolate 
a,  and  synthesise  it  with  itself  in  consciousness ;  in  Concipi- 
ence  I  isolate  the  parts  in  the  conceived  thing,  and  synthe- 
sise them  as  a  one  thing  (in  many)  ;  in  the  general  concept 
I  isolate  like  characters  in  a  plurality  of  objects,  and  synthe- 
sise them  in  a  one  rational  thing  or  entity  ;  and  this  process 
is  also  the  process  of  inductive  reasoning  (many  in  one). 
In  deductive  reasoning,  again,  as  when  I  say,  "  That  beast 
is  ferocious ;  because  it  is  a  tiger ;  and  all  tigers  are  fero- 
cious," I  have  isolated  the  beast  before  me  from  other  objects, 
and  synthesised  it  with  the  general  concept  "tiger,"  and  all 
that  is  implicit  in  "  tiger."  In  affirming  the  cause  of  an 
effect,  I  isolate  particular  antecedent  and  sequent,  and  syu- 
thesise  them  in  a  causal  unity :  the  one  always  contains  the 
other.  The  simple  act  of  percipience  of  the  single,  with 
which  we  began,  becomes,  it  is  true,  more  complex  as  expe- 
rience presses  plurality  more  and  more  upon  me  and  demands 
rationalisation ;  but  that  is  all.  Thus  the  central  Will, 
whose  "end"  is  the  causal  rationalisation  of  all  experience 
as  an  ultimate  one  in  many  and  many  in  one,  behaves  itself 
always  in  the  same  way.  Each  step  is  rationally  grounded, 
from  the  dialectic  process  in  simple  percipience  upwards ; 
and  each  step  is  also  a  synthesis  or  judgment.  [Judgment 
and  thought-affirmation  are  the  same :  the  judgment-/or/n 
exists  only  when  articulated  into  subject  and  predicate : 
when  expressed  in  words  it  is  a  proposition.] 

Even  the  Attuit  in  the  animal  mind  is,  as  being  a  result- 
ant synopsis,  an  anticipation  of  judgment  —  a  judgment 
within  the  domain  of  Sensation  pure  and  simple,  which, 
with  the  advent  of  Reason,  is  transformed  into  a  synthesis. 

If  we  wish  to  generalise  in  one  word  the  way  or  form  of  the 
reason-movement,  it  is  to  be  called  the  Analytico-synthetic 
way  —  the  search  for  identity  in  difference.  The  ultimate 
result  is  that  Will-reason,  in  its  necessary  dialectic,  insists 


272      Appendix  on  Philosophical   Questions. 

on  grasping  the  cosmic  whole  of  identity  in  difference  as  a 
synthesis  of  Phenomenon  and  primal  perduring  One  Reason. 
As  a  system  of  Reason,  however,  the  world  is  outside, 
and  remote  from,  mere  feeling  in  the  individual  subject, 
even  in  its  highest  attuitional  form.  It  is  only  when  the 
conscious  or  feeling  subject  evolves  itself  as  Will  moving  as 
a  dialectic  process,  that  it  becomes  aware  of  the  universe  as  a 
reasoned  system.  That  reasoned  system,  or  system  of  rea- 
son, is  outside  there  all  the  while ;  but  until  7  have  reason, 
how  can  I  see  the  reason  in  it?  It  is  not  my  reason  that 
reveals  the  reason  of  the  universe  to  that  universe ;  the 
function  of  my  reason  is  to  make  explicit  the  reason  in  the 
universe  of  sensation  to  me,  a  self-conscious  subject.  Prior 
to  the  emergence  of  reason  in  Man,  the  universal  Reason  is 
there  in  things  and  in  man's  sensation  of  things.  The  man 
born  blind  cannot  see  light ;  the  conscious  subject  cannot 
see  Reason-universal  until  it  grows  within  itself  the  eye  of 
reason.  And  when  it  grows,  it  does  not  say,  "Light  is  there 
because  I  have  an  eye,"  but  rather,  "  I  having  an  eye  can 
now  see  the  light  which  all  the  while  was  there."  I  cannot, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  know  the  universe  except  as  a  reasoned 
system ;  the  seeming  chaos  of  sensation,  from  the  initial 
to  the  final  act  of  the  self-conscious  subject,  is  necessarily 
gripped  as  a  reasoned  world.  Finite  reason  itself  might  be 
briefly  denned  as  a  conscious  being  freely  moving  to  the 
reduction  of  all  to  itself  in  the  form  of  Causality ;  which  is 
the  Form  of  the  initial  act  of  Percipience  and  of  the  last  act 
of  completed  knowledge. 


THE  INSTITUTES  OF  EDUCATION: 

COMPRISING  A 

Rational  Introduction  to  Psychology. 

BY 
S.  S.  LAURIE,  LL.D.,  F.R.S.E., 

Professor  of  the  Institutes  and  History  of  Education,  University 

of  Edinburgh,  Author  of  "  Metaphysica  "  and 

"  Ethica,"  etc. 

i6mo.    $1.00. 


OTHER   WORKS    BY    DR.    LAURIE. 

OCCASIONAL  ADDRESSES  ON  EDUCATIONAL  SUB- 
JECTS. I2mo.  $1.25. 

CONTENTS. 

I.  The  Respective  Functions  in  Education  of  Primary, 

Secondary,  and  University  Schools. 
II.  Free  Schooling. 

III.  Professorships  and  Lectureships  on  Education. 

IV.  Organization  of  the  Curriculum  of  Secondary  Schools. 
V.  Method  Applied  to  the  Teaching  of  Geography. 

VI.  On  the  Religious  Education  of  the  Young. 
VII.  Liberal  Education  in  the  Primary  School. 
VIII.  Examinations:  Emulation  and  Competition. 
IX.  John  Milton. 
X.  Practical  Hints  on  Class  Management. 

LECTURES  ON  LANGUAGE  AND  THE  LINGUISTIC 
METHOD  IN  THE  SCHOOL.  Delivered  in  the  University 
of  Cambridge.  90  cents. 

Lectures  which  treat,  with  a  master's  hand,  of  language  as  the  supreme  in- 
strument in  education,  and  as  substance  of  thought;  of  method  and  discipline; 
of  the  grammar  of  the  vernacular;  of  the  manner  of  teaching  foreign  tongues., 
Latin  being  taken  as  the  type;  and  of  language  as  literature.  Professor  Laurie 
is  a  philosopher  of  acute  and  profound  mind,  and  these  lectures  are  very  far 
above  dull  disquisitions  on  their  subject.  They  are  philosophic,  animated,  and 
finished  expositions  of  principle  and  method  which  should  delight  and  profit  every 
true  teacher.  —  Literary  World. 


MACMILLAN   &   CO., 

112  FOURTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK. 


LECTURES  ON  TEACHING, 

DELIVERED    IN    THE    UNIVERSITY    OF    CAMBRIDGE, 

BY 

J.   Q.    FITCH,  M.A. 

WITH   AN    INTRODUCTORY  PREFACE  BY 

THOMAS  HUNTER,  Ph.D., 
President  of  the  Normal  College,  New  York. 

i6mo,  Cloth.     $1.00. 


From  the  New  England  Journal  of  Education. 

"  This  is  eminently  the  work  of  a  man  of  wisdom  and  expe- 
rience. He  takes  a  broad  and  comprehensive  view  of  the 
work  of  the  teacher,  and  his  suggestions  on  all  topics  are 
worthy  of  the  most  careful  consideration." 

From  the  Saturday  Review. 

"  The  lectures  will  be  found  most  interesting,  and  deserve 
to  be  carefully  studied,  not  only  by  persons  directly  concerned 
with  instruction,  but  by  parents  who  wish  to  be  able  to  exer- 
cise an  intelligent  judgment  in  the  choice  of  schools  and 
teachers  for  their  children.  For  ourselves,  we  could  almost 
wish  to  be  of  school  age  again,  to  learn  history  and  geography 
from  some  one  who  could  teach  them  after  the  pattern  set  by 
Mr.  Fitch  to  his  audience.  But  perhaps  Mr.  Fitch's  observa- 
tions on  the  general  conditions  of  school  work  are  even  more 
important  than  what  he  says  on  this  or  that  branch  of  study." 


MACMILLAN   &   CO., 

112  FOURTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK. 


2 


MACMILLAN  &  CO.'S 

WORKS  ON  TEACHING,  ETC. 


ACLAND  — Studies  in  Secondary  Education.     Edited  by 

ARTHUR  H.  D.  ACLAND,  M.P.,  Vice-President  of  the  Committee  of  the  Coun- 
cil on  Education.  With  an  Introduction  by  JAMES  BRYCE,  M.P.  $1.75. 

Interesting  and  suggestive  statistics,  both  of  public  and  private  schools,  are 
included ;  also  courses  of  study,  methods  of  grading  and  classification ;  the  needs 
and  defects  of  the  existing  system,  with  proposed  improvements;  and  much  other 
matter  that  will  give  the  reader  a  clear  idea  of  this  department  of  education  as 
developed  and  conducted  in  Great  Britain  up  to  the  present  time.  ...  Its  accu- 
racy and  authority  are  not  to  be  questioned.  —  Literary  World. 

ARNOLD— Higher  Schools  and  Universities  in  Germany. 

By  MATTHEW  ARNOLD,  D.C.L.,  LL.D.    $2.00. 
A    French    Eton ;     Or,  Middle-Class   Education  and  the 

State.  To  which  is  added  "  Schools  and  Universities  in  France,"  being  part 
of  a  Volume  on  Schools  and  Universities,  published  in  1868.  By  MATTHEW 
ARNOLD,  LL.D.  $1.75. 

Reports  on  Elementary  Schools,    1852=1882.     By 

MATTHEW  ARNOLD,  D.C.L.,  LL.D.,  one  of  Her  Majesty's  Inspectors  of 
Schools.  Edited  by  the  Right  Hon.  Sir  FRANCIS  SANDFORD,  K.C.B.  $1.50. 

No  one  who  is  making  an  historical  or  comparative  study  of  Education  can 
afford  to  neglect  these  valuable  reports  by  the  late  Matthew  Arnold,  on  schools 
of  all  grades  in  England  and  on  the  Continent. 

BLAKISTON  —  The  Teacher.     Hints    on   School    Man- 

agement.  A  Handbook  for  Managers,  Teachers'  Assistants,  and  Pupil 
Teachers.  By  J.  R.  BLAKISTON,  M.A.  (Recommended  by  the  London, 
Birmingham,  and  Leicester  School  Boards.)  i2mo.  75  cents. 

Into  a  comparatively  small  book  he  has  crowded  a  great  deal  of  exceedingly 
useful  and  sound  advice.  It  is  a  plain,  common-sense  book,  full  of  hints  to  the 
teacher  on  the  management  of  his  school  and  his  children.  —  School  Board 
Chronicle. 

CALDERWOOD  —  On  Teaching.     By  Prof.  HENRY  CALDER- 

WOOD.    New  edition.     i2mo.     50  cents. 

For  young  teachers  this  work  is  of  the  highest  value.  ...  It  is  a  book  every 
teacher  would  find  helpful  in  their  responsible  work.  —  New  England  Journal 
of  Education. 

Here  is  a  book  which  combines  merits  of  the  highest  (and  alas!  the  rarest) 
order.  .  .  .  We  have  rarely  met  with  anything  on  the  subject  of  teaching  which 
seems  to  us  to  appeal  so  directly,  both  to  the  teacher's  head  and  heart,  and  give 
him  so  clear  an  insight  into  the  true  nature  of  his  calling.  — Monthly  Journal 
of  Education. 

COLBECK  —  Lectures  on  the  Teaching  of  Modern  Lan- 
guages. Delivered  in  the  University  of  Cambridge.  By  C.  COLBECK,  M.A. , 
Assistant  Master  of  Harrow  School.  i6mo.  50  cents. 


COLLINS  — The   Study   of  English   Literature   at   the 

Universities.    By  J.  CHURTON  COLLINS,  M.A.    $1.00. 

This  book  with  its  description  of  the  conditions  under  which  English  Litera- 
ture is  studied  at  the  Universities  of  Oxford  and  Cambridge,  was  made  the  text 
for  very  interesting  reviews,  discussing  its  central  question  of  "Can  English 
Literature  be  taught  ?  "  by  Andrew  Lang  in  the  Illustrated  London  News  and 
Prof.  Brander  Matthews,  of  Columbia  College,  in  the  Educational  Review. 
The  reviewers,  it  may  be  added,  reached  opposite  conclusions. 

The  author's  outline  of  a  course  for  a  true  School  of  Literature  in  a  Univer- 
sity, with  hints  at  methods,  will  interest  all  teachers  in  this  department.  —  Post 
Graduate  Quarterly. 

COMBE  —  Education :   Its  Principles  and  Practice,  as 

developed  by  GEORGE  COMBE,  Author  of  "  The  Constitution  of  Man." 
Collated  and  Edited  by  JULIUS  JOLLY.  8vo.  $5.00. 

COMENIUS,  John  Amos,  Bishop  of  the  Moravians.    His 

Life  and  Educational  Works,  by  S.  S.  LAURIE,  M.A.,  F.R.S.E.,  Professor 

of  the  Institutes  and  History  of  Education  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh. 

Second  edition,  revised.     $1.00. 

The  papers  by  Mr.  Laurie  ...  go  at  some  length  into  the  permanent  ser- 
vices rendered  to  education  by  Comenius  which  may  perhaps  be  summarized  thus: 
he  insisted  that  education  is  a  natural,  not  an  artificial  process ;  .  .  .  that  the 
mother-tongue  must  be  brought  into  the  schools  as  a  subject  of  instruction;  .  .  . 
that  sense-training  is  fundamental;  that  geography  and  history  should  be  made 
school  subjects;  that  young  children  should  be  given  a  special  training,  anticipat- 
ing much  of  Froebel's  Kindergarten  system;  that  knowledge  must  t>e  fitted  to 
action,  and  education  adapted  to  life;  and  finally,  that  education  is  for  all,  and 
not  for  a  limited  number  or  a  favored  class.  In  our  day  these  positions  are 
commonplaces.  But  such  is  their  value,  that  we  do  well  to  pause  to  honor  the 
memory  of  him  who  first  made  them  so.  —  Educational  Review. 

CRAIK  —  The  State  in  its  Relation  to  Education.    By 

HENRY  CRAIK,  M.A.,  LL.D.    English  Citizen  Series.    $1.00. 

FARRAR  and  POOLE  —  General  Aims  of  the  Teacher. 

Lectures  delivered  in  the  University  of  Cambridge  by  Archdeacon  FARRAR, 
D.D.,  and  R.  B.  POOLE,  B.D.,  Head  Master  of  Bedford  Modern  School: 
i6mo.  40  cents. 

FEARON  —  School  Inspection.    By  D.  A.  FEARON,  Assistant 

Commissioner  of  Endowed  Schools.     Third  edition.     75  cents. 

FITCH  —  Lectures  on  Teaching.     Delivered  in  the  University 

of  Cambridge,  by  J.  G.  FITCH,  M.A.,  Inspector  of  Schools.    With  a  Preface 

by  THOMAS  HUNTER,  Ph.D.,  of  the  Normal  College,  New  York.    $1.00. 

Mr.  Fitch's  book  covers  so  wide  a  field,  and  touches  on  so  many  burning 

questions,  that  we  must  be  content  to  recommend  it  as  the  best  existing  vade 

mecum  for  the  teacher.     He  is  always  sensible,  always  judicious,  never  wanting 

in  tact;  ...  he  brings  to  his  work  the  ripe  experience  of  a  well-stored  mind,  and 

he  possesses  in  a  remarkable  degree  the  art  of  exposition.  —  Pall  Mall  Gazette. 

—  Notes  on  American  Schools  and  Training  Colleges. 

By  J.  G.  FITCH,  M.A.,  Assistant  Commissioner  to  the  late  Endowed  Schools 

Commission.     i6mo.     60  cents. 

Mr.  Fitch  is  a  wise  and  enthusiastic  student  of  pedagogy,  the  author  of  some 
specially  excellent  Lectures  on  Teaching  delivered  in  the  University  of  Cam- 
bridge, and  a  rarely  good  observer  of  new  facts.  .  .  .  The  book  is  a  treasure  of 
clever  description,  shrewd  comment,  and  instructive  comparison  of  the  English 
system  and  our  own.  —  Churchman, 


GEIKIE —  The  Teaching  of  Geography.     By  ARCHIBALD 

GEIKIE,  F.R.S.,  LL.D.,  Director  General  of  the  Geological  Surveys  of  the 
United  Kingdom.  i6mo.  60  cents. 

Among  the  best  possible  books  to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  teacher.  —  Chi- 
cago [nter-Ocean. 

A  capital  little  book  .  .  .  original,  fresh,  and,  we  need  not  add,  well  worth 
close  attention.  —  Independent. 

These  suggestions  as  to  principles  and  methods  of  teaching,  made  by  one  of 
the  foremost  scholars  of  the  day  in  his  especial  department,  will  be  of  the  great- 
est assistance  to  teachers  in  awakening  an  interest  r.mong  their  pupils  in  this 
most  important  branch  of  knowledge.  We  commend  it  most  heartily.  —  Church- 
man. 

LAURIE  —  Occasional  Addresses  on  Educational  Sub- 
jects. By  S.  S.  LAURIE,  M.A.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  the  Institutes  and  His- 
tory of  Education  in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  $1.25. 

Lectures  on  Language  and  the  Linguistic  Method 

in  School.  Delivered  in  the  University  of  Cambridge  by  S.  S.  LAURIE, 
M.A.,  LL.D.,  Professor  of  the  Institutes  and  History  of  Education  in  the 
University  of  Edinburgh,  go  cents. 

Lectures  which  treat,  with  a  master's  hand,  of  language  as  the  supreme  in- 
strument in  education,  and  as  substance  of  thought;  of  method  and  discipline; 
of  the  grammar  of  the  vernacular;  of  the  manner  of  teaching  foreign  tongues, 
Latin  being  taken  as  the  type;  and  of  language  as  literature.  Professor  Laurie 
is  a  philosopher  of  acute  and  profound  mind,  and  these  lectures  are  very  far 
above  dull  disquisitions  on  their  subject.  They  are  philosophic,  animated,  and 
finished  expositions  of  principle  and  method  which  should  delight  and  profit 
every  true  teacher.  —  Literary  World. 

The   Institutes    of    Education  ;    Comprising   a   Rational 

Introduction  to  Psychology.  By  Dr.  S.  S.  LAURIE,  M.A.,  F.R.S.E.,  Pro- 
fessor in  the  University  of  Edinburgh.  $1.00. 

LOCKE— Some    Thoughts    concerning    Education.     By 

JOHN  LOCKE.  With  Introduction  and  Notes  by  the  Rev.  R.  H.  QUICK, 
Si.  A.  90  cents. 

The  work  before  us  leaves  nothing  to  be  desired.  It  is  of  convenient  form 
and  reasonable  price,  accurately  printed,  and  accompanied  by  notes  which  are 
admirable.  There  is  no  teacher  too  young  to  find  this  book  interesting;  there  is 
no  teacher  too  old  to  find  it  profitable.  —  School  Bulletin. 

—  On  the  Conduct  of  the  Human  Understanding.    By 

JOHN  LOCKE.  Edited  with  Introduction  and  Notes,  by  T.  FOWLER,  M.A. 
i6mo.  50  cents. 

I  cannot  think  any  parent  or  instructor  justified  in  neglecting  to  put  this  lit- 
tle treatise  in  the  hands  of  a  boy  about  the  time  when  the  reasoning  powers 
become  developed.  — Hallam. 

HILTON  — Tractate  on  Education.    A  facsimile  reprint  from 

the  Edition  of  1673.  Edited,  with  Introduction  and  Notes,  bv  OSCAR  BROWN- 
ING, M.A.  50  cents. 

A  separate  reprint  of  Milton's  famous  letter  to  Master  Samuel  Hartlib  was  a 
desideratum,  and  we  are  grateful  to  Mr.  Browning  for  his  elegant  and  scholarly 
edition,  to  which  is  prefixed  the  careful  resume  of  the  work  given  in  his  "  His- 
tory of  Educational  Theories." —  Journal  i>f  Education. 


ROBERTS  —  Eighteen  Years  of  University  Extension. 

By  R.  D.  ROBERTS,  M.A.,  D.Sc.,  Organizing  Secretary  for  Lectures  to  the 
Local  Examinations  and  Lectures  Syndicate.  With  Map.  35  cents. 

THREE  LECTURES  on  the  Practice  of  Education.  De- 

livered  in  the  University  of  Cambridge.     50  cents. 

Contents  :   I.  On  Marking,  by  H.  W.  EVE,  M.A. 
II.  On  Stimulus,  by  A.  SIDGWICK,  M.A. 
III.  On  the  Teaching  of  Latin  Verse  Composition, 
by  E.  A.  ABBOTT,  D.D. 

Like  one  of  Bacon's  Essays,  it  handles  those  things  in  which  the  writer's  life 
is  most  conversant,  and  it  will  come  home  to  men.  Like  Bacon's  Essays,  too,  it 
is  full  of  apothegms.  —  Journal  of  Education. 

THRINQ— Theory   and    Practice   of  Teaching.      By  the 

Rev.  EDWARD  THRING,  M.A.     i6mo.     $1.00. 

We  hope  we  have  said  enough  to  induce  teachers  in  America  to  read  Mr. 
Thring's  book.  They  will  find  it  a  mine  in  which  they  will  never  dig  without 
some  substantial  return,  either  in  high  inspiration  or  sound  practical  advice. 
Many  of  the  hints  and  illustrations  given  are  of  the  greatest  value  for  the  ordi- 
nary routine  work  of  the  class-room.  Still  more  helpful  will  the  book  be  found 
in  the  weapons  which  it  furnishes  to  the  schoolmaster  wherewith  to  guard  against 
his  greatest  danger,  slavery  to  routine.  —  Nation. 

Education    and    School.     By  the  same  author.     Second 

edition,     izmo.     $1.75. 

WARNER  —  Lectures   on   the  Growth  and   Means   of 

Training  the  Mental  Faculty.  By  FRANCIS  WARNER,  M.D.,  Physician  to 
the  London  Hospital,  Lecturer  of  the  London  Hospital  College,  and  formerly 
Professor  in  the  Royal  College  of  Surgeons  of  England.  i6mo.  90  cents. 

A  valuable  little  treatise  on  the  physiological  signs  of  mental  life  in  children, 
and  on  the  right  way  to  observe  these  signs  and  classify  pupils  accordingly.  .  .  . 
The  book  has  great  originality,  and  though  somewhat  clumsily  put  together,  it 
should  be  very  helpful  to  the  teacher  on  a  side  of  his  work  much  neglected  by  the 
ordinary  treatises  on  pedagogy.  —  Literary  World. 

The  eminence  and  experience  of  the  author,  and  the  years  of  careful  study 
he  has  devoted  to  this  and  kindred  subjects,  are  a  sufficient  guarantee  for  the 
value  of  the  book;  but  those  who  are  fortunate  enough  to  examine  it  will  find 
their  expectations  more  than  fulfilled.  ...  A  great  deal  may  be  learned  from 
these  lectures,  and  we  strongly  commend  them  to  our  readers.  —  Canada  Edu- 
cational Journal. 

It  is  original,  thorough,  systematic,  and  wonderfully  suggestive.  Every 
superintendent  should  study  this  book.  Few  works  have  appeared  lately  which 
treat  the  subject  under  consideration  with  such  originality,  vigor,  or  good  sense. 
—  Education. 


MACMILLAN   &    CO., 

112  FOURTH  AVENUE,  NEW  YORK. 


Longer  English  Poems. 

WITH     NOTES,     PHILOLOGICAL    AND     EXPLANATORY,     AND     AN 
INTRODUCTION   ON    THE  TEACHING   OF   ENGLISH. 

Edited  by  J.  W.  HALES,  M.A., 

Late  Lecturer  on  English  Literature  in  King's  College  School,  London, 
i6mo.    $1.10. 

The  notes  are  very  full  and  good,  and  the  book,  edited  by  one  of  our  most  cul- 
tivated English  scholars,  is  probably  the  best  volume  of  selections  ever  made  for  the 
use  of  English  schools.  —  PROFESSOR  MORLEY. 

The  poems  quoted  range  from  Spenser's  Prothalamion  to  Shelley's  Adonais,  fol- 
lowing a  chronological  order,  and  the  Notes  supply  a  brief  sketch  of  the  life  and 
work  of  each  Author  from  whom  citation  is  made. 


A    HISTORY   OF 

Elizabethan  Literature. 

By  GEORGE  SAINTSBURY. 
lamo,  Cabinet  Edition,  $1.75.  Student's  Edition,  $1.00. 

Mr.  Saintsbury  has  produced  a  most  useful,  first-hand  survey  —  comprehensive, 
compendious,  and  spirited  —  of  that  unique  period  of  literary  history  when  "  all  the 
muses  still  were  in  their  prime."  One  knows  not  where  else  to  look  for  so  well-pro- 
portioned and  well-ordered  conspectus  of  the  astonishingly  varied  and  rich  products 
of  the  teeming  English  mind  during  the  century  that  begins  with  Tottel's  Miscellany 
and  the  birth  of  Bacon,  and  closes  with  the  Restoration.  —  M.  B.  ANDERSON,  in  The 
Dial.  

A   HISTORY    OF 

Eighteenth  Century  Literature. 

(1660-1780.) 
By  EDMUND  GOSSE,  M.A., 

Clark  Lecturer  in  English  Literature  at  Trinity  College,  Cambridge. 
i2mo,  Cabinet  Edition,  $1.75.    Student's  Edition,  $1.00. 

Mr.  Gosse's  book  is  one  for  the  student  because  of  its  fulness,  its  trustworthiness, 
and  its  thorough  soundness  of  criticisms;  and  one  for  the  general  reader  because  of 
its  pleasantness  and  interest.  It  is  a  book,  indeed,  not  easy  to  put  down  or  to 
part  with.  —  OSWAULD  CRAWFORD,  in  London  Academy. 

Mr.  Gosse  has  in  a  sense  preempted  the  eighteenth  century.  He  is  the  most 
obvious  person  to  write  the  history  of  its  literature,  and  this  attractive  volume  ought 
to  be  the  final  and  standard  work  on  his  chosen  theme. — The  Literary  World. 


MACMILLAN  &   CO., 

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BOOKS    SUITABLE    FOB    SUPPLEMENTARY 
BEADING. 

The  publishers  expect  to  include  in  this  School  Library  only  such 
of  their  books  for  the  young  as  have  already  by  their  popularity  and 
recognized  excellence  acquired  the  right  to  rank  as  standard  reading 
books. 

CHURCH  — The  Story  of  the  Iliad.  By  the  Rev.  Prof.  ALFRED 
J.  CHURCH.  50  cents. 

No  writer  has  succeeded  in  outrivalling  Rev.  A.  J.  Church  in  his 
stories  of  ancient  Greek  history  and  mythology.  He  has  the  faculty  of 
weaving  into  a  delightful  romance  the  hard  facts  of  history,  or  in  put- 
ting into  narrative  form  the  significant  incidents  of  the  Homeric  poems. 
Mr.  Church's  style  is  clear,  distinct,  and  to  the  point.  —  Boston  Herald. 

YONQE  —  A  Book  of  Qolden  Deeds  of  All  Times  and  All 
Lands,  Gathered  and  Narrated  by  the  Author  of  "The  Heir  of 
Redclyffe."  By  CHARLOTTE  M.  YONGE. 

"  Surely  it  must  be  a  wholesome  contemplation,"  the  author  re- 
marks, "  to  look  on  actions  the  very  essence  of  which  is  such  entire 
absorption  in  others  that  self  is  not  so  much  renounced  as  forgotten; 
the  object  of  which  is  not  to  win  promotion,  wealth,  or  success,  but 
simple  duty,  mercy,  and  loving-kindness." 

KINQSLEY  — Madam  How  and  Lady  Why.  First  Lessons 
in  Earth  Lore  for  Children.  By  the  Rev.  CHARLES  KINGSLEY, 
author  of  "  Greek  Heroes,"  "  Water  Babies,"  etc. 

PALQRAVE  — The  Children's  Treasury  of  English  Song. 

Selected   and   arranged,  with   Notes,  by  FRANCIS  TURNER  PAL- 
GRAVE,  Editor  of  the  Golden  Treasury. 

OTHER  VOLUMES  TO  FOLLOW. 


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